yes
I suggest you respond to POPLA with the following, for the record:
Dear POPLA Complaints,
Thank you for your reply.
For the record, your response simply reinforces the core legal defects I had already identified. It also confirms a worrying lack of understanding of PoFA Schedule 4, the purpose of a consideration period, and the status of persuasive appellate authority. These are not matters of opinion; they are basic points of law and reasoning that any competent adjudicator ought to grasp.
First, your attempt to turn the wording “the period of parking immediately prior to 16:57” plus a photo timestamped 16:52 into a “specified period of parking” is hopeless. At best, this is two isolated instants with no stated duration and no clearly specified start and end. PoFA 9(2)(a) requires the Notice to Keeper itself to specify the period of parking. That means an actual period, not vague narrative wording and a single image. You cannot avoid that requirement by enlarging the photo or pointing to an option to go online and view “further evidence”. Statutory compliance is judged on the face of the NtK as served. Post-hoc evidence and web portals cannot retrospectively cure a defective statutory notice.
Second, your statement that by not naming the driver I “accept” that I can be held liable as keeper is legally wrong. There is no such mechanism in PoFA. Keeper liability arises, and only arises, if the operator has strictly complied with every mandatory element of Schedule 4 in the NtK. Silence from the keeper does not create liability where the statutory gateway has not been passed. Your position reverses the burden and misstates the scheme of the Act in a way that is frankly astonishing for a body that claims its assessors are trained on “relevant law”.
Third, your treatment of the five minute consideration period shows the same level of confusion. You assert that the consideration period had ended and the contract was accepted because the operator provided several images of the vehicle across two bays over about five minutes and a photo of a nearby sign. That is not what a consideration period is about. The consideration period concerns the pre-contract window during which a driver must be allowed to find, read and decide whether to accept the terms or leave. A sequence of photos showing the vehicle’s position proves nothing about whether a fair opportunity was actually afforded, nor does it establish any parking duration beyond the minimum period, nor does it prove when or whether a contract was accepted. You have simply assumed contract formation from the fact that the vehicle was present, which is precisely the kind of lazy reasoning the consideration period is intended to prevent.
Fourth, you continue to brush aside Brennan v Premier Parking Solutions and VCS v Edward on the basis that they are “county court” cases, without engaging at all with their reasoning. These are appellate decisions, directly on point as to what constitutes a “period of parking” and why it is not permissible simply to infer that the keeper was the driver. Nobody has suggested they are binding like Court of Appeal authority, but they are clearly persuasive and relevant. A credible adjudicator would either follow the reasoning or explain, with reasons, why they do not. POPLA has done neither.
Finally, you conflate alleged breach evidence with the statutory route to keeper liability. Photos of a vehicle across bay markings may be relevant to the operator’s allegation of breach, but they do not and cannot substitute for a PoFA compliant period of parking on the NtK, nor do they prove proper consideration, contract formation, or a lawful route to transfer liability to the keeper. You repeatedly jump from “there are photos” to “the keeper is liable” without ever showing that the statutory preconditions have been satisfied.
I understand fully that POPLA operates a one stage process and that you will not overturn this decision, no matter how clear the legal errors are. That in itself will form part of my evidence. For the avoidance of doubt, if MET Parking are unwise enough to progress this to litigation, I will rely on all points raised in my appeal and in my subsequent correspondence, together with the content of POPLA’s decision and your complaint response, to demonstrate both the defects in the NtK and the lack of any lawful keeper liability.
In addition, POPLA is not some neutral public body. It is operated as a cog within Trust Alliance Group Limited (company number 04351294).
In light of that, I will be raising a complaint with the Competition and Markets Authority under the Digital Markets, Competition and Consumers Act in respect of POPLA’s conduct.
In plain terms, the DMCC angles I will be advancing are as follows.
First, misleading commercial practice in the way POPLA and Trust Alliance Group market the service as independent, impartial and offering effective redress, when in reality decisions are one-shot, not capable of being corrected even where clear legal errors are identified, and function to the commercial advantage of the parking industry.
Second, misleading omission in failing to make it clear that POPLA is a trade-association scheme operated within Trust Alliance Group, with no statutory basis and no ministerial or regulatory status, and that its decisions are only binding on operators under industry rules and do not bind any court.
