1. Keeper liability is not established because the Notice to Keeper (NtK) does not comply with PoFA Schedule 4 paragraph 9(2)(a).
PoFA 9(2)(a) requires an NtK to “specify… the period of parking to which the notice relates”. This NtK does not specify any period of parking and does not even use those words. The operator has not identified any wording on the NtK that states a “period of parking”. Instead, they rely on later CCTV stills and assert “over 8 minutes”. That is not what the statute requires.
PoFA is a strict, conditions-based mechanism. If an operator wants to transfer liability from an unknown driver to a keeper, the NtK itself MUST contain the mandatory information. Evidence produced later cannot retrospectively make a defective NtK PoFA compliant. The notice must be compliant on its face. It is not. Therefore, no keeper liability can arise.
2. CCTV stills and an asserted “8 minutes” do not satisfy PoFA 9(2)(a).
The operator says CCTV stills show the vehicle at the location for about 8 minutes. Even if POPLA accepts those timestamps, that does not address the failure in the NtK: PoFA 9(2)(a) requires the NtK itself to specify the period of parking to which it relates.
A period of parking MUST be specified as a period, not left to inference. A “period” means a stated duration or a stated start/end period set out in the NtK itself. Two images with times are not the NtK specifying a period of parking; at best they are raw data from which someone might infer something. PoFA does not say “provide information from which a period might be inferred”. It says the NtK MUST specify the period.
There is also no legal requirement to include photos on an NtK. Here, the images are small and the timestamps are tiny and not reliably legible on the NtK. A statutory requirement cannot be satisfied by expecting a recipient (or POPLA) to magnify tiny images, guess at numbers, or construct an alleged period from photographs.
Accordingly, whether the operator relies on the NtK images or later CCTV stills in the evidence pack, that cannot cure the absence of a specified period of parking on the NtK. Since the NtK does not specify the period of parking as required by PoFA 9(2)(a), keeper liability cannot arise and the appeal must be allowed.
3. The operator’s “liability has been established because the keeper confirmed keeper status” statement is a clear legal error.
The evidence pack states, in effect, “the keeper confirmed they were the keeper, therefore liability has been established”. That is wrong. Keeper status is not liability. Keeper liability only arises if the operator fully complies with all statutory conditions. POPLA should give no weight to any conclusion of “keeper liability established” that is based on that error.
4. Their Notice of Rejection is generic assertion and does not evidence contract formation.
They simply assert: there was an offer brought to attention by signage, the driver had an opportunity to read it, and it is the motorist’s duty to “seek out, read and comply” with terms. That is advocacy, not evidence. It does not evidence any entrance sign; it does not show where the alleged offer was displayed on approach; it does not show that signs were in “prominent positions”; and it does not explain how a contract is formed for an area they label as “no parking / no waiting / no obstruction”.
5. Consideration is not evidenced for a “no parking area” allegation, and their own sign wording is prohibitive.
The operator’s quoted sign terms are prohibitions: “No parking on roads and footpaths”, “No waiting”, “No loading/unloading”, “No parking on yellow lines”, etc., with a threatened charge if a motorist fails to comply. For a contract there must be an offer capable of acceptance and consideration (permission/benefit granted in exchange for compliance/payment). For a location that is expressly prohibited (“no parking”), there is no offer of parking to accept in that prohibited area and no consideration/permission granted for that location. The operator cannot logically argue both:
(1) “parking for any amount of time is not allowed here”; and
(2) “a contract was offered and accepted to park here”.
A prohibition backed by a demand for £100 is not an “offer” to park in a prohibited area. The Notice of Rejection does not address this contradiction, and it does not explain what consideration the driver supposedly received for parking where parking is said to be forbidden.
6. They have not evidenced any entrance signage, despite claiming the terms were brought to attention on entry.
They state “signage displayed at the entrance… and throughout”. Yet the pack does not evidence an entrance sign in situ in any way that shows a driver would see it on entry on the material date. Close-up “sample” photos of a terms sign are not proof of entrance notice. If they rely on a claimed duty to “seek out” terms, they must first prove the driver was alerted on entry that the land is private, that contractual terms apply, and that further terms signage must be located and read. They have not.
7. Their signage evidence does not demonstrate that the driver was put on notice on entry, nor that any terms signage was sufficiently prominent to be found and then read.
