Decision: Unsuccessful
Assessor Name: Richard Beaden
Assessor Summary:
The appellant disputes that the operator can issued a penalty believing only the train company can. The explain that the operator cannot use the Protection of Freedoms Act (2012) as the land is not relevant land. The appellant disputes that the operator can claim that the keeper of the vehicle is the owner. The appellant believes that the operator has to approach the magistrate’s court. The appellant has commented on the parking operator’s evidence.
Assessor Reason for Decision: (formatted for legibility)
When assessing an appeal POPLA considers if the parking operator has issued the penalty correctly and if the driver has complied with the rules of the car park.
This penalty has been issued for a breach of the Railway Byelaws. The byelaws make the owner of a vehicle responsible for the charge, who the operator can assume is the registered keeper unless the appellant can provide evidence that they were not the owner of the vehicle at the time of the offence. In this case no such evidence has been provided so I am satisfied that the appellant was the keeper of the vehicle and therefore the owner.
The appellant is correct that the operator cannot use the Protection of Freedoms Act (2012) as this site is not relevant land. The operator is pursing the appellant as the owner of the vehicle under the Railway Byelaws. Section 25 of the Railway Byelaws advises that an authorised person is any person authorised by the railway operator. APCOA has provided a document confirming that the Railway operator has given it permission to issue penalties on this site.
The specific of the APCOA contract with the railway operator is not relevant to this appeal as the ticket box itself is sufficient to prove that it has been granted the relevant authority to pursue penalties. Section 14 of the railway byelaws give the operator the right to issue penalties if a motorist breaches the displayed rules on the signs on the site.
The signs on this site advise that a penalty of £100 will be issued if the driver does not comply with the rules displayed. The rules require the driver to make a valid payment for their parking. The operator has provided a list which shows that no payment was made.
The appellant is correct the operator can take the appellant to magistrate’s court to purse the penalty if it remains unpaid. This does not invalidate the penalty or mean that the operator cannot first issue it and offer an appeals process. There is nothing within the byelaws which prevents POPLA from considering the penalty as a free alternative to it having to go to court. Even if the railway operator has maintained the right to pursue the penalties in court this does not prevent APCOA from issuing the charges or pursuing them for payment.
While the appellant advises that a Freedom of Information act request has been advised of this POPLA has not been presented with any evidence in support of this claim. I also note that as it did not affect the ability of the driver to comply with the parking rules it is not relevant to the outcome of this assessment.
APCOA is a member of the British Parking Association which requires it to provide access to POPLA. A contract has been provided which confirms that APCOA has been appointment by the railway operator to issue and purse penalties. The operator can hold the keeper of the vehicle liable as the owner of the vehicle. The department for transport confirmed that POPLA could consider appeals regarding penalties on Railway Land.
If the appellant has any concerns regarding the legality of POPLA considering the PCN I recommend the appellant seeks their own legal advice. The evidence confirms that the driver failed to pay for their use of their site.
As such I must conclude that the penalty was issued correctly and refuse this appeal.
APCOA does not prosecute byelaw breaches in the magistrates’ courts, we have not delegated prosecution of this power. Southeastern retains prosecutorial responsibility.
Subject: POPLA involvement in APCOA “Penalty Notices under Railway Byelaws” – potential breaches of DMCC 2024
Dear Sir or Madam,
I write as a private individual and advisor to motorists who receive demands from unregulated private parking operators, including APCOA Parking (UK) Ltd. This email is not sent in my capacity as a recipient of any APCOA Penalty Notice, but in my personal capacity as someone who regularly reviews POPLA decisions and operator practices.
POPLA is presented publicly as an independent appeals service for Parking Charge Notices issued on private land, administered by Trust Alliance Group Limited. However, APCOA are using POPLA in relation to documents that are explicitly described to consumers as “Penalty Notices under Railway Byelaws” and framed as “offences” that may lead to a criminal record.
These APCOA Penalty Notices are not conventional civil Parking Charge Notices. They purport to be statutory penalties for alleged Byelaw 14 offences but demand discounted “penalties” payable to a private contractor, rely on DVLA registered keeper data on non-relevant land, and are issued where there is no clear delegation of prosecutorial powers from the Train Operating Company. Motorists are then directed to POPLA as if POPLA were a legitimate appellate body for those alleged offences.