Third, lack of professional diligence in repeatedly misapplying PoFA, ignoring or side-stepping directly relevant persuasive appellate county court authority, and treating post hoc evidence as curing statutory defects in Notices to Keeper, thereby creating a real risk that consumers will be induced to accept and pay liabilities that they do not in law owe.
Your decision and this complaint response will be submitted in full to the CMA as part of that DMCC complaint, together with a copy to my Member of Parliament.
This email is therefore to ensure that your position, and the legal errors within it, are clearly recorded and attributable.
Yours faithfully,
[Name]
[POPLA reference]
When you get a response from POPLA, please show it to us.
If further evidence that POPLA assessors, especially this moronic feckwit, are not legally trained and prove beyond any reasonable doubt that they are intellectually malnourished, this decision is clear evidence that they are not fit for purpose.
1. PoFA 9(2)(a): basic statutory error
They equate a single timestamped photo with a “period of parking”. That is plainly wrong. A period requires a duration. Saying the NtK “contains the period parked” because it shows a date/time is legally indefensible.
2. Keeper liability: burden flipped and law misstated
They assert it’s the registered keeper’s “responsibility” to name the driver. It isn’t. The operator can pursue the keeper only if (and because) the NtK is fully PoFA-compliant. No compliance, no keeper liability. The assessor reverses that scheme.
3. Consideration period: concept misunderstood
They claim no consideration period applies because the vehicle was “out of bay”. Consideration is about pre-contract opportunity to find and read terms. Whether a breach later occurred is irrelevant to whether that minimum five-minute window had to be allowed and evidenced. The assessor’s position is circular.
4. Contract formation: assumption standing in for analysis
“By parking on site a contract was formed” is a conclusion, not reasoning. Formation depends on opportunity to see and digest the terms. One timestamp cannot prove acceptance—especially when the operator’s own case tops out at “~5 minutes observed”.
5. Persuasive authority: wrong standard, wrong dismissal
They dismiss cited County Court appeal decisions wholesale as “cannot set a precedent”. Correct: they’re not binding. But they are persuasive—and directly on point about “period of parking”. Ignoring them because they’re not binding is an intellectual cop-out.
6. “Curing” NtK defects with an evidence pack
They treat later photos/narrative as if they can retrofit missing NtK content. PoFA compliance is determined from the NtK itself. Post-hoc material cannot mend an omission in a statutory notice. The assessor never engages with that.
7. Signage: transitional rules over-stretched
Referring to legacy BPA signage provisions during the transition does not displace other live Single Code duties (like consideration). The assessor uses signage compliance to sidestep the separate questions of formation and PoFA content. That’s a non sequitur.
8. Landowner authority: relevance blurred, Beavis misused
Beavis says nothing about whether a redacted “licence” actually confers authority to issue and litigate in the operator’s own name for this site. The assessor accepts a highlighted, redacted document at face value without testing mandatory particulars the Code requires.
9. Evidential threshold: photos ≠ strict proof
“Series of photos” showing a tyre over a line may evidence the alleged posture of the vehicle. They do not evidence (a) the period of parking for PoFA, or (b) that a contract was actually formed after adequate opportunity to read terms. The assessor conflates breach proof with liability route.
10. Failure to engage with the core point
The appeal’s fulcrum was narrow and statutory: no period of parking on the face of the NtK. The decision ducks that question, replaces it with generalities about signage, and pronounces keeper liability as if it were automatic. It isn’t.
Bottom line
This decision is legally unsound. It misstates PoFA, ignores directly relevant persuasive authority, confuses formation with breach, and tries to graft later evidence onto a defective NtK. In short: assertion in place of analysis, conclusions in place of reasoning.
The decision is not binding on you and you DO NOT pay anything. I will draft a formal complaint to POPLA, which will not get them to reverse their decision, irrespective of whether they are with the complaint but it puts them on record as to their utter incompetence and that it will not be soon enough when they become an irrelevance once the Private Parking (Code of Practice) Act 2019 is eventually brought into play.
From now on, you can safely ignore all useless debt recovery letters. Debt collectors are powerless to do anything except to try and intimidate the low hanging fruit on the gullible tree into paying out of ignorance and fear. Come back if/when ou receive a Letter of Claim (LoC) and we will advise on how to bring this to a conclusion without having to pay a penny to these scammers.
