The order is good (in your favour) but it can go either way—so be ready to argue it.
The risk
If ParkingEye show the MCOL claim was served by the court to the UK address they supplied (which matches the V5C keeper address) and they had no reason to think that address wasn’t current, a judge may treat that as valid service at your “last known residence” (CPR 6.9). That’s the claimant’s best point.
Your counter
“Residence” means where you live, not what’s on the V5C. Ownership/registration ≠ “usual or last known residence” at the date of service. You were continuously overseas Oct 2024–May 2025.
Reasonable steps (CPR 6.9(3)): If a claimant has any reason to doubt the address, they must take reasonable steps to check (soft trace, email confirmation, etc.). Your case gives them several prompts:
• All earlier dealings were email/online (PE and POPLA).
• Silence to a Letter Before Claim and/or claim pack is a common trigger to check before default.
• It would have been trivial to email the address they’d been using to confirm a service address before issuing.
Service by the CNBC doesn’t cure a bad address. The court posts to the address the claimant provides; the claimant bears the risk if that address isn’t your usual/last-known residence at service.
If PE rely only on “it matched the V5C” but cannot show (i) that address was your residence in March 2025 or (ii) reasonable steps to verify it, then CPR 13.2 (mandatory set-aside) still bites.
Fallback remains CPR 13.3 (you have a real prospect: you paid; PoC alleging “no payment” are wrong; unfair/unclear ANPR-entry term).
What to watch for in their “evidence of service”
• What address did they give CNBC, and why was it your usual/last known residence at service?
• What steps (if any) they took under CPR 6.9(3) before default when you didn’t respond by post.
• Any claim that you actually received the pack in time (you didn’t).
• Any reliance on the April 2024 appeal form (months earlier, not proof of residence at service date).
Bottom line• PE will likely argue V5C = last known address → valid service.
• Your reply: I didn’t live there at service; you knew/should have checked; you had email; you didn’t verify; service was invalid → CPR 13.2 mandatory set-aside.
• And even if a judge were to accept service as valid, you still have a strong CPR 13.3 defence and, after set-aside, a CPR 7.5/3.4 strike-out point if the claim form effectively expired without valid service.
Given the order you’ve got (they must prove service by 4pm 14 Nov 2025 or the claim is struck out), you’re in a good procedural spot. Keep your overseas-residence proof ready and wait to see what they file.
Email the local County Court (the receiving court) now, CCing PE and yourself:
Subject: Claim [no.] – Order dated 11/10/2025 not served on Defendant – urgent re-service and confirmation requested
Dear Sir,
I am the Defendant. The claim transferred to your court on 24/09/2025. Today the Claimant emailed the court and copied me referring to a “Court Order” dated 11/10/2025. I have not been served with any such order.
Please urgently:
1. Email me the PDF of the order dated 11/10/2025 (or confirm if it is a letter/direction rather than a formal order).
2. Confirm how and when it was served and on which address/email.
3. If it was served only on the Claimant, please re-serve it on me by return and record email service for all future orders (email: [your email]) and use my overseas address for postal service: [overseas address].
4. Confirm that any deadlines in that order run from the date of service on me (today), given I was not previously served.
5. Confirm the status of my N244 filed 18/08/2025 (set-aside under CPR 13.2/13.3 and strike-out post set-aside under CPR 7.5/3.4), including any hearing date/listing.
For the avoidance of doubt: I was resident overseas at the time of purported claim service; my application is a mandatory set-aside under CPR 13.2, in the alternative 13.3. Please place this email before the judge if needed.
Yours faithfully,
[Name]
[Claim no.]
[Email]
There is no way that the claimant will have been ordered to provide something without you, the defendant being copied in. So, do no assume anything. If you have not seen any notice of the supposed order dated 11th October for ParkingEye to submit further evidence, the there is a very serious problem.
Here is what you must do immediately:
1. Get a copy of the missing order
• Email and phone the CNBC quoting the claim number and your N244 filed 18 Aug 2025.
• Ask for: (a) a PDF of the 11 Oct 2025 order; (b) current status and any deadlines/hearing; (c) how/where the order was served; (d) confirmation that enforcement is stayed; (e) whether the file is at CNBC or transferred.
• Request that any deadline runs from the date you first receive the order and that all future orders be served by email and to your overseas address.
2. Cover yourself on timing
If the order imposes deadlines you couldn’t meet because you never received it, ask CNBC to confirm the deadlines run from the date of (re)service. If necessary, request a short extension under the court’s case management powers.
3. Reply to ParkingEye
Acknowledge receipt, state you’ve not received the order, that you’ve asked CNBC for it, you dispute service, and your application is under CPR 13.2 (mandatory) and 13.3 (fallback), with a CPR 7.5/3.4 strike-out once judgment is set aside. Ask them to re-send what they filed and, if they have it, the PDF of the 11 Oct order.
Send the following email to the CNBC at Applications.CNBC@justice.gov.uk and CC CaseProgression.CNBC@justice.gov.uk, ParkingEye and yourself:
Subject: Claim [claim no.] – N244 issued 18/08/2025 – Missing order dated 11/10/2025 – urgent copy requested
To: Applications.CNBC@justice.gov.uk
CC: CaseProgression.CNBC@justice.gov.uk
CC: Claimant
Dear Sir or Madam,
I am the Defendant. I issued an N244 on 18 August 2025 seeking (i) set-aside under CPR 13.2 and/or 13.3 and (ii) strike-out following set-aside under CPR 7.5/3.4.