In my view, POPLA’s involvement in these Railway Byelaw Penalty Notices places Trust Alliance Group Limited at risk of breaching Part 4 Chapter 1 of the Digital Markets, Competition and Consumers Act 2024 (DMCC), for which TAGL is the relevant “trader”, POPLA being only a trading style.
In particular:
1. Misleading actions (s.226 DMCC)
Where POPLA considers appeals against APCOA “Penalty Notices under Railway Byelaws” and issues decisions that endorse APCOA’s position that a registered keeper is “legally liable” to pay a discounted penalty to APCOA, POPLA risks making or reinforcing false or misleading representations about:(a) the nature and legal status of the demand (civil parking charge versus statutory criminal penalty),
(b) the legal obligations of the consumer (for example, keeper liability on land that is not “relevant land” for the purposes of Schedule 4 PoFA 2012), and
(c) POPLA’s own competence and status (implying it has power to adjudicate criminal or quasi-criminal liability under Railway Byelaws).
These representations are clearly likely to cause the average consumer to take a transactional decision they would not otherwise take, namely to pay a demand believing that an independent and authoritative body has confirmed legal liability for a Byelaw “offence”. That is exactly the scenario contemplated by section 226 DMCC.
2. Lack of professional diligence (s.229 DMCC)
POPLA’s own published remit is confined to Parking Charge Notices issued on private land in accordance with the BPA Approved Operator Scheme. Railway Byelaw Penalty Notices relate to land under statutory control, engage criminal procedure in the magistrates’ courts, and any genuine penalty would be imposed by a court and paid to the public purse, not to a private company.
By nevertheless accepting “appeals” in these Penalty Notice cases and purporting to decide whether Byelaw “offences” have occurred or whether a registered keeper is liable as “owner”, POPLA appears to be operating outside its own competence and applying a private-sector code in an area where only a magistrates’ court has jurisdiction. That is, at the very least, capable of falling below the standard of special skill and care expected of a professional ADR body and therefore of breaching the requirement of professional diligence under section 229 DMCC.
3. Promotion of unfair practices via a code of conduct (s.225 and Schedule 20 DMCC)
Trust Alliance Group operates POPLA within the BPA AOS Code of Practice framework. Where POPLA uses that code to support or endorse APCOA’s practice of presenting what are, in reality, private parking charges as “Penalty Notices under Railway Byelaws”, with all the associated suggestions of criminality and keeper liability, there is a real risk that Trust Alliance Group is promoting or supporting unfair commercial practices through a code of conduct within the meaning of section 225 and Schedule 20 DMCC.
The net result is that motorists are being told that POPLA has “rejected” their appeal in relation to a supposed Railway Byelaw “offence”, that they remain “legally liable” to pay a penalty to APCOA, and that this reflects the correct legal position, when in fact:• POPLA has no statutory jurisdiction over Byelaw offences;
• ownership and any Byelaw 14 liability can only be determined by a magistrates’ court to the criminal standard; and
• the only lawful route for a genuine Byelaw prosecution is for the Train Operating Company to lay information before a Magistrate within six months.
In those circumstances, I believe that POPLA’s ongoing involvement in APCOA Railway Byelaw Penalty Notices presents a serious consumer-protection risk and exposes Trust Alliance Group Limited to possible regulatory action by the Competition and Markets Authority under the DMCC.
I therefore request that Trust Alliance Group Limited:1. Undertakes an urgent internal review of POPLA’s remit and policies in relation to any APCOA (or other operator) documents described as “Penalty Notices under Railway Byelaws”;
2. Pauses or withdraws POPLA from handling such cases unless and until Trust Alliance Group Limited is satisfied that POPLA has a clear and lawful basis to adjudicate them and that consumers are not being misled about the nature of the charge or POPLA’s powers; and
3. Confirms what steps will be taken to ensure that POPLA’s published materials and decision letters do not state or imply that POPLA has confirmed criminal or quasi-criminal liability, or that a keeper is legally obliged to pay a Byelaw “penalty” to a private operator.
This email is intended to give Trust Alliance Group Limited a fair opportunity to address these concerns internally. If I do not see evidence that POPLA is being brought back within its published remit and that Byelaw Penalty Notices are being excluded from its scope, I reserve my position to share case examples and refer these issues to the Competition and Markets Authority for investigation as potential breaches of Part 4 Chapter 1 DMCC.
Given the nature of these concerns, I would ask that this correspondence is brought to the attention of your legal and compliance teams, and to the senior executive responsible for the POPLA business unit.