In the meantime, I advise you to send the following formal complaint about this idiot POPLA assessor with the following to info@popla.co.uk and CC yourself:QuoteSubject: Formal Complaint – Incompetent and Legally Defective Adjudication by POPLA Assessor [assessor name]
To: POPLA Complaints Team
Dear POPLA Complaints Team,
I am writing to lodge a formal complaint about the standard of adjudication in my recent POPLA appeal against MET Parking Services. The assessor’s decision is not merely wrong in law; it is so bereft of legal reasoning that it raises serious questions about the competence, training, and impartiality of your adjudication staff.
While I am fully aware that POPLA’s complaints process never overturns a decision — regardless of how egregiously flawed — I require a written response to this complaint for submission to my Member of Parliament and other oversight bodies. The manner in which this appeal has been handled exemplifies why public confidence in POPLA has collapsed: decisions are routinely reached by individuals who appear neither legally trained nor intellectually equipped to apply the very legislation they cite.
1. Statutory Illiteracy – PoFA 9(2)(a)
The assessor treated a single timestamp on the Notice to Keeper as satisfying the statutory requirement to “specify the period of parking”. This is legally absurd. A single timestamp represents an instant, not a duration, and therefore cannot constitute a “period”.
This is not a matter of interpretation — it is a matter of plain English and binding statutory drafting. The point has been clarified in persuasive appellate authority, Brennan v Premier Parking Solutions (2023), where the judge expressly ruled that an instant in time cannot evidence a period of parking.
By failing to grasp that fundamental distinction, the assessor has demonstrated a level of incompetence that is wholly incompatible with any adjudicative role.
2. Reversal of the Burden of Proof
The assessor stated that it was the keeper’s “responsibility” to name the driver and that liability “remains with the registered keeper”. That is the opposite of what PoFA provides. The Act creates a narrow and conditional statutory exception allowing keeper liability only if the operator has issued a fully compliant NtK.
The keeper has no legal duty whatsoever to identify the driver. The assessor has completely inverted the law. This is not a borderline interpretative issue — it is a fundamental misunderstanding of the legislative scheme POPLA was created to apply.
3. Refusal to Acknowledge Persuasive Authority
The assessor’s refusal to consider Brennan v Premier Parking Solutions and VCS v Edward on the grounds that “county court cases cannot set precedent” betrays a lack of even the most rudimentary legal training. These were appellate decisions, which, while not binding, are persuasive — a concept clearly beyond the assessor’s comprehension.
To summarily dismiss them rather than engage with the reasoning within those judgments is intellectually negligent and incompatible with the role of an adjudicator purporting to apply statutory law.
4. Post-Hoc “Evidence” Used to Cure a Defective NtK
The assessor accepted that later evidence in the operator’s “evidence pack” could retrospectively fix omissions in the original NtK. That is simply wrong.
PoFA compliance is judged on the face of the notice as issued. The Act does not permit later materials to “cure” a statutory defect. This is basic procedural fairness. The assessor’s failure to understand this undermines the entire purpose of the PoFA regime.
5. Misunderstanding of the Consideration Period
The assessor dismissed the argument regarding the mandatory consideration period under Section 5.1 of the Private Parking Single Code of Practice, asserting that none applied because the driver “was parked out of a bay”. This is nonsensical.
The consideration period exists before a parking contract is formed and applies regardless of where the vehicle stops. It is designed to give a motorist time to locate, read, and understand the terms before deciding to stay. The assessor’s logic that “no consideration period applies if the terms were breached” is circular, incoherent, and wrong in law.
6. Blind Acceptance of Operator Assertions
The assessor’s entire reasoning rests on unverified assertions from the operator — including redacted, unsigned “contracts” and generalised claims of signage adequacy. The evidence was accepted at face value, while every legally grounded argument from the appellant was ignored. This asymmetric scrutiny is not impartial adjudication; it is de facto advocacy for the operator.
7. Institutional Lack of Accountability
I am under no illusion that POPLA will ever reverse this decision, regardless of how obvious the assessor’s failings are. However, this complaint is being lodged formally so that the resulting correspondence can be placed on record and provided to my MP and the Ministry of Housing, Communities, and Local Government (MHCLG).
POPLA’s refusal to revisit defective decisions, even where basic statutory requirements have been misapplied, reinforces the widespread public perception that it functions not as an independent adjudicator but as an industry shield — an extension of the very trade body it purports to regulate.
8. Requested Actions1. A full written response addressing each of the points above.
2. Confirmation that the assessor’s legal understanding and decision-making will be reviewed by a senior adjudicator or legally qualified manager.