The operator’s “seek out the terms” argument presupposes entry-point notice. Without an entrance sign, a driver would have no reason to know they must actively search for any sign at all, still less that stopping in the area shown would purportedly trigger a £100 charge.
In the absence of any evidenced entrance signage, the operator must at least prove that the on-site terms signage was sufficiently prominent to be readily seen and recognised as a terms sign from the area where the vehicle is shown, so that a driver would know to go and read it. They have not done so.
Their contravention photos show the vehicle partially on a yellow-lined pedestrian pathway with a sign far away in the background; the terms are unreadable in the context shots. The operator then relies on close-up photos (apparently from other dates) to show the wording. Close-up photos prove only that a sign exists when photographed up close; they do not prove that a motorist would have noticed it in real conditions, from the route of entry and from the area where the vehicle is shown.
Further, the only sign they appear to rely upon is mounted on a bike shed at the back of the area, not on a freestanding pole, and their own close-up shows it positioned alongside other worn/competing signage. That reduces prominence and makes it less likely to stand out as the key contractual notice. The operator has not provided driver-eye photos showing how a motorist would be alerted to the need to find and read that sign, nor evidence it was the nearest/most prominent sign relative to the vehicle position.
8. Their “opportunity to read due to duration” argument is circular.
They argue the motorist had opportunity to read the terms because of “the duration of parking” and “proximity of signboards”. That is an assumption, not evidence. Time on site does not prove the driver saw, read, or accepted the terms, particularly where no entrance sign is evidenced and the alleged terms sign is distant and not shown to stand out.
9. Multiple vehicles parked similarly supports lack of adequate notice, not the operator’s case.
The operator’s own plan/photographs show multiple vehicles parking on the same pathways/areas. That is consistent with drivers not being given clear, prominent notice of any alleged “no parking” terms. If the location were clearly and prominently signed, it is unlikely that multiple motorists would independently choose to park in the same “prohibited” place.
10. Standing/landowner authority: POPLA must not infer authority from the mere presence of signs or the operator’s say-so.
The operator has not produced verifiable evidence of landowner authority meeting the mandatory requirements set out in PPSCoP section 14.1 (a–j). What they provide is essentially an operator-produced “permission” document / redacted site agreement, which is not adequate proof of standing.
POPLA must not assume “they must have permission because the signs are there” or “no reasonable landowner would allow it otherwise”. That is speculation and reverses the burden of proof. Signs can remain after expiry/termination; signs can be installed by agents/contractors with limited powers; authority can be limited to parts of a site; or authority can be held by a different entity. None of those issues is resolved by the mere existence of signage. The operator must prove contemporaneous, site-specific authority with a dated, signed, verifiable agreement/confirmation that evidences compliance with the Code’s mandatory requirements.
11. Net result: the operator’s pack does not rebut the appeal.
It does not show PoFA compliance because the NtK does not specify the period of parking (PoFA 9(2)(a)) and later CCTV stills cannot cure that defect. It does not evidence a contract because it does not evidence an entrance sign, does not show prominence/findability of the alleged terms sign, and relies on prohibitive wording without explaining what offer and consideration supposedly created a contract in a prohibited area. It does not properly evidence standing under PPSCoP section 14 and POPLA must not fill that evidential gap by making assumptions. The appeal should be allowed and the charge cancelled.
Keeper rebuttal of CUP Enforcement evidence pack (PCN 114634, Trade City Romford)
1. Keeper liability is not established because the Notice to Keeper does not comply with PoFA Schedule 4 paragraph 9(2)(a).
PoFA 9(2)(a) requires the Notice to Keeper to “specify… the period of parking to which the notice relates”. The Notice to Keeper in this case does not specify any period of parking and does not even use those words. The operator has not identified any wording on the Notice to Keeper that states a "PERIOD OF PARKING". Instead, they rely on later evidence (CCTV stills) and assert “over 8 minutes”. That is not what the statute requires.
PoFA is a strict conditions-based mechanism. If an operator wants to transfer liability from an unknown driver to a keeper, the Notice to Keeper itself MUST contain the mandatory information. Evidence produced later cannot retrospectively make a defective Notice to Keeper PoFA compliant. The legal notice must be compliant on its face. It isn’t. Therefore, no keeper liability can arise.
2. The operator’s reliance on CCTV stills and an asserted “8 minutes” does not cure the defective Notice to Keeper, and POPLA must not treat tiny/illegible photographs as satisfying 9(2)(a).