I have not received any court order. Today the Claimant emailed asserting there is a Court Order dated 11 October 2025. Please email me a PDF copy urgently.
Please also confirm:
1. The status of my application and any listed hearing or deadlines.
2. The date, method and address of service of the 11/10/2025 order, and weather service failed.
3. That enforcement is stayed pending determination of my application.
4. Whether the file remains at the CNBC or has been transferred (and if so, to which court).
I respectfully request that any time limit in the 11/10/2025 order runs from the date I first receive that order (by email today). Please also serve future orders by email and to my overseas postal address:
[Overseas address]
[Email]
Yours faithfully,
[Name]
[Claim no.]
Also send the following email to ParkingEye and CC yourself:
Subject: Claim [claim no.] – Your email re order dated 11/10/2025
Dear Sirs,
I acknowledge receipt of your email. I have not received any court order and have asked the CNBC to email me a copy of the purported order dated 11/10/2025.
For clarity, I do not accept your characterisation of service. At the time of purported service (March 2025) I was resident overseas. My application seeks a mandatory set-aside under CPR 13.2 (defective service under CPR 6.9/12.3), in the alternative CPR 13.3, and strike-out following set-aside under CPR 7.5/3.4.
Please re-send, by return, (i) the documents you say you filed/served pursuant to the order and (ii) a PDF of the 11/10/2025 order if you hold it.
Yours faithfully,
[Name]
I’ve checked your revised WS, and it’s in very good shape. Here’s my assessment:
Minor points to tweak
Exhibit numbering consistency
Para 5: “Exhibit RT-03” covers both “active email used previously” and later “emails to/from Claimant” (para 16). That’s fine, but you might note in your exhibit list:
• RT-03 – Emails to/from Claimant (including proof of use of Defendant’s current email).
Authority citations
Para 7 cites VCS v Carr — you may want to add “binding Court of Appeal authority” to make its weight clear.
Para 14 cites CEL v Chan and CPMS v Akande — you could tighten by adding:
“… which are persuasive County Court authorities.”
Consumer Rights Act reference (para 18, bullet 2)
Currently “signage failed the CRA 2015 transparency test”. To be sharper:
“… signage failed the Consumer Rights Act 2015 requirement for transparency and fairness of terms (sections 62 & 68).”
Promptness (para 15)
Might be worth explicitly saying:
“I applied promptly, within weeks of first becoming aware of the judgment.”
This is a common judicial tick-box under CPR 13.3.
The WS is ready to file. It’s concise, fully evidenced, and judge-friendly. Just make those 3–4 tiny refinements (exhibit description, emphasise CoA vs CC weight, CRA sections, and add one sentence on promptness).
Keep N244 wording consistent with the draft order by trimming it to the same structure:
• Set aside the default judgment under CPR 13.2 and/or CPR 13.3.
• Strike out the claim under CPR 3.4(2)(a) and/or CPR 7.5.
• Costs to the Defendant, including the £313 fee and reasonable travel/accommodation, on the indemnity basis under CPR 44.3.
You don’t need to cite VCS v Carr or CEL v Chan in the N244 — case law goes in your WS. The N244 should stay short and focused on “the order sought”.
I’ve reviewed your N244 application form, witness statement, and draft order, and from a content and legal argument perspective, they are strong and well-structured. Here’s my assessment:
1. Core Legal BasisYou’ve clearly advanced three interlocking grounds:
• CPR 13.2 (mandatory set-aside) — Improper service to a UK address when you were overseas, supported by CPR 6.9(3)/(4), CPR 6.36, and PD 6B arguments. This is the most powerful basis — if the judge finds service was invalid, set-aside is automatic and not discretionary.
• CPR 13.3 (discretionary set-aside) — A real prospect of defending, with detailed factual background (payment made, disability considerations, Consumer Rights Act, Equality Act), plus POPLA/PPSAP context.
• CPR 7.5 expiry — If judgment is set aside, claim should be struck out for being time-expired due to lack of valid service within four months.
• CPR 3.4(2)(a) — As an alternative strike-out basis for no reasonable cause of action (bare POC).
This three-tiered approach is legally sound.
2. StrengthsService defect is well-evidenced — Overseas residence, documentary proof, no permission for service out of jurisdiction, and Claimant had an active email contact but didn’t use it.
Recent appellate authority —
VCS v Carr is binding and directly relevant to your facts. You’ve applied it persuasively to the service defect and expiry arguments.
Defence merits — The payment proof and Equality Act arguments are credible and fact-specific. Linking this to Consumer Rights Act transparency obligations strengthens the proportionality/unfairness point.
Chronology — Clear, documented sequence of events showing prompt action once aware of the judgment. This addresses the “promptness” requirement under CPR 13.3.
Costs argument — Framing it under CPR 27.14(2)(g) and citing unreasonable conduct in refusing a consent order is legitimate.