3. Disclosure of what retraining or disciplinary action, if any, will be taken.
4. A clear statement of POPLA’s position on whether assessors are expected to be legally trained before adjudicating statutory keeper liability cases.
9. Conclusion
This decision is an embarrassment to POPLA and a disservice to the public. It misstates statutory law, disregards persuasive appellate authority, and displays a level of analytical incompetence that renders it unfit for purpose.
If the assessor cannot be retrained to a minimum acceptable standard of legal literacy, then the only appropriate outcome is removal from post. POPLA cannot credibly claim independence or professionalism while tolerating adjudicators who cannot interpret a statute written in plain English.
Yours faithfully,
[Your Full Name]
[Your POPLA Verification Code / Case Reference]
When you get a response from POPLA, please show it to us.
Subject: Formal Complaint – Incompetent and Legally Defective Adjudication by POPLA Assessor [assessor name]
To: POPLA Complaints Team
Dear POPLA Complaints Team,
I am writing to lodge a formal complaint about the standard of adjudication in my recent POPLA appeal against MET Parking Services. The assessor’s decision is not merely wrong in law; it is so bereft of legal reasoning that it raises serious questions about the competence, training, and impartiality of your adjudication staff.
While I am fully aware that POPLA’s complaints process never overturns a decision — regardless of how egregiously flawed — I require a written response to this complaint for submission to my Member of Parliament and other oversight bodies. The manner in which this appeal has been handled exemplifies why public confidence in POPLA has collapsed: decisions are routinely reached by individuals who appear neither legally trained nor intellectually equipped to apply the very legislation they cite.
1. Statutory Illiteracy – PoFA 9(2)(a)
The assessor treated a single timestamp on the Notice to Keeper as satisfying the statutory requirement to “specify the period of parking”. This is legally absurd. A single timestamp represents an instant, not a duration, and therefore cannot constitute a “period”.
This is not a matter of interpretation — it is a matter of plain English and binding statutory drafting. The point has been clarified in persuasive appellate authority, Brennan v Premier Parking Solutions (2023), where the judge expressly ruled that an instant in time cannot evidence a period of parking.
By failing to grasp that fundamental distinction, the assessor has demonstrated a level of incompetence that is wholly incompatible with any adjudicative role.
2. Reversal of the Burden of Proof
The assessor stated that it was the keeper’s “responsibility” to name the driver and that liability “remains with the registered keeper”. That is the opposite of what PoFA provides. The Act creates a narrow and conditional statutory exception allowing keeper liability only if the operator has issued a fully compliant NtK.
The keeper has no legal duty whatsoever to identify the driver. The assessor has completely inverted the law. This is not a borderline interpretative issue — it is a fundamental misunderstanding of the legislative scheme POPLA was created to apply.
3. Refusal to Acknowledge Persuasive Authority
The assessor’s refusal to consider Brennan v Premier Parking Solutions and VCS v Edward on the grounds that “county court cases cannot set precedent” betrays a lack of even the most rudimentary legal training. These were appellate decisions, which, while not binding, are persuasive — a concept clearly beyond the assessor’s comprehension.
To summarily dismiss them rather than engage with the reasoning within those judgments is intellectually negligent and incompatible with the role of an adjudicator purporting to apply statutory law.
4. Post-Hoc “Evidence” Used to Cure a Defective NtK
The assessor accepted that later evidence in the operator’s “evidence pack” could retrospectively fix omissions in the original NtK. That is simply wrong.
PoFA compliance is judged on the face of the notice as issued. The Act does not permit later materials to “cure” a statutory defect. This is basic procedural fairness. The assessor’s failure to understand this undermines the entire purpose of the PoFA regime.
5. Misunderstanding of the Consideration Period
The assessor dismissed the argument regarding the mandatory consideration period under Section 5.1 of the Private Parking Single Code of Practice, asserting that none applied because the driver “was parked out of a bay”. This is nonsensical.
The consideration period exists before a parking contract is formed and applies regardless of where the vehicle stops. It is designed to give a motorist time to locate, read, and understand the terms before deciding to stay. The assessor’s logic that “no consideration period applies if the terms were breached” is circular, incoherent, and wrong in law.
6. Blind Acceptance of Operator Assertions
The assessor’s entire reasoning rests on unverified assertions from the operator — including redacted, unsigned “contracts” and generalised claims of signage adequacy. The evidence was accepted at face value, while every legally grounded argument from the appellant was ignored. This asymmetric scrutiny is not impartial adjudication; it is de facto advocacy for the operator.