The operator says they have CCTV stills showing the vehicle at the location for 8 minutes. Even if POPLA accepts those timestamps, this does not address the failure in the Notice to Keeper: PoFA 9(2)(a) requires the notice itself to “specify the period of parking to which the notice relates”.
In anticipation of a POPLA argument: “the Notice to Keeper includes two CCTV stills with timestamps, therefore it specifies the period”. That is wrong for two separate reasons:
(a) A period of parking MUST be specified as a period, not left to inference.
A “period” means a stated duration or a stated start/end period of parking set out in the body text of the Notice to Keeper. Two images with times (even if readable) are not a specified period of parking. At best they are raw data from which someone might try to infer something. PoFA does not say “provide information from which a period might be inferred”. It says the Notice “MUST specify… the period of parking”.
(b) The timestamps are not part of the mandatory statutory wording and are illegible on the Notice to Keeper.
There is no legal requirement to include photographs on a Notice to Keeper at all. The operator chose to include small images, but the timestamps are tiny and not reliably legible on the Notice itself. A statutory requirement cannot be satisfied by expecting a recipient (or POPLA) to magnify tiny images, guess at the numbers, or infer a duration.
Accordingly, even if two timed CCTV stills appear on the Notice to Keeper, they do not satisfy PoFA 9(2)(a). The Notice must specify the period of parking in the notice itself. It does not. Later evidence cannot repair that statutory defect.
3. The operator’s “liability has been established because the keeper confirmed keeper status” statement is a clear legal error.
The evidence pack states, in effect, “the keeper confirmed they were the keeper, therefore liability has been established”. That is wrong. Keeper status is not liability. Keeper liability ONLY arises if the operator FULLY complies with ALL statutory conditions. POPLA should give no weight to any conclusion of “keeper liability established” that is based on that error.
4. Their Notice of Rejection is generic assertion and does not evidence contract formation.
The operator’s Notice of Rejection says (paraphrased) “there was an offer brought to attention via signage; the driver had opportunity to read; it is the motorist’s duty to seek out signs; by parking they accept the consequences; terms were undoubtedly displayed”. That is advocacy, not evidence.
It does not evidence:
(a) where the alleged offer was displayed on approach to the site (they do not even evidence an entrance sign)
(b) that terms were readable from a driver’s viewpoint before stopping/parking where the vehicle is shown
(c) that signage was in “prominent positions” as they claim
(d) how a contract is formed for an area they label as “no parking” / “no waiting” / “no obstruction”.
5. Consideration is not evidenced for a “no parking area” allegation, and their own sign wording is only prohibitive.
The operator’s sign wording (as they quote it) is only prohibitions: “No parking on roads and footpaths”, “No waiting”, “No loading/unloading”, “No parking on yellow lines”, etc., with a threatened charge if a motorist fails to comply.
For a contract, there must be an OFFER capable of ACCEPTANCE and CONSIDERATION (permission/benefit granted in exchange for compliance/payment). For a location that is expressly prohibited (“no parking”), there is no offer of parking to accept in that prohibited area. The operator cannot logically argue both:
(1) “parking for any amount of time is not allowed here” and
(2) “a contract was offered and accepted to park here”.
If their position is that stopping/parking on the roadway/footpath/yellow line is forbidden, then the sign is not offering parking in those areas. It is warning drivers not to do it. A prohibition backed by a demand is not an offer of parking at that place. The Notice of Rejection does not address this contradiction at all, and it does not explain what consideration the driver allegedly received for parking in a prohibited area.
6. They have not evidenced any entrance signage, despite claiming that the terms were brought to attention on entry.
They state “signage displayed at the entrance… and throughout”. Yet the pack does not evidence an entrance sign in situ in any way that shows a driver would see it on entry. Close-up “sample” photos of a terms and conditions sign are not the same thing as proving an entrance sign existed, was positioned correctly, and was readable at the material time from a driver’s approach. If the offer is allegedly made on arrival, entrance signage is fundamental evidence. It is missing.
7. Their signage evidence does not demonstrate that the driver was put on notice on entry, nor that any terms signage was sufficiently prominent to be noticed and then read.
The operator asserts that the driver had a duty “upon arrival” to “seek out, read and comply” with terms. That presupposes that the driver was first placed on clear notice at the point of entry that this is private land subject to contractual terms and that further terms signs exist which must be located and read. The operator has not evidenced any entrance sign at all. Without an entrance sign, a driver would have no reason to know that they must actively search for other signs within the site, still less that stopping in the area shown would purportedly trigger a £100 charge.