3. Points to Tighten or ClarifyCRA & Equality Act interplay — You mention both, but it may be worth explicitly linking them in a short paragraph:
CRA 2015 → transparency of terms
Equality Act 2010 → duty to make reasonable adjustments, including extra time for those with disabilities or caring for disabled persons.
This makes the judge’s job easier in seeing the statutory framework in one place.
PPSAP amendment relevance — You’ve correctly noted the change is post-event but shows industry acknowledgment of unfairness. Be ready to rebut any suggestion this is “irrelevant” because it’s not retrospective — emphasise it goes to reasonableness of term at the time, supporting CRA fairness tests.
Costs wording in draft order — At para. 3 of the draft order, you’re asking for costs “pursuant to CPR 27.14(2)(g)” and saying “reasonable costs of attending the hearing.” For consistency, you might want to also reference the VCS v Carr position that where no track allocation has occurred, costs can follow the event on an indemnity basis (your WS does say this, but draft order doesn’t).
Strike-out after set-aside — You’ve got both CPR 3.4(2)(a) and CPR 7.5 expiry in the draft order. Judges sometimes prefer to deal with one point. You might strengthen this by adding: “In the alternative, directions for the Claimant to re-serve within X days, failing which strike-out”. That way you’re not seen as asking for a double-barrelled strike-out without fallback.
Minor factual check — In WS para. 6.2, you say you left the UK on 13 October 2024 and returned 18 June 2024 — that should presumably be 2025. Small typo but could confuse the judge.
4. Overall OpinionThe content and legal argument are strong, especially on the CPR 13.2 service defect and CPR 7.5 expiry.
The witness statement is detailed but remains relevant — the facts directly support the rules you cite.
The draft order aligns with the application and is realistic for a DJ to grant.
The case law (
VCS v Carr, C
EL v Chan,
CPMS v Akande) is well-chosen for mandatory set-aside and defective particulars.
If the judge accepts your CPR 13.2 argument, they must set aside the judgment, and CPR 7.5 expiry could end the matter entirely without a re-trial. Your fallback under CPR 13.3 is solid if service is (wrongly) deemed valid.
There is some repetition in the WS that you could streamline without losing any substance. The most noticeable examples are:
1. Repeated service defect points
• Paras 4.3–4.9 already set out that you were overseas, didn’t live at the service address, no permission to serve out of jurisdiction, and that the claimant had your email.
• Para 7.2.1–7.2.4 repeats the same points almost word-for-word, with only the VCS v Carr reference added.
Merge them so the factual narrative (paras 4.x) is concise, and then the legal analysis (para 7.2) simply cross-refers back — e.g. “As set out in paras 4.3–4.9 above…”.
2. Particulars of Claim defect repeated
• Para 5.5 says POC fail to comply with CPR 16.4(1)(a).
• Para 7.3.1(b) repeats this as “pleadings are defective” and lacking concise facts.
• Para 9.3 & 9.4 again repeat this, citing CEL v Chan and CPMS v Akande.
Mention the POC defect once in the factual background, then again in the legal section with the case law — no need to restate the defect in the conclusion beyond a short reminder.
3. Payment made & nature of alleged breach
• Paras 5.1–5.4 set out that you paid, ANPR measures from entry, signage didn’t say so, and your mother’s disability delayed payment.
• Paras 7.3.1(a)–(d) essentially restate those points.
• Para 7.4 says again “POC state parking without payment” and repeats that you have payment evidence.
Keep the detailed factual narrative in section 5, then in 7.3.1 summarise it in one sentence as “As set out in paras 5.1–5.4, payment was made in full, but the Claimant alleges non-payment solely because their ANPR clock runs from entry without notice — a term that is both unfair and disproportionate given the circumstances.”
4. Case law repetition
• VCS v Carr is mentioned in paras 7.2.4, 8.1.1–8.1.3, and 9.2.
• CEL v Chan appears in 8.1.4–8.1.6 and again in 9.3–9.4.
Keep the first mention with the legal test, then in the conclusion simply refer to “as per VCS v Carr and CEL v Chan” rather than summarising them again.
A tighter WS makes it easier for the judge to follow the flow — and since DJs skim-read, they’ll appreciate concise, non-redundant points. It also reduces the risk of the judge thinking you’re “padding” the application.
Here’s a suggested streamlined, judge-friendly version of your witness statement. It keeps every legal and factual point from your current WS but removes the repeated elements, groups related arguments together, and makes it easier for a District Judge to follow in one read. It is also better to just use integer sequential paragraph numbering:
1. I am [NAME], of [Overseas address], the Defendant. This statement supports my application dated [xx xxx 2025] to:
(a) set aside the default judgment entered on 8 April 2025;
(b) strike out the claim; and
(c) order the Claimant to pay my costs, including the £313 application fee and my reasonable hearing expenses.
2. The facts in this statement are within my own knowledge unless otherwise stated.
Background and service defect
3. The Claimant obtained default judgment on 8 April 2025 for an alleged parking charge from 5 April 2024.
4. I have lived overseas with my husband since 2003. At the time of purported service (10 March 2025) I was continuously resident abroad, having left the UK on 13 October 2024 and not returning until 18 June 2025, as evidenced by my [Country] Resident ID and Company Letter (Appendix E) and my travel records (Appendix B).