7. Institutional Lack of Accountability
I am under no illusion that POPLA will ever reverse this decision, regardless of how obvious the assessor’s failings are. However, this complaint is being lodged formally so that the resulting correspondence can be placed on record and provided to my MP and the Ministry of Housing, Communities, and Local Government (MHCLG).
POPLA’s refusal to revisit defective decisions, even where basic statutory requirements have been misapplied, reinforces the widespread public perception that it functions not as an independent adjudicator but as an industry shield — an extension of the very trade body it purports to regulate.
8. Requested Actions1. A full written response addressing each of the points above.
2. Confirmation that the assessor’s legal understanding and decision-making will be reviewed by a senior adjudicator or legally qualified manager.
3. Disclosure of what retraining or disciplinary action, if any, will be taken.
4. A clear statement of POPLA’s position on whether assessors are expected to be legally trained before adjudicating statutory keeper liability cases.
9. Conclusion
This decision is an embarrassment to POPLA and a disservice to the public. It misstates statutory law, disregards persuasive appellate authority, and displays a level of analytical incompetence that renders it unfit for purpose.
If the assessor cannot be retrained to a minimum acceptable standard of legal literacy, then the only appropriate outcome is removal from post. POPLA cannot credibly claim independence or professionalism while tolerating adjudicators who cannot interpret a statute written in plain English.
Yours faithfully,
[Your Full Name]
[Your POPLA Verification Code / Case Reference]
I gave you the text to copy and paste into the POPLA response to the operators evidence. Beyond that, there is nothing more to do but wait for the decision.
If it’s not successful, so what? The decision is not binding on you and you move on to the next phase of the fight.
Just copy and paste the following into the POPLA postal as your response:QuoteResponse to MET’s “keeper liability / 5-minute observation” claims:
1. Keeper liability rises or falls on the NtK itself
Keeper liability is a narrow statutory exception (PoFA Sch 4 para 4). It applies only if the operator has given a fully compliant NtK. PoFA para 9(2) uses mandatory language (“must”) and the assessment is confined to the NtK as given. Later materials (portal images, extra timestamps, Section C narratives or “evidence packs”) cannot retrospectively supply a missing statutory element or cure a defect.
2. PoFA 9(2)(a) failure on the face of the NtK
PoFA 9(2)(a) requires the NtK to “specify the period of parking”. MET’s NtK cites a single time and vague wording about “immediately prior”. A single timestamp is not a “period of parking” and does not meet para 9(2)(a). See Brennan v Premier Parking Solutions (2023) (appeal) confirming that an instant in time cannot evidence a “period of parking”. If the period is not specified in the NtK, keeper liability cannot arise.
3. “Observed over 5 minutes” does not prove contract formation or cure PoFA
MET’s Section E claim that the vehicle was “observed for over 5 minutes” is (a) not part of the NtK and (b) does not evidence a parking duration beyond the mandatory consideration period. The Private Parking Single Code of Practice (17 Feb 2025) s5.1 requires a minimum five-minute consideration period to find, read and decide on the terms. An observation of ~5 minutes cannot exclude time spent reading signage or choosing to leave; it does not prove that a contract was accepted or that any charge became payable.
4. Statutory content must be in the NtK; assertion is not evidence
PoFA 9(2) also requires the NtK to describe “the circumstances… that made [the charges] payable” (para 9(2)(d)). If MET wished to rely on keeper liability, the NtK itself had to set out the parking period and the facts said to constitute breach. Post-hoc photos and narratives in Section B/C/E are not the NtK and cannot be imported to fix omissions.
Conclusion
The NtK fails PoFA 9(2)(a) on its face. Keeper liability therefore does not arise. The driver has not been identified. MET’s later “evidence pack” and portal material cannot cure a defective NtK or prove contract formation beyond the consideration period. On keeper liability alone, this appeal must be allowed.
QuoteFor the avoidance of doubt: This is not one bay with three lines, this is oneThe fact that they feel the need to state this "for the avoidance of doubt", and to use bold, red underlined text to do so, might suggest there is considerable room for doubt...
standard-size parking bay with a pedestrian walkway next to it.