In the absence of any evidenced entrance signage, the operator must at least prove that the on-site terms signage was sufficiently prominent to be readily seen and recognised as a terms sign from the place where the vehicle is shown, so that a driver would know to go and read it. They have not done so.
Their “contravention” photos show the vehicle partially on a yellow-lined pedestrian pathway with a sign in the far background. The sign is not prominent in the context images and the terms are not readable from those shots. The operator then relies on close-up “sample signage” photos (apparently from other dates) to show the wording. Close-up photos prove only that a sign exists somewhere when photographed up close; they do not prove that a driver would have noticed it in real conditions, from the route of entry and from the area where the vehicle is shown.
Further, the only sign they appear to rely upon is mounted on a bike shed at the back of the area, not on a freestanding pole, and their own close-up shows it positioned alongside other worn/competing signage. That dilutes prominence and makes it less likely to stand out as the key contractual notice. The operator has not provided driver-eye photos showing how a motorist would be alerted to the need to find and read that particular sign, nor any evidence that it was the nearest or most prominent sign in relation to the vehicle’s position.
Accordingly, the operator has not shown (i) any entry-point notification that contractual terms applied and must be sought, or (ii) that the alleged terms signage was prominent enough to be found and read by a motorist at the material time.
8. Their “opportunity to read due to duration” argument is circular and assumes what they must prove.
They argue the motorist had opportunity to read the terms because of “the duration of parking” and “proximity of signboards”. That is not evidence of communication of terms; it is an assumption.
If there is no evidenced entrance sign and the only sign they rely on is at the back of the car park, then “time on site” does not prove the driver ever saw, read, or accepted anything. POPLA should require evidence that terms were reasonably brought to attention, not accept a circular argument that “because they were there for X minutes, they must have read it”.
9. “Multiple vehicles parked similarly” supports lack of adequate notice, not the operator’s case.
The operator’s own plan/photographs show multiple vehicles parking on the same pathways/areas. That is consistent with drivers not being given clear, prominent notice of any alleged “no parking” contractual terms. If the location were clearly and prominently signed, it is unlikely that multiple motorists would independently choose to park in the same “prohibited” place.
This reinforces the appeal point: signage is not prominent and is not doing what the operator claims it does.
10. Standing/landowner authority: POPLA must not infer authority from the mere presence of signs or the operator’s say-so.
The operator has not produced proper evidence of landowner authority meeting the mandatory requirements set out in PPSCoP section 14.1 (a–j). What they provide is essentially an operator-produced “permission” document / redacted site agreement. That is not adequate proof of standing.
It is not open to POPLA to assume “they must have permission because the signs are there” or “no reasonable landowner would allow it otherwise”. That is speculation and it reverses the burden of proof. The burden is on the operator to prove authority, not on an appellant to disprove it.
There are many real-world reasons why signage might be present even where authority is absent or deficient, including:
(a) authority expired or was terminated but signs remain in place
(b) authority is limited to certain bays/areas but the operator is ticketing outside that scope
(c) authority is held by a different entity than the one pursuing the charge
(d) a managing agent or contractor installed signs without the landowner’s informed consent or without a compliant written confirmation
(e) authority exists in some form, but not in the form required by the Code (missing mandatory items).
Because the operator relies on its alleged standing to issue and pursue charges, POPLA should require the operator to actually prove it with a contemporaneous, verifiable, dated, signed agreement and supporting confirmation that covers all mandatory elements. If they do not, POPLA cannot be satisfied they have standing for this site and this specific area.
11. Net result: the operator’s pack does not rebut the appeal.
It does not show PoFA compliance because the Notice to Keeper does not specify the period of parking (PoFA 9(2)(a)), and later CCTV stills cannot cure that defect. It does not evidence a contract because it does not evidence an entrance sign, does not evidence prominence/readability from the driver’s position, and relies on prohibitive “no parking” wording without explaining what offer and consideration supposedly created a contract in a prohibited area. It does not properly evidence landowner authority meeting the mandatory PPSCoP requirements and POPLA must not fill that evidential gap by making assumptions.
For those reasons, the appeal should be allowed and the charge cancelled.