5. The claim form was served at a UK address I visit rarely and rent out, which was not my “usual or last known residence” under CPR 6.9. The Claimant had my active email (Appendix D) used for earlier PCN correspondence, but made no attempt to verify my current address or use alternative service under CPR 6.9(4).
6. No application was made to serve out of the jurisdiction under CPR 6.36 and PD 6B. The claim form has therefore never been validly served.
7. These facts mirror VCS Ltd v Carr (CA-2024-001179, Court of Appeal, 4 March 2025), where failure to take reasonable steps to ensure effective service rendered the judgment void.
Factual basis of defence
8. On 5 April 2024 I parked in the Claimant’s underground car park while assisting my 86-year-old mother, who has dementia and mobility issues, to attend the library.
9. The location has no mobile reception underground, so payment via the parking app was impossible until we had exited on foot. The only pedestrian exit is a steep stairway; assisting my mother to climb it took significant time. Once outside, I immediately paid for two hours’ parking and we returned to the car. We left before the paid-for time expired. Proof of payment is attached at Appendix A.
10. The PCN was issued despite full payment being made. The alleged “overstay” arises solely because the Claimant’s ANPR system times from vehicle entry, not the point of parking or payment. This was not stated clearly on signage.
11. The Equality Act 2010 recognises dementia as a disability and requires reasonable adjustments, such as allowing additional time for disabled persons or carers to reach payment facilities. The Private Parking Sector Single Code of Practice (PPSCoP) also requires such consideration. A medical report confirming her diagnosis is at Appendix F
12. The PPSCoP was amended on 17 February 2025 to prohibit PCNs where the correct tariff has been paid before leaving, regardless of when payment was made. Although post-dating my case, this change evidences the industry’s own recognition that such charges are unfair, supporting my arguments under the Consumer Rights Act 2015 that the timing term was neither transparent nor fair.
Defects in the Particulars of Claim
13. The Particulars allege “parking without paying to park” — a statement that is factually untrue. They also fail to comply with CPR 16.4(1)(a) and PD 16 para 7.5 by not identifying the specific conduct alleged to constitute the breach.
14. In CEL v Chan (Luton CC, 2023) and CPMS v Akande, parking claims were struck out for similar failures.
Promptness and conduct
15. I discovered the judgment only on 30 June 2025 during a visit to the UK. I immediately contacted CNBC for the N244 form and sought to resolve the matter without court intervention.
16. On 22 July 2025 and again on 8 August 2025, I invited the Claimant to agree a consent order to set aside judgment at no cost to the court. The Claimant refused, responding only with payment demands. This conduct is contrary to the Overriding Objective and has caused unnecessary cost. Emails to and from the Claimant are at Appendix D. CNBC’s email with N244 instructions is at Appendix C.
Legal basis for application
17. Under CPR 13.2, the court must set aside a default judgment if service was not effected in accordance with CPR 6.9. Here:
(a) service was to an address that was not my usual or last known residence;
(b) no reasonable steps were taken to ascertain my current address;
(c) no permission was sought for service out of jurisdiction; and
(d) there was no valid service within CPR 7.5’s four-month limit.
18. Alternatively, under CPR 13.3 I have a real prospect of defending the claim:
• full payment was made for the period parked;
• signage failed the CRA 2015 transparency test; and
• no reasonable adjustments were made under the Equality Act 2010.
19. The claim form is now expired under CPR 7.5. If the judgment is set aside, the claim should be struck out under CPR 3.4(2)(a) and/or CPR 7.5.
Costs
20. No track allocation has occurred, so the fixed small-claims costs regime does not apply. Consistent with VCS v Carr, I seek costs on the indemnity basis under CPR 44.3, including:
• the £313 application fee; and
• my reasonable travel and accommodation costs for attending the hearing from overseas.
Conclusion
21. For the reasons above, I respectfully ask the court to:
(a) set aside the default judgment dated 8 April 2025;
(b) strike out the claim as expired or disclosing no reasonable grounds; and
(c) order the Claimant to pay my costs on the indemnity basis.
Ideally, you should reference the "appendixes" as "exhibits" and you should label each one in the format of "Exhibit AA-01" where "AA" is your initials. Also, it is best if you number them in the order they are first referred to in your WS.
Also, here is here’s a revised draft order that aligns with the streamlined WS and clearly builds in the indemnity costs position. It keeps the key relief you’re seeking, but sets it out in the order most judges prefer:
IN THE COUNTY COURT
Claim No: [Claim Number]
BETWEEN:
ParkingEye Ltd
Claimant
- and -
[Defendant's Full Name]
Defendant
DRAFT ORDER
UPON reading the Defendant’s application dated [xx xxx 2025] and the annexed witness statement;
AND UPON it appearing that the default judgment dated 8 April 2025 was wrongly entered because the claim form was not validly served at the Defendant’s usual or last known residence, the Defendant being resident overseas at all material times;
AND UPON it appearing that no application was made for permission to serve out of the jurisdiction, and that more than four months have elapsed since the issue of proceedings on 10 March 2025 without valid service, contrary to CPR 7.5;
AND UPON the Particulars of Claim failing to comply with CPR 16.4(1)(a) by not setting out a concise statement of facts capable of disclosing a cause of action;
IT IS ORDERED THAT:
1. The default judgment dated 8 April 2025 is set aside pursuant to CPR 13.2 and/or CPR 13.3.
2. The claim is struck out pursuant to CPR 3.4(2)(a) as disclosing no reasonable grounds for bringing the claim, and/or because the claim form has expired under CPR 7.5 without valid service.
