I respectfully submit the following comments in response to the evidence provided by ParkingEye in this matter.
1. Excessive Redaction of the Landowner Contract
ParkingEye has produced a contract that has been excessively redacted. Crucially, the section concerning how the agreement may be terminated has been withheld. This omission makes it impossible to establish whether the agreement remains valid and enforceable.
Because of these redactions, the evidence provided does not show that ParkingEye has the authority it claims to operate and issue Parking Charge Notices at this site.
2. No Evidence of Landowner Authority – Managing Agent is not the Landowner
The contract provided is signed by a managing agent, incorrectly described as the “landowner.” This is inaccurate.
The car park at Godwin Court & Crowndale Road, 5 Crowndale Road, London NW1 1TU sits on Camden Council estate land; “Godwin and Crowndale Tenant Management Co-operative Ltd” manages it on Camden’s behalf, i.e., they are an agent/manager, not the landowner.
Camden Council explains that estates with a Tenant Management Organisation (TMO) are managed “on our behalf” under a Modular Management Agreement; TMOs deliver services but do not own the land.
Camden’s council-led project pages and newsletters for the Godwin & Crowndale estate, including the car park between Godwin Court and Crowndale Road, reat the land as Council estate land. These sources also state that the TMO “manage the grounds, repairs and parking on the estate” on Camden’s behalf.
The contract ParkingEye relies upon is therefore not “flowing from the landowner.” It is only between the operator and an agent managing services. There is no evidence that the landowner (Camden Council) have agreed to anything.
The appeal put ParkingEye to strict proof of a contract “flowing from the landowner.” What has been evidenced is only a contract between the landowner’s agent and the operator, with the agent wrongly described as the landowner. The contract is not valid, and therefore the operator has not evidenced that it has any authority to operate or to issue PCNs in its own name at this location.
3. The Site is Not Relevant Land
The car park at Godwin Court & Crowndale Road is not “relevant land” as defined in Schedule 4 of the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 (PoFA). This is because the estate is controlled by Camden Council, which is a statutory traffic authority.
PoFA excludes land provided or controlled by a traffic authority from being classed as relevant land. This applies even if day-to-day management is delegated to a Tenant Management Organisation (TMO) or another agent.
The fact that this site is excluded from PoFA reinforces that Camden Council is the controlling body for this land. ParkingEye has only shown a contract with a TMO, which cannot create landowner rights. The absence of relevant land status underlines that the operator has failed to produce a contract flowing from the actual landowner.
4. Signage Plan Confirms My Position
ParkingEye’s own signage plan confirms my original appeal. A driver entering via the Goldington Crescent NW1 entrance, travelling directly to the launderette, and parking immediately outside (as I did) would not pass any sign displaying the full terms and conditions — neither by car nor on foot.
There are also no signs in the immediate vicinity of the launderette. My walk-around video and photographic evidence clearly demonstrate this. ParkingEye’s signage plan therefore supports my position that the terms and conditions were not properly displayed or communicated.
5. Conclusion
The contract provided has been excessively redacted, hiding critical information such as termination rights.
The agreement is with a managing agent/TMO incorrectly described as the landowner, not with the actual landowner.
Camden Council is the true landowner of the estate, and the operator has failed to demonstrate authority flowing from them.
The site is not relevant land under PoFA, which confirms Camden Council’s control and further undermines ParkingEye’s claim to authority.
The operator’s own signage plan proves that no terms and conditions were passed or displayed along the route I took, nor near the launderette where I parked.
For these reasons, ParkingEye has failed to establish that it has the authority or legal basis to issue and enforce Parking Charge Notices at this location, and has also failed to comply with the BPA Code of Practice regarding proper signage. I respectfully request that POPLA allow this appeal.
Further, it is now apparent that the land is not relevant for the purposes of PoFA and so liability for the charge rests with the unidentified driver. There can be no Keeper liability.Just on the above point. The driver has been identified to them whilst filling out the appeal form. (They are kicking them self for doing this.) (https://emoji.tapatalk-cdn.com/emoji22.png)
I appeal on the following grounds.1. Inadequate signage (BPA AOS Code of Practice v9, Feb 2024)
Whilst there is an estate entrance sign, there were no ParkingEye terms-and-conditions signs between that entrance and the forecourt outside the launderette where the vehicle was parked, nor any readable from the parked position. My walkthrough video shows no operator T&Cs or charge amount at or near the bays used.