For the avoidance of doubt: This is not one bay with three lines, this is oneThe fact that they feel the need to state this "for the avoidance of doubt", and to use bold, red underlined text to do so, might suggest there is considerable room for doubt...
standard-size parking bay with a pedestrian walkway next to it.[/b]
Host their evidence, especially the landowner contract, on Google Drive or similar so we can review it.
Response to MET’s “keeper liability / 5-minute observation” claims:
1. Keeper liability rises or falls on the NtK itself
Keeper liability is a narrow statutory exception (PoFA Sch 4 para 4). It applies only if the operator has given a fully compliant NtK. PoFA para 9(2) uses mandatory language (“must”) and the assessment is confined to the NtK as given. Later materials (portal images, extra timestamps, Section C narratives or “evidence packs”) cannot retrospectively supply a missing statutory element or cure a defect.
2. PoFA 9(2)(a) failure on the face of the NtK
PoFA 9(2)(a) requires the NtK to “specify the period of parking”. MET’s NtK cites a single time and vague wording about “immediately prior”. A single timestamp is not a “period of parking” and does not meet para 9(2)(a). See Brennan v Premier Parking Solutions (2023) (appeal) confirming that an instant in time cannot evidence a “period of parking”. If the period is not specified in the NtK, keeper liability cannot arise.
3. “Observed over 5 minutes” does not prove contract formation or cure PoFA
MET’s Section E claim that the vehicle was “observed for over 5 minutes” is (a) not part of the NtK and (b) does not evidence a parking duration beyond the mandatory consideration period. The Private Parking Single Code of Practice (17 Feb 2025) s5.1 requires a minimum five-minute consideration period to find, read and decide on the terms. An observation of ~5 minutes cannot exclude time spent reading signage or choosing to leave; it does not prove that a contract was accepted or that any charge became payable.
4. Statutory content must be in the NtK; assertion is not evidence
PoFA 9(2) also requires the NtK to describe “the circumstances… that made [the charges] payable” (para 9(2)(d)). If MET wished to rely on keeper liability, the NtK itself had to set out the parking period and the facts said to constitute breach. Post-hoc photos and narratives in Section B/C/E are not the NtK and cannot be imported to fix omissions.
Conclusion
The NtK fails PoFA 9(2)(a) on its face. Keeper liability therefore does not arise. The driver has not been identified. MET’s later “evidence pack” and portal material cannot cure a defective NtK or prove contract formation beyond the consideration period. On keeper liability alone, this appeal must be allowed.
Your POPLA draft is on the right track and already covers the essential points, but I’d recommend tightening the language a little, so it reads more like a structured legal submission rather than a complaint letter. POPLA assessors tend to prefer clear, numbered grounds rather than commentary. Here’s a refined version of what you’ve drafted:QuoteI am the registered keeper of the vehicle. I deny any liability for this parking charge and appeal in full.
The operator bears the burden of proof. They must establish that a contravention occurred, that a valid contract was formed between the operator and the driver, and that they have lawful authority to operate and issue Parking Charge Notices (PCNs) in their own name.
Accordingly, I put MET Parking Services to strict proof of the following:1. Failure to Comply with PoFA 2012 – No Period of Parking Specified
The Notice to Keeper (NtK) does not comply with Schedule 4 of the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012, Paragraph 9(2)(a), which requires that a “period of parking” be specified.
MET Parking has only provided a single timestamp (16:57 on 21 June 2025) and vague wording about “the period of parking immediately prior to that time”. A single timestamp is not a period. This has been confirmed in the persuasive appellate case of Brennan v Premier Parking Solutions (2023) [H6DP632H], where the judge held that a single observation time cannot evidence a “period of parking” and thus the NtK was not PoFA-compliant.
Because the NtK is not compliant, MET cannot transfer liability to the keeper. The operator’s repeated assertions that their NtK is PoFA compliant do not make it so.
2. No Contract Could Have Been Formed – No Period of Parking Evidenced
The operator has failed to evidence any period of parking, instead relying on a single timestamp to justify the charge. This is completely inadequate and fails both the legal and contractual standards.
The operator has ignored the minimum consideration period that must be allowed under the Private Parking Single Code of Practice, section 5.1. That section states that operators must allow a reasonable consideration period for the driver to find the terms, read them, and either decide to accept and park or leave. This period is defined as a minimum of five minutes.
By producing only a single timestamp and no proof of a parking duration beyond the mandatory consideration period, the operator has failed to evidence that a valid contract was ever formed with the driver. The law requires that a motorist be given sufficient time to read the terms, understand them, and make an informed decision whether to accept. Without evidence that the vehicle remained for longer than the minimum consideration period, there is no basis to conclude that any contract was entered into.
