Time to get the CMA involved with this corrupt cabal of the BPA, their AOS members and POPLA. You can report POPLA to the CMA and anchor it under the DMCC. Legally it’s not a ridiculous idea – but it’s important to be clear what that can and cannot achieve, and how best to frame it.
You can report POPLA to the CMA under the DMCC because POPLA sits inside a chain of “commercial practices” that influence whether consumers pay alleged parking debts. Under the DMCC’s unfair commercial practices regime, a “product” is not just goods for sale but also services and payment demands, including demands made “in settlement of actual or purported liabilities”. A “commercial practice” is any act or omission by a trader relating to the promotion or supply of a product, and that explicitly includes post-contract behaviour such as debt collection and complaints handling. The guidance also makes clear that platforms and intermediaries can fall within scope even if they are not the ones directly selling to the consumer, and that several different traders in the same chain can each be caught by the rules.
In private parking, the real “product” is the alleged parking debt and the enforcement process around it. BPA Approved Operators issue PCNs and seek payment. POPLA is then used as the mandatory ADR service. It is funded by operators on a per-appeal basis but marketed to motorists as a free, independent appeals service. POPLA’s decisions directly affect a consumer’s “transactional decision” in DMCC terms, because they heavily influence whether a motorist pays the alleged debt or chooses to defend it. On that basis there is a credible argument that POPLA, alongside the BPA as code-owner and promoter, is engaged in commercial practices within the meaning of the DMCC, because it sits in the middle of a structured process designed to induce payment of alleged liabilities.
You can also point to the types of unfair commercial practice the CMA highlights: misleading actions or omissions, aggressive practices, lack of professional diligence, and unfair practices embedded in codes of conduct. POPLA and the BPA present POPLA as an independent, judicially independent appeals body, with decisions binding on the operator and final for the motorist, and as a one-stage process that cannot be revisited if the motorist disagrees.
In reality, in this case, POPLA received a detailed, legally reasoned appeal (covering PoFA 9(2)(a) and “period of parking”, the Single Code consideration period, the authority requirements in the Code, and Equality Act issues), yet its decision and subsequent complaint response refused to grapple with those points. POPLA’s complaints process is limited to checking that the assessor followed internal procedure and expressly refuses to look at whether the decision is actually correct in law. This creates an overall impression of independent, merits-based scrutiny when, in practice, legal errors are not corrected even when clearly particularised. That is at least arguable as a breach of professional diligence in the DMCC sense: POPLA is an ADR body whose decisions materially affect whether average consumers, including disabled and otherwise vulnerable motorists, pay alleged debts, yet it does not exercise the standard of care and legal rigour consumers would reasonably expect.
You can then explain that the BPA/POPLA/Single Code architecture functions as an industry code of conduct that may itself promote unfair practices. BPA membership and access to POPLA are tied to adherence to that code. Within this framework operators often misstate keeper liability under PoFA, dress up private charges as if they were statutory penalties, and lean on POPLA’s “independent” status to reassure motorists that any rejection is final.
In reality, the system delivers a single-stage, operator-funded, non-reviewable process that tends to uphold charges, especially where complex legal or disability-related points are raised. This can steer consumers towards paying debts they might otherwise contest and can cause vulnerable motorists to abandon Equality Act rights because they believe an independent body has definitively ruled against them.
Finally, you should be realistic: a DMCC-anchored complaint about POPLA and the BPA is about feeding evidence of systemic unfairness into the CMA’s enforcement and policy work, not about securing an individual right of appeal or getting a specific PCN cancelled. There is a coherent legal hook to include POPLA in a DMCC complaint, but the CMA is not an ombudsman. The aim is to get the regulator to look at the sector as a whole and decide whether the BPA/private parking/POPLA model amounts to unfair commercial practices under the new regime.
To submit the complaint, you should first go to the CMA online reporting page (https://www.gov.uk/guidance/contact-the-cma) and select the option “An issue in a sector of the UK economy”. This is because the problem is not just with one business but with the way the private parking sector operates as a whole, including BPA operators and POPLA as the “independent” appeals layer.
In the next step, when you are asked “Tell us what happened”, briefly describe the sector and the roles involved: that British Parking Association Approved Operators issue private Parking Charge Notices, that motorists are directed to POPLA as the only appeals service, and that POPLA is funded by operators on a per-appeal basis but marketed as free and independent for consumers. Then summarise what happened in your own case: that you appealed a MET Parking PCN to POPLA, raised detailed legal arguments about non-compliance with Schedule 4 of the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012, the required “period of parking”, the new Private Parking Single Code of Practice consideration period, defects in the operator’s landowner authority, and Equality Act issues linked to a disabled bay. Explain that POPLA’s decision did not properly engage with those statutory and Code points and that your subsequent formal complaint set out the legal errors clearly. Then explain that POPLA’s complaint reply said it is a one-stage process, that it cannot reconsider decisions even if wrong in law, that complaints are limited to checking “process” only, and that it will not correspond further. Add one short sentence saying that you have uploaded a separate document containing your full detailed legal and Code analysis.