BPA CoP v9 requires specific parking-terms signs placed throughout the site so that drivers have the chance to read them at the time of parking/leaving the vehicle; signs must be conspicuous, legible and intelligible (§19.3). With no T&Cs signage at or near the bays, the core terms (including any charge) were neither accessible nor prominent, so no contract could be formed.
2. Lack of transparency / unfair terms (Consumer Rights Act 2015)
Any price/charge term must be transparent and prominent (CRA ss.62, 64(2), 68). No parking charge or key terms were visible or prominent at the relevant location. Enforcing an undisclosed/inaccessible term fails transparency and prominence.
3. Landowner authority and site boundary (PPSCoP v1.1, §14.1(a–j))
ParkingEye is put to strict proof that, on 28/04/2025, it held a valid, contemporaneous, unredacted, written agreement flowing from the landowner. The operator must produce either (i) the full, unredacted contract, or (ii) if relying on a letter of authority, that letter must itself expressly confirm each and every requirement in PPSCoP v1.1 §14.1(a–j). This includes, without limitation, the landowner’s identity, the precise extent of the controlled land (with a boundary/plan), the terms/charge regime permitted, responsibility for and approval of signage (with a sign/location schedule), and express authority to issue and pursue parking charges and legal proceedings in the operator’s own name for the material period. Generic, redacted, templated or out-of-date documents (or witness statements) are not sufficient.
4. Consideration and grace periods (PPSCoP v1.1 §5.1–§5.2 and Annex B) — applied to the facts
The PPSCoP prohibits enforcement unless a driver has first had a reasonable consideration period to locate a bay, identify and read the terms, and decide whether to accept them or leave. Annex B sets minimum timings, which only start to run once a driver encounters a readable T&Cs sign.
At this site there were no T&Cs signs anywhere between the estate entrance and the forecourt outside the launderette, and none readable from the parked position (see video/stills). Because no T&Cs were available to read at or near the bay, the consideration period never began and no contract could be accepted. ANPR timestamps at an estate entrance cannot evidence the start of a parking contract or the expiry of a consideration period where the operator failed to place any T&Cs signage at the relevant location.
Accordingly, enforcing a charge here is improper under §5.1–§5.2 and Annex B. ParkingEye must strictly prove where the nearest readable T&Cs sign was in relation to the bay used and that, after the driver could first read those terms, at least the Annex B minimum consideration time elapsed before enforcement. They cannot do so on this evidence.
5. Operator maladministration — relevance to evidence and weight (context to this appeal)
The operator misaddressed the rejection/POPLA code (copy attached). This proven addressing error is directly relevant to evidential weight and case management. I ask the Assessor to:(i) admit all of my evidence without adverse inference about timing, because timely ADR was denied by the operator’s error;
(ii) require strict proof of any communication the operator claims to have sent (including headers/logs for emails, and proof of correct addressing/service), and place reduced weight on bare assertions; and
(iii) approach the operator’s evidence (including any unsigned/redacted templates) with appropriate caution given this demonstrated administrative inaccuracy.
Conclusion
Given the absence of required T&Cs signage under BPA CoP v9, the lack of transparent/prominent terms (CRA), the consideration/grace requirements, and the lack of strict proof of landowner authority meeting PPSCoP §14.1(a–j), I respectfully request that POPLA allow this appeal and cancel the PCN.
I appeal this PCN on the following grounds:
1. Inadequate signage — BPA Code breach (19.7)
The BPA Code requires entrance signage and specific-terms signs to be placed so drivers can read them at the time of parking; signs must be conspicuous, legible and intelligible, and terms should be available without the motorist having to leave their vehicle or search the site. Where I parked — directly outside the launderette — there were no signs between the site entrance and the launderette, and no sign close enough to my parking spot to bring the terms to my attention before I parked. My video clearly shows the absence of signage at the location I used. Under the Code, this means drivers were not given adequate notice of any terms.