Yours faithfully,
This rebuttal is a single, overarching point that arises directly from APCOA’s own operator evidence and from Southeastern’s description of that same contractual relationship. It goes to the heart of jurisdiction. Once this point is understood, POPLA has no lawful basis to adjudicate on this Penalty Notice at all, still less to uphold it against the registered keeper.
APCOA’s evidence pack includes a document headed “Contract for Parking Enforcement & Landowner Authority” between SE Trains Limited and APCOA Parking (UK) Ltd. This is the central document which APCOA rely on to show “landowner authority”. Nothing in this rebuttal introduces new factual material about the incident; it is analysis of APCOA’s own contract and of the legal framework they themselves say applies (Railway Byelaws).
The contractual document is drafted entirely as a British Parking Association Approved Operator Scheme parking agreement. It states that APCOA is authorised to carry out “parking enforcement” on SE Trains’ property “in accordance with sections 7.1 to 7.4 of the British Parking Association Code of Practice”. It then goes on to say (in substance) that this agreement extends authority “to carry out parking enforcement for breaches of the advertised terms and conditions, and pursuit of unpaid parking charges”. It later adds that “this contract gives the operator (APCOA Parking UK Ltd) the authority to take legal action on any outstanding parking charges”.
The financial term is set out in a table as a “Parking Charge Amount: £100.00 reduced to £80.00 if paid within 14 days of issue”. That is classic private Parking Charge Notice wording. Statutory penalties imposed under Railway Byelaws are court fines; they are not “parking charges”, cannot be discounted for early payment, and they are not payable to a private contractor. Any reduced-amount “charge” demanded by APCOA is, by definition, a CIVIL parking charge under contract, not a CRIMINAL penalty under Byelaws.
The only mention of Byelaws anywhere in the contract is a tick in a box in the “Enforcement Type” section labelled “Penalty – under Byelaws”. That label does not create any new legal power. There is no clause which says that APCOA may issue Penalty Notices under the Railway Byelaws in its own name, no clause that allows APCOA to demand statutory penalties for itself, and no clause that authorises APCOA to prosecute Byelaw offences in the magistrates’ court. On the contrary, the operative clauses repeatedly and exclusively talk about “parking charges” (not Penalty Notices), “breaches of the advertised terms and conditions”, and “legal action on any outstanding parking charges”, all by reference to the BPA AOS Code of Practice. In other words, APCOA’s authority is CONTRACTUAL and CIVIL, not STATUTORY and CRIMINAL.
Southeastern themselves, in response to a Freedom of Information request, have confirmed that APCOA “does not prosecute byelaw breaches in the magistrates’ courts” and that Southeastern “have not delegated prosecution of this power” and “retain prosecutorial responsibility”. This is not new factual evidence about the event; it is Southeastern’s own explanation of the contract APCOA have already placed in evidence and of how that relationship operates. It merely confirms what is already apparent on the face of the contract: APCOA is a parking contractor issuing private charges; it is not a prosecuting authority for Byelaw offences.
APCOA’s “Penalty Notice” and subsequent correspondence try to have it both ways. They describe an “offence” under the Railway Byelaws, threaten that a criminal record may result, assert that the registered keeper is “legally liable as the owner even if not the driver”, and yet simultaneously demand a discounted sum payable to APCOA’s own PO Box, refer to the BPA Code of Practice, and rely on a contract that only authorises pursuit of civil parking charges. They expressly state in their evidence that they are “not issuing under the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012” but then import keeper/owner presumptions that appear in civil contexts, not in the Railway Byelaws themselves. The Byelaws contain no deeming provision that the DVLA registered keeper is the “owner”; DVLA data is administrative and the V5C is not proof of ownership. Ownership for a Byelaw 14(4) prosecution would have to be proved, beyond reasonable doubt, in a magistrates’ court. APCOA cannot convert that criminal standard into a civil presumption in front of POPLA.
POPLA exists as an independent appeals service for BPA members’ private parking charges. It is not a court and has no statutory footing to determine criminal or quasi-criminal liability under Railway Byelaws, to decide who the “owner” is for the purposes of Byelaw 14(4), or to award statutory penalties to a private company. APCOA’s own contract shows they are authorised to issue parking charges and to pursue civil debts. Southeastern’s own explanation confirms that any Byelaw prosecution remains their responsibility and has not been delegated. In those circumstances, APCOA’s attempt to dress up a civil parking enforcement contract as a Byelaw “Penalty Notice” is ultra vires the contract and outside POPLA’s remit.