The operator is attempting to have it both ways: they wish to rely on PoFA to hold the keeper liable, which requires evidence of a defined parking period, yet at the same time they are relying on nothing more than a single instant in time to claim that a contract was entered into and breached. That is legally and logically unsustainable.
This is not about whether the vehicle was briefly observed on site. It is about whether the evidence demonstrates that the driver had sufficient time to read and accept the terms, which is essential for contract formation. A single timestamp does not prove that a parking period took place.
Therefore, even if every other element of the operator’s case were accepted (which they are not), their failure to show that the vehicle remained for longer than the minimum five-minute consideration period fatally undermines any claim that a binding contract was formed or that the PoFA requirements have been met.
3. No Evidence the Keeper was the Driver – Keeper Cannot Be Held Liable
MET has provided no evidence whatsoever that the appellant was the driver at the time of the alleged contravention. The identity of the driver has not been disclosed, and MET has not disputed this or provided any evidence to the contrary.
This leaves the operator with just one legal route: to pursue the registered keeper under Schedule 4 of the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 (PoFA). However, that mechanism only becomes available if the operator fully complies with every single mandatory condition set out in PoFA. As demonstrated earlier in point #1 of this appeal, the Notice to Keeper does not comply with a key requirements of PoFA, namely paragraph 9(2)(a), which requires that a “period of parking” be specified.
Therefore, by failing the overall test of absolute and unambiguous compliance with the statutory scheme, an analogy must be stated clearly: just as a person cannot be partially or even mostly pregnant, a Notice to Keeper cannot be partially or even mostly PoFA compliant. It is a binary point. It either is or it isn't — and in this case, it isn’t. That is the law.
This means MET cannot rely on PoFA to transfer liability to the keeper. With PoFA compliance off the table, the only remaining option would be to prove — with actual evidence — that the keeper was also the driver. They have not done so.
There is no legal presumption that the keeper was the driver. In VCS v Edward (2023) [H0KF6C9C], a persuasive County Court judgment in which HHJ Gargan explained precisely why it is not appropriate to infer driver identity from registered keeper status. MET has not presented any evidence to support such an inference.
POPLA is not entitled to make assumptions in the operator’s favour, nor is it permitted to apply a lower evidential threshold than the law requires. Keeper liability only arises if PoFA is complied with. It is not a default position, and it does not arise by implication.
Accordingly, the only lawful conclusion is that MET cannot pursue the appellant as keeper. There is no PoFA compliance, no driver identification, and therefore no legal basis for continuing enforcement of this charge.
4. Inadequate and Ambiguous Signage
The operator is put to strict proof of clear, prominent, and adequate signage in situ on the material date.• MET must provide a detailed site plan showing the placement of each sign and legible images of the actual signs.
• They must prove that signage was visible, legible, and compliant with the Private Parking Single Code of Practice (PPSCoP), including font size, positioning, and the prominence of key terms.
• The photographs they have provided already show ambiguous and faded bay markings. No contract can be formed where terms such as “park only in marked bays” are not objectively clear.
5. Landowner Authority
The operator is put to strict proof of a valid, contemporaneous contract or lease flowing from the landowner that authorises the operator to manage parking, issue PCNs, and pursue legal action in its own name. I refer the operator and the POPLA assessor to Section 14 of the PPSCoP (Relationship with Landowner), which clearly sets out mandatory minimum requirements that must be evidenced before any parking charge may be issued on controlled land.
In particular, Section 14.1(a)–(j) requires the operator to have in place written confirmation from the landowner which includes:• the identity of the landowner,
• a boundary map of the land to be managed,
• applicable byelaws,
• the duration and scope of authority granted,
• detailed parking terms and conditions including any specific permissions or exemptions,
• the means of issuing PCNs,
• responsibility for obtaining planning and advertising consents,
• and the operator’s obligations and appeal procedure under the Code.
These requirements are not optional. They are a condition precedent to issuing a PCN and bringing any associated action. Accordingly, I put the operator to strict proof of compliance with the entirety of Section 14 of the PPSCoP. Any document that contains redactions must not obscure the above conditions. The document must also be dated and signed by identifiable persons, with evidence of their authority to act on behalf of the parties to the agreement. The operator must provide an agreement showing clear authorisation from the landowner for this specific site.