2. Lack of transparency / unfair terms — Consumer Rights Act 2015 (s.62 & s.68)
For any contract to be enforceable, terms must be fair and transparent. Where key terms and charges are not properly displayed or are effectively hidden, they cannot be said to have been accepted by me. Attempting to enforce a charge based on terms that were not visible or intelligible breaches the requirement for transparency and fairness in consumer law.
3. Genuine customer
I was a bona fide customer of the launderette and parked immediately outside while using their service. Penalising genuine customers where signage does not fairly bring the terms to their attention is unreasonable and contrary to proper site management.
Conclusion
Given the absence of required signage where I parked (BPA 19.7), the lack of transparency under the Consumer Rights Act, and the fact I was a genuine customer, I respectfully request that POPLA allow this appeal and cancel the PCN.
Dear Mr xxxx,
We note your submission that you appealed the Parking Charge and received no reply.
Parkingeye can confirm that we received an appeal on 30/05/2025 and a response advising you that your appeal had been unsuccessful and providing you a code to lodge a further appeal to POPLA (Parking On Private Land Appeals) was sent to the email address provided on 30/05/2025 (please see attached).
It is not within Parkingeye’s interest to fail to respond to motorist correspondence as it is preferable to resolve these matters prior to any legal action being taken.
Furthermore, we operate a dedicated appeals team and each appeal is dealt with on a case by case basis.
It is Parkingeye’s position that the time for a POPLA appeal to be lodged has now passed and it is noted that you failed to lodged a further appeal in response to the letter we issued on 30/05/2025, which rejected your appeal. This letter contained a POPLA verification code.
Parkingeye stipulates that any internal appeal must be made within 28 days, which is in line with the Single Code of Practice (para 8.4), and when Parkingeye rejected your appeal, a POPLA code was provided. This code expired after a further 28 days, so the time for a POPLA appeal has now passed.
Once legal action is taken, POPLA is no longer a suitable method of ADR. POPLA does not take into account legal costs incurred and POPLA decisions are not binding upon the motorist, so it is not guaranteed that such an appeal would resolve this matter.
However, there are alternate methods of ADR that Parkingeye remains open to, such as using the Small Claims Mediation Service and/or direct mediation. Such correspondence can be processed via post or email and Parkingeye remain open to considering any correspondence provided in this manner. Please ensure any such correspondence is clearly marked ‘without prejudice’.
We note from your reply to our Letter Before Claim that you dispute the outstanding sum. We can confirm that we have now reviewed your correspondence but it is our position that the Parking Charge remains due.
We can confirm that £130 remains outstanding and that full payment is required within the next 14 days to prevent further action. We are prepared to take legal action if necessary and should court proceedings be issued, further costs will be incurred. These will include, but are not limited to, the court claim issue fee and the solicitors costs referred to within the Letter Before Claim.
If you wish to make payment, you can do so by telephoning our offices on 0330 555 4444, by visiting www.Parkingeye.co.uk, or by posting a cheque/postal order to the below address. Please note that you must quote the above Parking Charge reference on the reverse of the cheque or postal order.
Dear ParkingEye,
This is a formal complaint regarding your handling of Parking Charge [insert reference].
A timely appeal was submitted by the Keeper. No response was received. You failed to issue a Notice of Rejection and failed to provide a POPLA code. This is a breach of the BPA/IPC Private Parking Single Code of Practice (PPSCoP). Your failure has denied the Keeper access to Alternative Dispute Resolution, contrary to the Consumer Rights Act 2015 and the Pre-Action Protocol for Debt Claims.
You have now issued a Letter of Claim. This is premature and procedurally defective. You are attempting to escalate to litigation without exhausting the required appeal and ADR process.
The rebuttable presumption of service under CPR 6.26 is challenged. You are put to strict proof that any Notice of Rejection was properly addressed, posted, and served. The Keeper received no correspondence until the Letter of Claim.
You are required to:• Suspend the Letter of Claim immediately.
• Re-issue the Notice of Rejection.
• Provide a valid POPLA code to enable the Keeper to appeal.
• Confirm compliance with the PPSCoP and provide evidence of service.
Failure to comply will result in escalation to the DVLA and the BPA for breach of the PPSCoP and unlawful use of keeper data under your KADOE contract.
This complaint does not constitute an admission of liability. All rights are reserved.
Yours faithfully,
[Your Name]
Registered Keeper
[PCN Reference]