Next, make clear why this is a DMCC and consumer protection issue. Explain that the “product” in this sector is the alleged private parking debt and the enforcement process surrounding it, and that operators, the BPA and POPLA together form a code-based appeals and enforcement system that directly influences whether consumers decide to pay or dispute those alleged debts. Say that POPLA is part of a “commercial practice” in DMCC terms because it is promoted as an independent, impartial arbiter, it is funded by the traders who benefit from upheld PCNs, and its decisions are routinely used to push consumers towards paying rather than defending claims in court. By refusing to correct legal and Code errors once a decision is issued, by operating a complaints process that only checks superficial procedure, and by ignoring points about disability and reasonable adjustments, POPLA arguably falls below the standard of professional diligence expected of an appeals body whose decisions affect consumers’ transactional decisions, especially for vulnerable motorists.
You should then say that the overall presentation of POPLA and the BPA scheme risks misleading the average consumer into believing that there is a genuine, independent safeguard, when in practice the system is structurally weighted in favour of operators and errors cannot be corrected. This is why POPLA can and should be included in a DMCC complaint: it is not a neutral bystander, but part of the way private parking traders present, process and enforce alleged liabilities.
End your “Tell us what happened” narrative by making clear that you are not asking the CMA to overturn your individual POPLA decision, but asking the CMA to look at the private parking sector as a whole, including the BPA and POPLA, to decide whether the structure and operation of this appeals model amount to unfair commercial practices under the DMCC.
On the “Upload evidence” page, upload up to five documents that best illustrate the problem: the POPLA decision, your detailed formal complaint to POPLA, POPLA’s complaint reply, the Notice to Keeper or PCN from MET Parking, and the operator’s landowner authority or contract page relied on by POPLA. Make sure that one of these uploaded files is your full detailed argument and legal analysis, so you are not limited by the 3,500 character box. You can redact personal data while leaving dates, locations and wording intact.
On the next page, if you are willing, provide at least an email address so the CMA can contact you for further information.
Finally, select the appropriate UK country, review the summary page to ensure that you have clearly described this as a sector problem involving private parking, the BPA and POPLA under the DMCC, confirm that the attached files are correct, and submit the report.
Here is a full narrative you can use as the uploaded file. You can save it as a Word/PDF and upload it as “Detailed legal and Code analysis” or similar. You can of course tweak names, dates and PCN refs as needed:
Digital Markets, Competition and Consumers Act 2024 – complaint about private parking appeals (BPA / POPLA / Approved Operators)
1. Overview
This document provides a fuller explanation of why I believe there are unfair commercial practices within the private parking sector, and why POPLA (Parking on Private Land Appeals), the British Parking Association (BPA) and BPA Approved Operators should be treated together as part of a commercial practice falling within the scope of the Digital Markets, Competition and Consumers Act 2024 (DMCC).
I am not asking the CMA to intervene in, or overturn, my individual POPLA decision. I am asking the CMA to consider whether the structure and operation of the BPA/POPLA/private parking model amount to unfair commercial practices under the DMCC, in particular in relation to misleading presentation, professional diligence and code-of-conduct-based practices.
My own case (MET Parking Services – McDonald’s Bow) is provided as a worked example and case study.
2. The sector and the “product”
In the private parking sector, the real “product” from the consumer’s point of view is not a physical good but an alleged parking liability and the associated enforcement process.
The typical chain is:
• A BPA Approved Operator issues a Parking Charge Notice (PCN) and seeks payment of an alleged contractual charge.
• The operator uses DVLA keeper data and ANPR or manual images to pursue the alleged debt.
• The operator’s paperwork and BPA membership direct motorists to POPLA as the only independent appeals service.
• POPLA is funded by operators on a per-appeal basis, but marketed as a free, independent appeals service for motorists.
• POPLA’s decision is binding on the operator and is routinely treated, in practice, as the decisive factor in whether a motorist pays the alleged debt or not.
Under the DMCC, a “product” includes services and also payment demands in settlement of actual or purported liabilities. A “commercial practice” covers not only pre-sale promotion but also complaints handling, after-sales conduct and debt-collection-related practices. It is expressly recognised that several traders in the same chain (including intermediaries and platforms) can all fall within scope, and that decisions which influence whether a consumer pays a debt count as affecting “transactional decisions”.
On that basis:
• The alleged private parking liability and its enforcement are a “product”.
• The conduct of operators, the BPA and POPLA in relation to that product together amount to a chain of “commercial practices” that can fall under the DMCC regime.
• POPLA is not a neutral bystander: it is part of the mechanism by which traders present, process and enforce alleged liabilities, and its decisions directly affect whether consumers decide to pay.