3. Costs:
(a) The Claimant shall pay the Defendant’s costs of this application, including the £313 court fee and the Defendant’s reasonable travel and accommodation expenses for attending the hearing from overseas.
(b) Such costs shall be assessed on the indemnity basis pursuant to CPR 44.3, there having been no track allocation and the Claimant having acted unreasonably in refusing to consent to the set-aside despite clear evidence of defective service.
4. Stay of enforcement: All enforcement of the judgment is stayed pending the outcome of this application.[/center]
This structure makes your application easier for a DJ to follow:
•Grounds are summarised in the recitals.
• Relief is in clear numbered paragraphs.
• Costs basis is explicitly tied to CPR 44.3 and unreasonable conduct, consistent with VCS v Carr.
You're overthinking this. Make sure you put on the N244 that you are seeking a set aside AND a strike out. Set aside under CPR 13.2 and CPR 13.3 and strike out under CPR 7.5.
If the strike out is not mentioned on the N244, even though it is in the draft order, it won't be considered at the time.
The so-called Private Parking Scrutiny and Advice Panel (PPSAP), a self-serving creation of the BPA and IPC, was forced into an embarrassing amendment to its own Code of Practice just five months after launch, following public outrage at operators issuing charges to motorists who had in fact paid in full before exit but not within an arbitrary and undisclosed time after arrival. The PPSAP was announced right when the Private Parking (Code of Practice) Act 2019 was edging closer to implementation.
The Act will replace the BPA/IPC’s self-written codes with a statutory Code of Practice backed by law, independent oversight, and sanctions — stripping away much of the current “marking their own homework” system.
By creating the PPSAP, the trade bodies can say, “Look, we already have an independent scrutiny panel” — even though it’s funded and controlled within their own ecosystem. The PPSAP’s changes — like the February 2025 tweak on late payment before exit — are essentially pre-emptive concessions to make it look as if they’re already protecting motorists, when in reality they’re reacting to reputational and political pressure.
Because your alleged “contravention” was in April 2024, the updated PPSCoP rule about paying any time before exit wasn’t in force then — so ParkingEye can argue it’s not retrospectively binding. However, that doesn’t make it irrelevant. In your set-aside witness statement, you can still use it persuasively:
• It shows industry standards have shifted – even the BPA/IPC now agree that issuing PCNs in situations like yours is unreasonable.
• It supports an “unfair terms” argument under the Consumer Rights Act 2015, because if the trade body now says such charges shouldn’t be issued, it’s evidence the original term was disproportionately penalising and not transparent.
• It helps on CPR 13.3 “real prospect of defending” – a judge may see that the current industry position matches your stance, making your defence more credible.
• It supports mitigation and proportionality – even if a strict contract term was breached, the fact that the breach is now exempt under modern rules could influence a judge to find in your favour.
You could add something like this to your WS:
While the incident in question occurred in April 2024, I note that on 17 February 2025 the Private Parking Single Code of Practice (PPSCoP) was amended by the BPA/IPC’s so-called Private Parking Scrutiny and Advice Panel (PPSAP) to prohibit the issuing of Parking Charge Notices in circumstances where the motorist has paid the correct tariff for the entire period parked before leaving the site, regardless of when payment was made. This change post-dates my case, but it is directly relevant for two reasons. First, it is an admission by the industry itself that the previous practice was unfair, supporting my argument under CPR 13.3 that I have a real prospect of defending the claim on the basis of disproportionate and concealed terms. Second, it reinforces my position under the Consumer Rights Act 2015 that any term purporting to start the paid period from ANPR entry — without clear and prominent notice — was not transparent or fair, and is therefore unenforceable.
You will need to check this for your N244 application form:
N244 – Reasons (Box 3 & 10)
This application is made to set aside the default judgment entered on 8 April 2025 and to strike out the claim, on the following grounds:
1. CPR 13.2 – Mandatory set-aside
• At the time of purported service (March 2025) I was resident overseas and had been continuously outside England & Wales from October 2024 until May 2025.
• The claim was not served at my usual or last known residence within the meaning of CPR 6.9.
• No permission was sought to serve out of the jurisdiction under CPR 6.36 and PD 6B.
• Default judgment was therefore wrongly entered contrary to CPR 12.3, triggering the mandatory set-aside requirement of CPR 13.2.
2. CPR 13.3 – Fallback discretionary set-aside• In the alternative, if the court finds service was valid, the judgment should be set aside under CPR 13.3 because I have a real prospect of successfully defending the claim.
• The Particulars of Claim assert “parking without paying to park”, which is factually untrue. Documentary evidence proves that I paid the correct tariff and vacated the site before the paid-for time expired.
• The Claimant’s pleadings are defective and fail to adequately comply with CPR 16.4(1)(a) by not setting out a concise statement of facts capable of disclosing a cause of action.