This leads to a single, unavoidable conclusion. Either:
1. POPLA treats this for what the contract actually authorises: a private Parking Charge Notice for breach of contract. In that case, the site is Railway land and not “relevant land” for Schedule 4 of the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012, so no keeper liability can arise and APCOA’s case against the keeper must fail; or
2. POPLA accepts APCOA’s characterisation that this is a Penalty Notice “issued under Byelaw 14”. In that case, POPLA has no jurisdiction at all to determine a statutory criminal allegation or to endorse keeper/owner liability that the Byelaws themselves do not provide for. The only lawful route is for Southeastern, not APCOA, to lay information before the magistrates within six months, where ownership and liability would have to be proved to the criminal standard. POPLA cannot substitute itself for a criminal court.
Either way, APCOA’s Penalty Notice cannot lawfully be upheld against the registered keeper. On the basis of APCOA’s own contract and Southeastern’s own statements about that contract, this Penalty Notice falls outside POPLA’s competence and outside APCOA’s proper authority. The only fair and lawful outcome is for POPLA to allow the appeal and direct that the Penalty Notice is cancelled.
For the avoidance of doubt, I also put POPLA, which is not a separate legal person but a trading style of Trust Alliance Group Limited (Company No. 04351294), on notice that any decision which upholds APCOA’s characterisation of this demand as a lawful “Penalty Notice under Railway Byelaws” and purports to impose liability on the keeper risks amounting to an unfair commercial practice under Part 4 Chapter 1 of the Digital Markets, Competition and Consumers Act 2024 (DMCC).
First, if POPLA endorses APCOA’s position that I am “legally liable” to pay a discounted “penalty” to a private contractor, and that POPLA can properly adjudicate criminal or quasi-criminal liability under the Railway Byelaws, that would be capable of being a misleading action under section 226 DMCC. It would amount to a false representation about my legal obligations and about POPLA’s own competence and status, and it is clearly material to a consumer’s transactional decision whether to pay or not.
Second, if POPLA involves itself in what APCOA describe as an “offence” under Byelaw 14, despite POPLA’s own published remit being limited to Parking Charge Notices on private land, that is at least a failure to exercise the standard of special skill and care that a consumer is entitled to expect from a professional ADR body. That is capable of breaching the requirement of professional diligence in section 229 DMCC.
Third, by using and applying a private-sector code (the BPA AOS Code of Practice) in a way which promotes the dressing-up of civil parking charges as statutory criminal penalties, POPLA and Trust Alliance Group Limited risk engaging section 225 and Schedule 20, which deal with the promotion of unfair practices in or through a code of conduct.
These provisions are now directly enforceable by the Competition and Markets Authority (CMA), which can impose significant administrative fines on traders who engage in unfair commercial practices. If POPLA, as a trading name of Trust Alliance Group Limited, chooses to step outside its published scope and to endorse APCOA’s misrepresentation of this Penalty Notice, I will reserve my position to refer Trust Alliance Group Limited’s conduct to the CMA for investigation under the DMCC.
In light of the potential consequences for Trust Alliance Group Limited, the assessor is invited to think very carefully before endorsing APCOA’s position. If there is any doubt about POPLA’s jurisdiction or about the DMCC implications, this decision should be escalated to an appropriately senior person within Trust Alliance Group Limited who has proper legal understanding of what a breach of the DMCC could mean for the company.
As can be seen from the Penalty Notice sent to Mr on 27/10/2025, the Penalty Notice states
that ‘DVLA Records indicate that you were the registered keeper on the date of the offence. You are
legally liable for this offence as the owner even if you were not the driver at the time.’ Therefore, Mr
is liable for the Penalty Notice as the registered keeper of the vehicle even if he was not the
driver at the time. The Penalty Notice is clearly addressed to Mr and within his appeal to
POPLA, Mr has confirmed that he is the registered keeper of the vehicle
I am the registered keeper. This is a Penalty Notice issued under the Railway Byelaws, not a civil Parking Charge Notice. This appeal is made strictly under protest because POPLA has no jurisdiction over statutory byelaw penalties. Only a Train Operating Company may operate or use an Independent Appeals Body for byelaw penalties. APCOA is a private contractor and cannot rely on POPLA to adjudicate a criminal or quasi-criminal allegation.