3. How POPLA and the BPA present the service
The BPA promotes POPLA as the independent appeals service for BPA Approved Operators. POPLA’s own materials describe it as an independent appeals service, emphasising that:
• It is “judicially independent”.
• It is free to motorists.
• It is funded by operators on a per-appeal basis.
• Its decisions are final and cannot be appealed or reviewed; POPLA is a one-stage process.
In operator correspondence and on BPA/POPLA websites, motorists are reassured that there is an independent tribunal-like stage where their arguments will be fairly considered. In practice, POPLA decisions are routinely used by operators to justify continuing demands and threats of county court proceedings, and by motorists as a key factor in deciding whether to pay.
4. My case as a worked example
The specific case I rely on to illustrate these concerns is:
• Operator: MET Parking Services.
• Site: McDonald’s Bow.
• PCN: AB22929772.
• POPLA appeal: 3862515108.
• Decision date: November 2025.
As registered Keeper, I appealed the MET PCN to POPLA. In my appeal I raised, among other things, the following issues:
(a) Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 (PoFA), Schedule 4, paragraph 9(2)(a) – “period of parking”
The Notice to Keeper (NtK) relied on a single manually taken photograph of the vehicle, with one timestamp. It did not specify any period of parking; instead it gave one time and date only. I argued that:
• PoFA requires the NtK to “specify the period of parking to which the notice relates”.
• A single instant in time is not a period.
• A County Court appeal judgment, Brennan v Premier Parking Solutions, supports the view that there must be at least a short, evidenced period of parking; a single snapshot is insufficient.
I provided this authority as persuasive support for the correct interpretation of PoFA in a parking context.
(b) Consideration period under the Private Parking Single Code of Practice
I pointed out that the new Private Parking Single Code of Practice (Single Code) requires a consideration period on arrival (for example to find a space, read the signs and decide whether to stay) before terms can bind a driver. MET provided no timed observation log or entry/exit timings to show any period of parking beyond one snapshot.
I argued that you cannot safely infer an immediate breach from a single photograph without recognising the consideration period that the Code requires.
(c) Standing and landowner authority
I analysed MET’s “Letter of Authority” and the single page of contract documentation they supplied. I explained how these documents failed to meet the specific mandatory elements of operator authority set out in the Code (for example site boundary, nature of terms, tariff, method of enforcement and who is responsible for what).
My position was that the operator had not produced contemporaneous, site-specific written authority that met the Code’s detailed requirements and therefore had not shown that it had standing to issue and enforce PCNs at that site.
(d) Equality Act and disabled-bay context
I explained the disabled-bay context and raised Equality Act and reasonable-adjustment issues. I argued that this was intrinsic to the alleged contravention and should not be treated as an optional or “new” issue. In a disabled-bay case, it is particularly important to consider how the operator and appeals service treat disabled motorists and whether reasonable adjustments have been made.
5. POPLA’s decision and complaint response
POPLA rejected my appeal. The written decision:
• Referred to the evidence in general terms, but did not meaningfully engage with the PoFA 9(2)(a) point about “period of parking”.
• Did not address the Brennan appeal judgment at all.
• Did not grapple with the Single Code consideration period before contract formation.
• Accepted the operator’s authority on the basis of a generic “signed letter + signs on site” approach, without addressing the specific Code requirements I had identified.
• Did not substantively deal with the Equality Act and disabled-bay issues.
I then submitted a detailed formal complaint to POPLA, setting out the legal and Code errors clearly and referencing the specific statutory provisions and Code clauses. I requested that POPLA:
• Recognise that a single snapshot is not a PoFA-compliant “period of parking”.
• Recognise that, without a timed observation period, an immediate breach finding is unsafe in light of the Single Code’s consideration period.
• Apply the Code’s own detailed requirements on operator authority.
• Take proper account of Equality Act obligations and the position of disabled motorists.
POPLA’s complaint reply (from its Complaints handler) stated:
• POPLA is a one-stage process.
• POPLA cannot reconsider decisions even if a motorist disagrees with them.
• The complaint function is limited to checking whether the assessor followed internal process.
• The assessor was said, in general terms, to have considered all grounds of appeal.
• POPLA would not correspond further on the matter.
The reply did not engage with any of the legal or Code-based points raised in the complaint. It expressly refused to consider whether the decision was right or wrong in law.
6. Why I believe this is an unfair commercial practice
In my view, the BPA/POPLA/private parking model raises several DMCC concerns.
(a) Misleading overall impression
Consumers are told that POPLA is independent and judicially independent, and that there is an appeal stage before a neutral adjudicator. In practice:
• POPLA is operator-funded on a per-case basis.
• POPLA’s decisions cannot be corrected even where clear legal or Code errors are identified.
• The complaint process is deliberately limited to a superficial process check, not a review of correctness.
This creates a misleading overall impression that there is a genuine, robust safeguard, when in reality errors are not remedied.