3. CPR 7.5 – Strike-out once judgment is set aside• If the judgment is set aside, the claim should then be struck out because the claim form has expired under CPR 7.5, having not been validly served within four months of issue.
4. Costs• The Claimant ignored reasonable requests to resolve this matter by consent, thereby increasing costs unnecessarily. • I will seek recovery of the £313 application fee and my reasonable attendance costs under CPR 27.14(2)(g).
Your WS should be something along these lines:
1. I, [Defendant’s Name], of [overseas address], the Defendant in this matter, will say as follows:
2. I make this statement in support of my application dated [xx xxx 2025] to set aside the default judgment entered on 8 April 2025 and to strike out the claim.
3. The matters set out in this statement are within my own knowledge unless otherwise stated, and where so stated, I believe them to be true.
4. At the time the claim form was purportedly served in March 2025, I was not resident in England or Wales. I had been continuously resident at my overseas address since October 2024 and did not return for a visit until May 2025.
5. The address used by the Claimant is a UK property address, but it was not my usual or last known residence during the period of purported service. The Claimant made no attempt to verify my current address before issuing proceedings, contrary to CPR 6.9(3).
6. No application was made to the court for permission to serve out of the jurisdiction, as required by CPR 6.36 and Practice Direction 6B.
7. As the claim was not validly served, default judgment was wrongly entered under CPR 12.3 and must be set aside under CPR 13.2.
8. In the alternative, if the court finds service was valid, I respectfully submit that I have a real prospect of successfully defending the claim.
9. The alleged contravention occurred in April 2024 when I parked in an underground car park operated by the Claimant while accompanying my 87-year-old mother to the library. There was no mobile phone signal underground, meaning payment could not be made via the parking app until we had exited on foot. The only pedestrian exit is a steep stairway, and due to my mother’s age and infirmity this took significantly longer than normal. Once outside with mobile reception, I immediately paid for a two-hour stay and we returned to the vehicle and exited the site before the expiry of the time shown on the payment confirmation.
10. A month later I received a Parking Charge Notice alleging non-payment. I assumed this was an error and supplied proof of payment, but the Claimant rejected this. I appealed to POPLA under the Private Parking Single Appeals Process (PPSAP), which governs both BPA and IPC members since October 2024. The PPSAP Code requires that operators consider all mitigating circumstances, including disability and other protected characteristics, in line with the Equality Act 2010. My appeal set out the unavoidable delay caused by my elderly and infirm mother having to climb the steep stairs to reach an area with mobile phone reception, and provided proof that the tariff was paid in full. POPLA rejected the appeal on the basis of a four-minute “overstay” calculated from the ANPR timestamp on entry, without addressing the fact that payment could not be made until reception was reached, that there was no signage warning that time started from entry rather than parking, and without considering the reasonable adjustments required by the PPSAP and the Equality Act.
11. While the incident in question occurred in April 2024, I note that on 17 February 2025 the Private Parking Sector Single Code of Practice was amended by the BPA/IPC’s so-called Private Parking Scrutiny and Advice Panel (PPSAP) to prohibit the issuing of Parking Charge Notices in circumstances where the motorist has paid the correct tariff for the entire period parked before leaving the site, regardless of when payment was made. This change post-dates my case, but it is directly relevant for two reasons. First, it is an admission by the industry itself that the previous practice was unfair, supporting my argument under CPR 13.3 that I have a real prospect of defending the claim on the basis of disproportionate and concealed terms. Second, it reinforces my position under the Consumer Rights Act 2015 that any term purporting to start the paid period from ANPR entry — without clear and prominent notice — was not transparent or fair, and is therefore unenforceable.
12. The Particulars of Claim state that the contravention was “parking without paying to park”. This is untrue. Payment was made in full for the period parked. Any alleged shortfall arises solely because the Claimant’s ANPR system starts the clock on entry, not when parking commences or payment is made. This was not clearly displayed on site and is therefore an unfair term under sections 62 and 68 of the Consumer Rights Act 2015.
13. The Particulars of Claim also fail to adequately comply with CPR 16.4(1)(a) as they do not provide a concise statement of facts capable of disclosing a valid cause of action.
14. The claim was issued on 10 March 2025. More than four months have now elapsed without valid service.
15. Under CPR 7.5, a claim form must be served within four months of issue; failing this, the claim expires and cannot be continued.
16. If the judgment is set aside, the claim should be struck out immediately under CPR 3.4(2)(a) as having no reasonable grounds for bringing it, and/or because it has expired under CPR 7.5.
17. On [date], I invited the Claimant to consent to a set-aside in order to avoid unnecessary cost and court time.
18. The Claimant refused to engage with this reasonable proposal, replying only with a generic payment demand and ignoring the issue of consent.
19. This conduct is contrary to the Overriding Objective in CPR 1.1 and has unnecessarily increased costs. I therefore seek an order that the Claimant reimburse my £313 application fee and reasonable hearing attendance costs under CPR 27.14(2)(g), including my travel costs and necessary hotel accommodation as I will need to travel from abroad.