POPLA Appeal – CUP Enforcement – Trade City Romford
I am the registered keeper of the vehicle. I appeal this Parking Charge Notice as keeper only. There will be no admission as to the identity of the driver, and no assumptions or inferences can be drawn. The operator has failed to comply with the mandatory requirements of Schedule 4 of the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 (“PoFA”), so no keeper liability can arise.
1. Failure to specify the period of parking (PoFA Paragraph 9(2)(a))
PoFA requires the Notice to Keeper (NtK) to:
“specify the vehicle, the relevant land on which it was parked and the period of parking to which the notice relates.”
This NtK contains no period of parking. It merely states that a parking charge was issued for “failed to make a valid payment” and refers to a date of issue.
Even if CUP Enforcement rely on ANPR or timestamped photos, entry/exit or snapshot times are not the same as “a period of parking”. They do not show when (or for how long) the vehicle was actually stationary. Persuasive decisions such as Brennan v Premier Parking (2023) confirm that a period of parking must refer to an actual period parked, not camera timestamps.
Because no period of parking is specified, the NtK fails 9(2)(a). A defective NtK cannot transfer liability to the keeper.
2. Failure to properly invite the keeper to pay or name the driver (PoFA Paragraph 9(2)(e))
PoFA 9(2)(e) requires the NtK to include a clear invitation to the keeper:
“to pay the unpaid parking charges; or, if the keeper was not the driver, to provide the name and address of the driver.”
The NtK does not invite the keeper to pay. Instead, it states that the driver “is required to pay” and instructs the keeper to “inform us of the name and current postal address of the driver”.
This removes the statutory choice that Parliament required. A directive to provide the driver’s details is not an invitation to the keeper to pay. This is a material failure to comply with PoFA, and therefore keeper liability cannot arise.
3. Defective keeper liability warning (PoFA Paragraph 9(2)(f))
PoFA requires the NtK to include the exact statutory warning that:
“after the period of 28 days beginning with the day after that on which the notice is given…”
the keeper may become liable, but only if all other conditions of Schedule 4 are met.
The NtK instead uses its own formula:
“after 29 days from the date given…”
This is not the wording prescribed by Parliament and does not explain that time runs from the day after the notice is “given” (as defined in 9(6)). It also asserts a “right to recover” without stating the statutory condition that this applies only if all applicable conditions of Schedule 4 have been met.
This is not a trivial miswording. PoFA is strict: the warning must be exactly as prescribed. Because it is not, keeper liability cannot arise.
Conclusion on PoFA
The NtK fails to comply with:
- 9(2)(a) – no period of parking
- 9(2)(e) – no lawful invitation to the keeper
- 9(2)(f) – incorrect statutory warning
As PoFA liability arises only if *all* mandatory requirements are met, CUP Enforcement cannot hold the keeper liable. They may only pursue the driver, whose identity has not been provided.
4. No evidence of landowner authority (PPSCoP Section 14)
I require strict proof of a contemporaneous contract or lease from the landowner authorising CUP Enforcement to operate at this site, issue PCNs, and pursue charges in its own name.
Section 14 of the Private Parking Single Code of Practice sets mandatory requirements for landowner authority. The operator must hold written authorisation covering, at minimum:
- The identity of the landowner or person entitled to grant authority
- A site boundary map
- Duration and extent of authority
- All parking terms, including any exemptions
- Authority and processes for issuing PCNs
- Responsibility for any planning/advertising consents
- Confirmation that appeals and operational procedures comply with the Code
These points must be evidenced in full. Redacted contracts that obscure any of the above do not satisfy the Code.
CUP Enforcement is put to strict proof. If they cannot produce unredacted, dated, signed authorisation showing landowner authority for this exact site, POPLA must allow the appeal for lack of standing.
do a search of the forum for other recent POPLA appeals and put one together. Don't submit it before showing us what you have put in it and we can then advise you on any corrections or changes you may need.If you show us what you have drafted so far having done the above we can offer feedback.
What am i selecting as my appeal on popla?
If its the "i was not the driver of the car, Popla want evidence of that.
The notice must—
(a)specify the vehicle, the relevant land on which it was parked and the period of parking to which the notice relates;
How can i post a photo of the PCN please?Guide: Posting Images (https://www.ftla.uk/announcements/posting-images/)
Apologies for that. First time using this site,
Apologies for that. First time using this site. How do i create a new Topic please?It’s been done for you already.