(b) Lack of professional diligence
An ADR body whose decisions are routinely relied upon to decide whether alleged debts are paid should, in my view, be expected to:
• Engage properly with statutory wording and relevant case law.
• Apply its own Code of Practice consistently and transparently.
• Pay particular attention to the position of disabled and otherwise vulnerable consumers.
In my case, and in others I am aware of, POPLA has failed to meet those basic standards. It has ignored clear PoFA wording, disregarded persuasive appellate authority on the same statutory provision, failed to apply its own Code requirements on consideration periods and operator authority, and sidelined Equality Act issues.
This appears inconsistent with the standard of professional diligence the DMCC expects from a trader in its field.
(c) Code of conduct and promotion of unfair practices
BPA membership, the Approved Operator Scheme and access to POPLA are built around a code of practice (now the Single Code). Within this framework:
• Operators frequently misstate the legal position on keeper liability.
• Operators often present private contractual charges as if they were statutory penalties or fines.
• References to POPLA are used to reassure motorists that any rejection is final and independent, when in fact there is no possibility of correcting errors and no external oversight of POPLA’s legal reasoning.
In my view, this code-based structure promotes or embeds unfair practices, because it creates a systemic, operator-funded appeals mechanism that tends to uphold charges and does not provide the level of independent scrutiny and correction that consumers are led to expect.
7. Effect on consumers and vulnerable motorists
The practices described above are likely to cause the average consumer to take transactional decisions they would not otherwise take, specifically:
• Paying alleged parking debts they might otherwise challenge or defend in court.
• Accepting that they have no realistic recourse if POPLA has misunderstood the law or the Code.
For disabled and otherwise vulnerable motorists, the harm is greater. Where POPLA refuses to grapple with Equality Act arguments or treats them as “new” and out of scope, disabled motorists may wrongly conclude that their rights have been definitively rejected by an independent body and give up.
8. What I am asking the CMA to do
I am not seeking individual redress or a reopening of my appeal. Rather, I invite the CMA to:
• Treat my case and the attached documents (PCN, NtK, operator evidence, POPLA decision, my appeal, my formal complaint and POPLA’s complaint response) as a case study illustrating how the BPA/POPLA/private parking model operates in practice.
• Consider whether the combination of operator behaviour, BPA code arrangements and POPLA’s structure and practice amount to unfair commercial practices under the DMCC, particularly regarding misleading presentation, lack of professional diligence and the promotion of unfair practices through a code of conduct.
I would be happy to provide further examples of similar patterns and additional evidence if required.
Another clear example of the utter incompetence at POPLA. You DO NOT pay. A POPLA decision is NOT binding on you.
You will soon start to receive useless debt recovery letters. You can safely ignore all debt collectors. They are powerless to do anything except to try and intimidate the low-hanging fruit on the gullible tree into paying out of ignorance and fear. Eventually you will receive a Letter of Claim (LoC) from DCB Legal and after you respond to that, a county court claim.
You will defend the claim with the defence we provide and in due course, I can guarantee with 99.9% certainty that the claim will eventually either be struck out or discontinued. You won't be paying a penny to MET if you follow the advice.
In the meantime, you can send the following formal complaint to POPLA about that legal embarrassing appeal decision:
Subject: POPLA Decision – MET Parking Services, PCN AB22929772 (McDonald’s Bow) – Fundamental Legal Error, Misapplication of Code, and Failure to Engage with Evidence
To: POPLA Lead Adjudicator
Dear Sir/Madam,
I lodge a formal complaint regarding the decision by Assessor Alexandra Roby in PCN AB22929772 (MET Parking Services, “McDonald’s Bow”). The decision exhibits fundamental legal error, selective and inconsistent application of Codes, and a wholesale failure to engage with the evidence actually supplied. As presently trained, the assessor is not fit to determine statutory keeper liability or Code compliance.
Executive summary
1. PoFA 2012 Sch 4 para 9(2)(a) was mis-stated and misapplied. The NtK cites a single point in time supported by one manually taken photograph. A moment is not a “period of parking”.
2. The Single Code’s arrival consideration period (s.5.1) was ignored. POPLA treated duration as irrelevant, collapsing contract formation into a single un-timed snapshot.
3. Standing was waved through despite a line-by-line PPSCoP 14.1(a)–(j) failure in the “Letter of Authority” and a lone contract page that cures nothing.
4. The decision “Code-switched”: BPA CoP was used to sidestep Single Code signage duties, yet the Single Code Appeals Charter was invoked to justify a £20 stance—while s.5.1 was ignored.
5. The assessor refused to consider Equality Act/reasonable adjustments in a disabled-bay case as “new”, when they are intrinsic to the allegation.
Determinative legal error: PoFA 9(2)(a)
• What PoFA requires: “the period of parking to which the notice relates.”