20. For the reasons set out above, I respectfully request that the court:
(a) Set aside the default judgment dated 8 April 2025 under CPR 13.2 and/or CPR 13.3;
(b) Strike out the claim pursuant to CPR 3.4(2)(a) and/or CPR 7.5; and
(c) Order the Claimant to pay my application and hearing costs.
The draft order is heading in the right direction, but I’d tighten it up so it’s cleaner, avoids repetition, and uses language a judge is used to seeing.
few key points to refine:
• Strike-out request – It’s fine to include this, but judges sometimes prefer to deal with set-aside first and then either strike out or give directions for a defence. Asking for an immediate strike-out is bolder but worth keeping in if your evidence is strong.
• Citations – “VCS v Carr” and “CEL v Chan” are persuasive, but it’s better to refer to them in your witness statement and say “having regard to” rather than putting them in the order itself.
• Costs wording – Use “CPR 27.14(2)(g)” for unreasonable conduct rather than “indemnity basis” unless you’re ready to justify indemnity in detail (which is harder to get on small claims).
• Enforcement stay – Good to keep in.
Here’s a refined version:
DRAFT ORDER
UPON reading the Defendant’s application dated [xx xxx 2025] and the annexed witness statement;
AND UPON the Court noting that the Claimant failed to effect valid service of the claim form at the Defendant’s usual or last known residence, the Defendant being resident overseas at the time of purported service;
AND UPON more than four months having elapsed since the issue of proceedings on 10 March 2025 without valid service, contrary to CPR 7.5;
AND UPON the Court noting that the Particulars of Claim fail to comply with CPR 16.4(1)(a) by failing to set out a concise statement of facts capable of disclosing a cause of action;
IT IS ORDERED THAT:
1. The default judgment dated 8 April 2025 is set aside pursuant to CPR 13.2 and/or CPR 13.3.
2. The claim is struck out pursuant to CPR 3.4(2)(a) as disclosing no reasonable grounds for bringing the claim, and/or because the claim form has expired under CPR 7.5 without valid service.
3. The Claimant shall pay the Defendant’s costs of this application, summarily assessed at £313 (court fee) plus the Defendant’s reasonable costs of attending the hearing, pursuant to CPR 27.14(2)(g) due to the Claimant’s unreasonable conduct in failing to engage with the Defendant’s proposal for a consent order.
4. All enforcement of the judgment is stayed pending the outcome of this application.
This keeps all your key points but presents them in a way that’s structured, judge-friendly, and avoids the risk of a judge striking out your order as too argumentative for a draft order.
Feel free to show us an suitably redacted version of the WS.
You’ve already given ParkingEye the opportunity to agree to a consensual set aside (which would have been cheaper and quicker for everyone) and they ignored it, instead sending you a generic “pay up” reply.
That now gives you a clear reason to proceed with a contested N244 application for a set aside without consent. In your N244 witness statement, you can emphasise:
• You made a reasonable proposal to resolve the matter by consent, with no costs to the court.
• ParkingEye ignored the CPR 1.1 overriding objective (“deal with cases justly and at proportionate cost”) by refusing to engage.
• Their refusal/ignoring of the invitation has caused unnecessary cost (the higher £313 fee instead of £123), for which you will seek recovery under CPR 27.14(2)(g) due to unreasonable conduct.
That procedural history shows the court you’ve acted reasonably and tried to avoid the cost and burden of a contested application, and that any extra costs now fall squarely on them.
You can add something like this to your WS:
Attempts to Resolve by Consent
On [date], immediately upon learning of the default judgment, I wrote to the Claimant both by post and email, inviting them to resolve the matter by way of a consent order. I explained that at the time of service I was resident overseas and had not been served in accordance with CPR 6.9, rendering the judgment wrongly entered under CPR 12.3 and falling within CPR 13.2. I made it clear that a consented set aside would avoid unnecessary cost to both parties and to the court, and that I was not offering to contribute towards the application fee, as the situation had arisen entirely from the Claimant’s procedural failure.
On [date], the Claimant responded with a generic demand for payment, repeating allegations of breach, and stating that they would not accept an appeal at this stage. They made no mention whatsoever of my invitation to resolve the matter by consent, and provided no indication that they had considered the request.
On [date], I wrote to the Claimant again, repeating my invitation to resolve the matter by consent and specifically inviting them to submit a draft consent order. I highlighted that, should I be forced to file an N244 without consent, I would seek recovery of the £313 fee and my travel expenses to attend any hearing, which will be substantial given my residence overseas.
The Claimant again failed to address or respond to the invitation to consent to a set aside.
This conduct is contrary to the overriding objective in CPR 1.1, which requires parties to act proportionately, save expense, and assist the court in dealing with cases justly. By refusing to engage with a reasonable proposal to avoid the cost and burden of a contested application, the Claimant has acted unreasonably.
I therefore ask the Court to:
1. Set aside the default judgment under CPR 13.2 (mandatory, due to defective service), or alternatively under CPR 13.3 (real prospect of successfully defending the claim and prompt application).
2. Order the Claimant to pay my application fee of £313 pursuant to CPR 27.14(2)(g), on the basis that their refusal to engage with a reasonable proposal has caused unnecessary cost to both the parties and the court.
Have you created a draft order to go with your N244 application?