Not relevant land / no keeper liability
The location is not “relevant land” for the purposes of Schedule 4 to the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012. Keeper liability under PoFA does not apply to land subject to Railway Byelaws. Accordingly, there is no lawful route to hold the keeper liable via civil mechanisms.
Pre-emptive rebuttal of the “owner” assertion
I anticipate APCOA/POPLA will assert: “DVLA records indicate you were the registered keeper. You are legally liable as the owner even if not the driver. ‘Owner’ means the person by whom the vehicle is kept, presumed to be the person in whose name the vehicle is registered.” That reasoning is wrong in law for a byelaw allegation.
No deeming provision in the Railway Byelaws
Byelaw 14(4)(ii) allows prosecution of “the owner”. The Byelaws do not define “owner” and contain no presumption that the registered keeper is the owner. Any such presumption must be created by the Byelaws themselves. It is not.
Civil presumptions are irrelevant to criminal liability
The “kept by/presumed owner” wording cited by APCOA derives from civil contexts (e.g. VERA administration; PoFA keeper liability). Those regimes are not incorporated into the Railway Byelaws and do not create criminal liability. A byelaw prosecution is criminal in character and requires proof beyond reasonable doubt. Ownership must be proved with evidence, not assumed from DVLA administrative data.
DVLA data is keeper data, not proof of ownership
DVLA provides registered keeper details only. The V5C expressly states it is not proof of ownership. DVLA data may be a starting point for enquiries, but it is not conclusive (or even sufficient) evidence of ownership for a criminal allegation.
Jurisdiction and correct route
If the operator believes an offence occurred, the only lawful route is to lay information in the magistrates’ court under the Single Justice Procedure within six months of the date of the allegation. POPLA cannot determine criminal liability or apply criminal standards of proof. Directing civil recovery or purporting to impose keeper liability under PoFA is outside scope.
Outcome sought1. POPLA should decline jurisdiction over a Railway Byelaws Penalty Notice and direct APCOA to cancel it; or
2.In the alternative, if POPLA nevertheless considers itself competent, it must allow the appeal because APCOA has provided no evidence of “owner” as required by Byelaw 14(4)(ii) and cannot rely on PoFA or civil presumptions to impose keeper liability on non-relevant land.
For the avoidance of doubt, should POPLA be minded to endorse APCOA’s defective position, please instruct APCOA to refer to the response given in Arkell v Pressdram (1971).
I am the Registered Keeper. My details are:
Full name: [ ]
Postal address: [ ]
Penalty Notice: [Ref]
This location is subject to Railway Byelaws and is not “relevant land” for PoFA 2012; you cannot transfer liability to the keeper. POPLA is not competent for Byelaws matters and is not a TOC approved Independent Appeals Body (IAB).
If you believe an offence occurred, lay an information before the magistrates under the Single Justice Procedure within six months. Otherwise, erase my data when no longer necessary for this purpose.
As to any further demands, I refer you to the response given in Arkell v Pressdram (1971).
I am the registered keeper of the vehicle referenced above. APCOA cannot hold a registered keeper liable for any alleged contravention on land that is under statutory control, such as Ashford International Station. As a matter of fact and law, APCOA will be fully aware that the Protection of Freedoms Act (PoFA) 2012 cannot be used to pursue keeper liability, as Ashford International Station is not 'relevant land' under that Act.
If the landholder of Ashford International Station wished to hold owners or keepers liable under Railway Byelaws, that would be within their right as the landowner. However, not only has this not been pleaded, but it is also legally impossible for APCOA to do so, as APCOA is not the landowner. Your fake 'Penalty Notice' is not a real statutory penalty. It is purely an attempt by APCOA to generate profit, as opposed to a lawful penalty under Railway Byelaws, which would go to the public purse.
APCOA’s fake Penalty Notice is nothing more than an "offered contract" relying on contract law allegations of breach and is only applicable to the driver. The registered keeper cannot be presumed or inferred to have been the driver, nor pursued under any misguided interpretation of agency law. Your fake Penalty Notice can only attempt to hold the driver liable, and as such, APCOA cannot lawfully pursue me as the registered keeper.
Given these facts, APCOA has no hope of success at POPLA or in any legal forum. I urge you to cancel this Penalty Notice now and avoid wasting both our time on an appeal that will inevitably fail.