• What MET produced: a single, manually taken photograph and an NtK stating one date/time. No observation period. No duration.
• What POPLA held: a single timestamp equals a “period of parking”.
This is wrong in law. A period is an interval. An instant is not.
Brennan v Premier Parking Solutions (County Court appeal 2023) confirms the point: recording a single instant is insufficient; there must be a short period specified or evidenced. Brennan is a County Court APPEAL judgment. While not binding like a Court of Appeal authority, it is PERSUASIVE: a reasoned decision by a higher-tier judge on the same statutory wording in the same jurisdiction. Persuasive authority demands serious engagement; it is not optional gloss. The decision engages with neither the statute nor Brennan’s reasoning.
Consideration period and contract formation (Single Code s.5.1)
The Single Code requires a consideration period on arrival before terms can bind a driver. MET provided no timed observation and no log. POPLA nonetheless declared the vehicle “parked” from a single image and treated duration as immaterial. That position erases s.5.1 and replaces contract formation with conjecture. It is not adjudication; it is assumption.
Standing – PPSCoP s.14.1(a)–(j) not met
I supplied an itemised analysis of the operator’s “Letter of Authority” (25/08/2016) and the solitary contract page. Outcome:
• Met: (a) identity (McDonald’s Restaurants Ltd).
• Partly: (d) duration (initial 9 months from 31/08/2010, then rolling). (h) only partial.
• Not met: (b) boundary plan/site schedule; (c) byelaws; (e) defined parking terms (free period, tariffs, exemptions); (f) method of issuing charges; (g) responsibility for planning/advertising consents; (i) documentation for authorised bodies; (j) appeals approach.
The single contract page cures none of those omissions. PPSCoP 14.1 requires contemporaneous, site-specific written authority (or the full contract with schedules) addressing (a)–(j). The assessor ignored this mandatory list and substituted a conclusory “signed letter + many signs” test. That is not the Code.
Code inconsistency
The decision adopts the BPA CoP for signage (to avoid Single Code signage implementation), yet leans on the Single Code Appeals Charter for the £20 “offer”, while refusing to apply the same Single Code’s s.5.1. This cherry-picking is arbitrary and outcome-driven.
Equality Act context (disabled bay)
In a disabled-bay case, reasonable adjustments are intrinsic—not “new grounds”. Excluding them at the comments stage is a procedural error and defeats the protective purpose of the law.
Requested actions
Quality review and corrective guidance to assessors:
• A timestamp or single photograph is not a “period of parking” under PoFA 9(2)(a).
• Where no timed observation exists, an immediate breach finding is unsafe in light of Single Code s.5.1.
• PPSCoP 14.1 requires site-specific, contemporaneous authority addressing (a)–(j); generic letters and isolated pages are not sufficient.
• County Court appeal judgments (e.g., Brennan) are persuasive and must be substantively engaged with.
Targeted retraining for the assessor on PoFA Schedule 4, Single Code s.5.1 and s.14.1, evidence sufficiency, and the distinction between binding and persuasive authority.
Audit: include this decision in the next audit sample for adverse-variance review. The errors here are basic, repeated, and corrosive of trust in POPLA’s legal standards.
Please acknowledge this complaint and confirm the steps you will take. Your response will be retained and provided to stakeholders considering reforms under the Private Parking (Code of Practice) Act 2019.
Yours faithfully,
[Name]
Registered Keeper
PCN: AB22929772
Site: McDonald’s Bow
Operator: MET Parking Services
So adjust accordingly:
The 25 August 2016 “Letter of Authority” does not satisfy PPSCoP 14.1 (a)–(j). It is a generic permission letter and omits most items the Code now requires.
Item-by-item check
a) Identity of landowner — Yes. Names McDonald’s Restaurants Limited.
b) Boundary map — No. None provided; merely refers to “Sites … detailed in Schedule 4 of the Contract.”
c) Applicable byelaws — No. No mention.
d) Permission and duration — Partly/Yes. Confirms MET’s authority and states initial 9-month term from 31/08/2010 continuing on a rolling basis.
e) Parking T&Cs (free period, tariffs, exemptions) — No. Says signage “must detail the terms and conditions,” but does not set them out (no free period, tariffs, or exemptions listed).
f) Means by which charges will be issued — No. Does not specify windscreen vs. postal issue, etc.
g) Responsibility for consents (planning/advertising for signs) — No. Notes MET supplies/maintains signage, but is silent on who obtains statutory consents.
h) Operator’s obligations “in compliance with this Code and as a member of an ATA” — Partial. Requires compliance with the BPA Code of Practice but does not state ATA membership/obligations expressly.
i) Notification of documentation the operator may have to supply to authorised bodies — No. Not addressed.
j) Operator’s approach to handling appeals — No. Not addressed.