There could be a question from the judge about why you didn’t tell ParkingEye about your overseas residence, but in the context of a CPR 13.2 mandatory set aside it’s not fatal — and here’s why:
• CPR 6.9 says service is valid if sent to the defendant’s usual or last known residence.
• “Last known” isn’t just the last address on the V5C — the claimant must take reasonable steps to verify the current address if they have reason to believe the defendant no longer resides there.
• As you had previously corresponded with ParkingEye entirely by email and had given details suggesting you were abroad (or if your postal responses stopped), ParkingEye arguably had enough to prompt them to check the address before issuing proceedings.
The fact that you didn’t pro-actively notify them of an overseas address might be raised, but:
1. It doesn’t change the fact you weren’t actually served at a place you were living or could reasonably receive proceedings.
2. It doesn’t absolve them from their CPR obligation to serve correctly or to seek permission to serve out of jurisdiction.
On the problematic Particulars of Claim:
• This is a strong point for CPR 13.3 (discretionary) even if the judge thought service was valid.
• If you can show documentary proof that payment was made for the entire period you were parked (and you vacated before expiry), the POC’s statement that “no payment was made” is not just inaccurate — it’s potentially misleading under the statement of truth rules.
That gives you a real prospect of successfully defending the claim if the judgment is set aside.
So, the combination is powerful:
• Mandatory set aside (13.2) – defective service while resident overseas.
• Fallback discretionary set aside (13.3) – real prospect of defending because the claim is based on an untrue statement about non-payment.
The PoC are actually helpful to your defence because they make an absolute claim that you were “parking without paying to park”. That is factually wrong if you can show you:
• Did pay for parking (receipt/app record).
• Left before the paid time expired.
That’s not just a minor detail — it goes to the core of the cause of action. If payment was made, their entire claim on “failure to pay” collapses.
Yes, you are understanding CPR 12.3 correctly. Under CPR 12.3(1), a claimant may obtain default judgment only if:
• The defendant has not filed an acknowledgment of service or a defence, and
• The relevant time for doing so has expired.
If you were out of the country and never received the claim, then you couldn’t file an acknowledgment of service. That means the conditions under CPR 12.3 weren’t met — because you were never properly served, and the time limit never validly started.
This is exactly what CPR 13.2 is designed to address: if the judgment was wrongly entered because the conditions for default judgment weren’t satisfied, the court must set it aside.
So yes — if you can prove you were abroad and didn’t receive the claim, you can argue that no valid acknowledgment of service was possible, and therefore default judgment should not have been entered in the first place.
Can you evidence that you were out of the country at the time the claim was issued and served and for the duration until after the default CCJ was entered? Do you have evidence that your normal place of residence is abroad and you do not reside in the UK but still maintain financial interests here?
If you mainly live abroad and the claim form was sent to a UK address where you don't actually reside or weren't present, then service may not have been valid. For service within the UK, it must be to a current and proper address where the defendant can reasonably expect to receive legal documents. If the claimant served the form to a UK address without confirming that the Keeper still used it, it could be defective.
CPR 13.2 provides mandatory grounds for setting aside a default judgment if it was wrongly entered. If the Keeper was never properly served—because they were out of the country and the claim form was sent to an address where they weren’t residing—then the judgment may have been wrongly entered under CPR 12.3, which triggers CPR 13.2.
• If service was invalid, for example under CPR 6.9 (usual or last known residence), and the claimant failed to take reasonable steps to verify the correct address, then the court must set aside the judgment under CPR 13.2.
• Evidence showing the Keeper was abroad at the time—such as travel records, visa stamps, tenancy agreements, or council tax records—can support the argument that no valid service occurred.
• Unlike CPR 13.3, which is discretionary, CPR 13.2 is mandatory: if the conditions for default judgment weren’t met, the court has no choice but to set it aside.
You will need to submit an N244 set aside application which will cost £313 but will be recoverable from the claimant. Assuming I am correct about your residency, you should first write to ParkingEye with the following:
Dear Sirs,
Re: Default Judgment – [Defendant’s Name] – Claim No. [Claim Number]
I write regarding the default judgment entered against me in the above matter.
At the time of purported service, I was residing outside the jurisdiction of England and Wales. The address used was not my residence, and I had no knowledge of the proceedings until after the judgment was entered. No valid service occurred, and you failed to obtain permission to serve out of jurisdiction under CPR 6.36 and Practice Direction 6B.
The judgment was therefore wrongly entered under CPR 12.3, and CPR 13.2 applies. The court is required to set it aside. Furthermore, the court lacks jurisdiction to hear the claim against a defendant domiciled abroad, and I have not submitted to the jurisdiction.
To avoid unnecessary costs and court time, I invite you to consent to a set aside. I am not offering to contribute to the application fee — this situation arises entirely from your procedural failure. A consented application would incur a lower fee of £123, which you would be responsible for paying.
Should you refuse or fail to respond within 7 days, I will proceed with a contested N244 application (fee £313) and seek recovery of that cost in full under CPR 27.14(2)(g), along with any other associated costs, citing unreasonable conduct.
If you agree to resolve the matter by consent, I invite you to submit your proposed draft order for my review. Any wording that implies cost liability or submission to jurisdiction will be rejected.
Yours faithfully,
[Defendant’s Name]