Bottom line: At best, (a), (b) and (d) are met and (h) is only partially met. The letter fails the remaining requirements. To comply with PPSCoP 14.1, the operator would need contemporaneous, site-specific written confirmation (or the underlying contract/schedules) covering the boundary plan, any byelaws, defined T&Cs (including free time/tariffs/exemptions), method of charge issue, consent responsibilities, ATA/Code obligations, what documents may be provided to authorised bodies, and the appeals approach.
The single page of the actual contract shown does not satisfy or cure any of the defective points raised above.
This page confirms:
(a) Identity of the landowner — McDonald’s Restaurants Limited.
(d) Duration of permission — initial 9 months from 31/08/2010, then continuing unless terminated (paras 3.1–3.3). It evidences a signed services agreement.
It does not address the previously unsatisfied items:
(b) boundary map/Schedule of sites (only referenced, not provided);
(c) any applicable byelaws;
(e) specific parking terms (free period, tariffs, exemptions);
(f) means of issuing charges (windscreen/postal);
(g) responsibility for planning/advertising consents;
(h) operator obligations under the PPSCoP/ATA membership;
(i) documentation to be supplied to authorised bodies;
(j) approach to appeals.[/indent]
So, beyond reinforcing (a), (b) and (d), this page does not satisfy any of the other PPSCoP 14.1 (c)–(j) requirements.
Use the following for your response to the operators evidence:
PCN AB22929772 – POPLA Comments on Operator Evidence
I am the registered keeper. No driver identity is admitted. Please address the following in order.
Landowner authority – Letter of Authority dated 25 August 2016 fails PPSCoP 14.1(a)–(j):
- PPSCoP 14.1(a) Identity of landowner: Met. Names McDonald’s Restaurants Limited.
- PPSCoP 14.1(b) Boundary map: Not met. No plan or site schedule is provided; it only refers to “Sites … detailed in Schedule 4 of the Contract,” which is not produced.
- PPSCoP 14.1(c) Applicable byelaws: Not met. No mention at all.
- PPSCoP 14.1(d) Permission and duration: Partly/yes on duration only. It states an initial 9-month term from 31/08/2010 continuing on a rolling basis, but this does not remedy the missing site-specific particulars elsewhere.
- PPSCoP 14.1(e) Parking terms and conditions (free period, tariffs, exemptions): Not met. It merely says signage “must detail the terms and conditions” without setting any out. No free period, tariffs, or exemptions are listed.
- PPSCoP 14.1(f) Means by which charges will be issued: Not met. No specification of windscreen notices versus postal ANPR, etc.
- PPSCoP 14.1(g) Responsibility for consents (planning/advertising for signs): Not met. It notes MET supplies/maintains signage but is silent on who obtains statutory consents.
- PPSCoP 14.1(h) Operator’s obligations “in compliance with this Code and as a member of an ATA”: Partial at best. It references BPA Code compliance but does not state ATA membership/obligations as required by the Single Code.
- PPSCoP 14.1(i) Notification of documentation the operator may have to supply to authorised bodies: Not met. No provision.
- PPSCoP 14.1(j) Operator’s approach to handling appeals: Not met. No provision.
Bottom line on the LoA: Only (a) and (d) are evidenced, with (h) only partially. Items (b), (c), (e), (f), (g), (i), and (j) are not satisfied. A generic permission letter cannot establish standing or Code compliance for this specific site and signage scheme on the material date.
Contract extract (single page) does not cure the LoA defects:
It confirms only (a) identity of landowner (McDonald’s Restaurants Limited) and (d) duration (initial 9 months from 31/08/2010, then continuing unless terminated, paras 3.1–3.3). It does not address the missing PPSCoP 14.1 items: no boundary plan or site schedule (b); no statement on byelaws (c); no defined parking terms including any free period, tariffs, exemptions (e); no method of issuing charges (f); no responsibility for planning/advertising consents (g); no explicit PPSCoP/ATA obligations (h); no statement on documentation to authorised bodies (i); no appeals approach (j). Therefore, even taken together, the LoA plus this single contract page fail PPSCoP 14.1(c)–(j). Strict proof is required in the form of contemporaneous, site-specific written authority (or the full contract with schedules) covering all 14.1 requirements. Redacted generic paperwork is insufficient.
PoFA Schedule 4 – no keeper liability:
The Notice to Keeper does not specify any period of parking as required by paragraph 9(2)(a). The operator relies on ANPR timestamps and an assertion that the driver exited the vehicle. That is not a period of parking and cannot establish duration. Without 9(2)(a) compliance, keeper liability cannot arise, regardless of any 29-day wording.
Consideration period not evidenced; no contract formation:
The Single Code requires a consideration period on arrival before terms can bind a driver. The operator has provided no observation log or timed evidence that the vehicle remained beyond that arrival period. Their own narrative says the charge was issued because the driver exited the vehicle without a displayed badge, not due to time. That concedes no evidence of duration beyond arrival and no breach.
Signage and core term visibility:
The photos are generic and do not prove that, on the actual entry route, an entrance sign and any disabled-bay core term were clearly brought to the driver’s attention before parking. POPLA should require contemporaneous driver-sightline images (and relevant lighting/conditions) showing the core term was prominent before the decision to park. Stating motorists must “seek out” terms does not replace the requirement for clear, timely notice of the core term.
Disabled bay and Equality Act duties:
A rigid “badge must be displayed at all times” condition cannot lawfully negate the arrival/consideration period or the duty to make reasonable adjustments. On private land, the Blue Badge scheme is not determinative, and demanding the reverse side of a badge (name/photo) is excessive. The operator has not shown that reasonable adjustments were considered or that the vehicle remained beyond arrival without display.
Date inconsistencies:
The operator’s evidence references a parking event on 17/06/2025 but elsewhere the issue/event is 20/06/2025. Their DVLA/NtK timeline is predicated on 17/06/2025. These contradictions undermine reliability and any claim of PoFA timing compliance.
Beavis not determinative:
Beavis turned on unusually prominent signage and a legitimate interest in turnover. The operator has not proved equally prominent signage, any time beyond the arrival period, or Code/equality-compliant enforcement in a disabled bay context.
Conclusion:
Standing is not proved because the LoA and single contract page fail PPSCoP 14.1(b)–(j) and only partly meet (h). Keeper liability fails because the NtK states no period of parking as required by PoFA 9(2)(a). The operator has not proved any exceedance of the consideration period or that a contract bound the driver before any alleged breach. Signage proof is inadequate, equality duties are not addressed, and dates conflict. The appeal should be allowed.
Is that the only page of their contract they have submitted? If so, together with that LoA, the operator has not satisfied the requirements that the PPSCoP states must be evidenced in any landowner contract and pointed out as requiring evidence in the POPLA appeal.
The 25 August 2016 “Letter of Authority” does not satisfy PPSCoP 14.1 (a)–(j). It is a generic permission letter and omits most items the Code now requires.
Item-by-item check
a) Identity of landowner — Yes. Names McDonald’s Restaurants Limited.
b) Boundary map — No. None provided; merely refers to “Sites … detailed in Schedule 4 of the Contract.”
c) Applicable byelaws — No. No mention.
d) Permission and duration — Partly/Yes. Confirms MET’s authority and states initial 9-month term from 31/08/2010 continuing on a rolling basis.
e) Parking T&Cs (free period, tariffs, exemptions) — No. Says signage “must detail the terms and conditions,” but does not set them out (no free period, tariffs, or exemptions listed).
f) Means by which charges will be issued — No. Does not specify windscreen vs. postal issue, etc.
g) Responsibility for consents (planning/advertising for signs) — No. Notes MET supplies/maintains signage, but is silent on who obtains statutory consents.
h) Operator’s obligations “in compliance with this Code and as a member of an ATA” — Partial. Requires compliance with the BPA Code of Practice but does not state ATA membership/obligations expressly.
i) Notification of documentation the operator may have to supply to authorised bodies — No. Not addressed.
j) Operator’s approach to handling appeals — No. Not addressed.
Bottom line: At best, (a) and (d) are met and (h) is only partially met. The letter fails the remaining requirements. To comply with PPSCoP 14.1, the operator would need contemporaneous, site-specific written confirmation (or the underlying contract/schedules) covering the boundary plan, any byelaws, defined T&Cs (including free time/tariffs/exemptions), method of charge issue, consent responsibilities, ATA/Code obligations, what documents may be provided to authorised bodies, and the appeals approach.
The single page of the actual contract shown does not satisfy or cure any of the defective points raised above.
This page confirms:
(a) Identity of the landowner — McDonald’s Restaurants Limited.
(d) Duration of permission — initial 9 months from 31/08/2010, then continuing unless terminated (paras 3.1–3.3). It evidences a signed services agreement.
It does not address the previously unsatisfied items:
(b) boundary map/Schedule of sites (only referenced, not provided);
(c) any applicable byelaws;
(e) specific parking terms (free period, tariffs, exemptions);
(f) means of issuing charges (windscreen/postal);
(g) responsibility for planning/advertising consents;
(h) operator obligations under the PPSCoP/ATA membership;
(i) documentation to be supplied to authorised bodies;
(j) approach to appeals.[/indent]
So, beyond reinforcing (a) and (d), this page does not satisfy any of the other PPSCoP 14.1 (b)–(j) requirements.
Use the following for your response to the operators evidence:
PCN AB22929772 – POPLA Comments on Operator Evidence
I am the registered keeper. No driver identity is admitted. Please address the following in order.
Landowner authority – Letter of Authority dated 25 August 2016 fails PPSCoP 14.1(a)–(j):
- PPSCoP 14.1(a) Identity of landowner: Met. Names McDonald’s Restaurants Limited.
- PPSCoP 14.1(b) Boundary map: Not met. No plan or site schedule is provided; it only refers to “Sites … detailed in Schedule 4 of the Contract,” which is not produced.
- PPSCoP 14.1(c) Applicable byelaws: Not met. No mention at all.
- PPSCoP 14.1(d) Permission and duration: Partly/yes on duration only. It states an initial 9-month term from 31/08/2010 continuing on a rolling basis, but this does not remedy the missing site-specific particulars elsewhere.
- PPSCoP 14.1(e) Parking terms and conditions (free period, tariffs, exemptions): Not met. It merely says signage “must detail the terms and conditions” without setting any out. No free period, tariffs, or exemptions are listed.
- PPSCoP 14.1(f) Means by which charges will be issued: Not met. No specification of windscreen notices versus postal ANPR, etc.
- PPSCoP 14.1(g) Responsibility for consents (planning/advertising for signs): Not met. It notes MET supplies/maintains signage but is silent on who obtains statutory consents.
- PPSCoP 14.1(h) Operator’s obligations “in compliance with this Code and as a member of an ATA”: Partial at best. It references BPA Code compliance but does not state ATA membership/obligations as required by the Single Code.
- PPSCoP 14.1(i) Notification of documentation the operator may have to supply to authorised bodies: Not met. No provision.
- PPSCoP 14.1(j) Operator’s approach to handling appeals: Not met. No provision.
Bottom line on the LoA: Only (a) and (d) are evidenced, with (h) only partially. Items (b), (c), (e), (f), (g), (i), and (j) are not satisfied. A generic permission letter cannot establish standing or Code compliance for this specific site and signage scheme on the material date.
Contract extract (single page) does not cure the LoA defects:
It confirms only (a) identity of landowner (McDonald’s Restaurants Limited) and (d) duration (initial 9 months from 31/08/2010, then continuing unless terminated, paras 3.1–3.3). It does not address the missing PPSCoP 14.1 items: no boundary plan or site schedule (b); no statement on byelaws (c); no defined parking terms including any free period, tariffs, exemptions (e); no method of issuing charges (f); no responsibility for planning/advertising consents (g); no explicit PPSCoP/ATA obligations (h); no statement on documentation to authorised bodies (i); no appeals approach (j). Therefore, even taken together, the LoA plus this single contract page fail PPSCoP 14.1(b)–(j). Strict proof is required in the form of contemporaneous, site-specific written authority (or the full contract with schedules) covering all 14.1 requirements. Redacted generic paperwork is insufficient.
PoFA Schedule 4 – no keeper liability:
The Notice to Keeper does not specify any period of parking as required by paragraph 9(2)(a). The operator relies on ANPR timestamps and an assertion that the driver exited the vehicle. That is not a period of parking and cannot establish duration. Without 9(2)(a) compliance, keeper liability cannot arise, regardless of any 29-day wording.
Consideration period not evidenced; no contract formation:
The Single Code requires a consideration period on arrival before terms can bind a driver. The operator has provided no observation log or timed evidence that the vehicle remained beyond that arrival period. Their own narrative says the charge was issued because the driver exited the vehicle without a displayed badge, not due to time. That concedes no evidence of duration beyond arrival and no breach.
Signage and core term visibility:
The photos are generic and do not prove that, on the actual entry route, an entrance sign and any disabled-bay core term were clearly brought to the driver’s attention before parking. POPLA should require contemporaneous driver-sightline images (and relevant lighting/conditions) showing the core term was prominent before the decision to park. Stating motorists must “seek out” terms does not replace the requirement for clear, timely notice of the core term.
Disabled bay and Equality Act duties:
A rigid “badge must be displayed at all times” condition cannot lawfully negate the arrival/consideration period or the duty to make reasonable adjustments. On private land, the Blue Badge scheme is not determinative, and demanding the reverse side of a badge (name/photo) is excessive. The operator has not shown that reasonable adjustments were considered or that the vehicle remained beyond arrival without display.
Date inconsistencies:
The operator’s evidence references a parking event on 17/06/2025 but elsewhere the issue/event is 20/06/2025. Their DVLA/NtK timeline is predicated on 17/06/2025. These contradictions undermine reliability and any claim of PoFA timing compliance.
Beavis not determinative:
Beavis turned on unusually prominent signage and a legitimate interest in turnover. The operator has not proved equally prominent signage, any time beyond the arrival period, or Code/equality-compliant enforcement in a disabled bay context.
Conclusion:
Standing is not proved because the LoA and single contract page fail PPSCoP 14.1(b)–(j) and only partly meet (h). Keeper liability fails because the NtK states no period of parking as required by PoFA 9(2)(a). The operator has not proved any exceedance of the consideration period or that a contract bound the driver before any alleged breach. Signage proof is inadequate, equality duties are not addressed, and dates conflict. The appeal should be allowed.