Conclusion
For the reasons above:• The NtK fails PoFA 2012 and cannot create keeper liability.
• The driver has not been identified.
• Signage and bay markings are inadequate and ambiguous.
• The operator has not proven landowner authority.
• The evidence fails to establish any parking event beyond the permitted consideration period.
Accordingly, I respectfully request that POPLA allow this appeal and direct that the charge be cancelled.
Your POPLA draft is on the right track and already covers the essential points, but I’d recommend tightening the language a little, so it reads more like a structured legal submission rather than a complaint letter. POPLA assessors tend to prefer clear, numbered grounds rather than commentary. Here’s a refined version of what you’ve drafted:QuoteI am the registered keeper of the vehicle. I deny any liability for this parking charge and appeal in full.
The operator bears the burden of proof. They must establish that a contravention occurred, that a valid contract was formed between the operator and the driver, and that they have lawful authority to operate and issue Parking Charge Notices (PCNs) in their own name.
Accordingly, I put MET Parking Services to strict proof of the following:1. Failure to Comply with PoFA 2012 – No Period of Parking Specified
The Notice to Keeper (NtK) does not comply with Schedule 4 of the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012, Paragraph 9(2)(a), which requires that a “period of parking” be specified.
MET Parking has only provided a single timestamp (16:57 on 21 June 2025) and vague wording about “the period of parking immediately prior to that time”. A single timestamp is not a period. This has been confirmed in the persuasive appellate case of Brennan v Premier Parking Solutions (2023) [H6DP632H], where the judge held that a single observation time cannot evidence a “period of parking” and thus the NtK was not PoFA-compliant.
Because the NtK is not compliant, MET cannot transfer liability to the keeper. The operator’s repeated assertions that their NtK is PoFA compliant do not make it so.
2. No Contract Could Have Been Formed – No Period of Parking Evidenced
The operator has failed to evidence any period of parking, instead relying on a single timestamp to justify the charge. This is completely inadequate and fails both the legal and contractual standards.
The operator has ignored the minimum consideration period that must be allowed under the Private Parking Single Code of Practice, section 5.1. That section states that operators must allow a reasonable consideration period for the driver to find the terms, read them, and either decide to accept and park or leave. This period is defined as a minimum of five minutes.
By producing only a single timestamp and no proof of a parking duration beyond the mandatory consideration period, the operator has failed to evidence that a valid contract was ever formed with the driver. The law requires that a motorist be given sufficient time to read the terms, understand them, and make an informed decision whether to accept. Without evidence that the vehicle remained for longer than the minimum consideration period, there is no basis to conclude that any contract was entered into.
The operator is attempting to have it both ways: they wish to rely on PoFA to hold the keeper liable, which requires evidence of a defined parking period, yet at the same time they are relying on nothing more than a single instant in time to claim that a contract was entered into and breached. That is legally and logically unsustainable.
This is not about whether the vehicle was briefly observed on site. It is about whether the evidence demonstrates that the driver had sufficient time to read and accept the terms, which is essential for contract formation. A single timestamp does not prove that a parking period took place.
Therefore, even if every other element of the operator’s case were accepted (which they are not), their failure to show that the vehicle remained for longer than the minimum five-minute consideration period fatally undermines any claim that a binding contract was formed or that the PoFA requirements have been met.
3. No Evidence the Keeper was the Driver – Keeper Cannot Be Held Liable
MET has provided no evidence whatsoever that the appellant was the driver at the time of the alleged contravention. The identity of the driver has not been disclosed, and MET has not disputed this or provided any evidence to the contrary.
This leaves the operator with just one legal route: to pursue the registered keeper under Schedule 4 of the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 (PoFA). However, that mechanism only becomes available if the operator fully complies with every single mandatory condition set out in PoFA. As demonstrated earlier in point #1 of this appeal, the Notice to Keeper does not comply with a key requirements of PoFA, namely paragraph 9(2)(a), which requires that a “period of parking” be specified.
Therefore, by failing the overall test of absolute and unambiguous compliance with the statutory scheme, an analogy must be stated clearly: just as a person cannot be partially or even mostly pregnant, a Notice to Keeper cannot be partially or even mostly PoFA compliant. It is a binary point. It either is or it isn't — and in this case, it isn’t. That is the law.
This means MET cannot rely on PoFA to transfer liability to the keeper. With PoFA compliance off the table, the only remaining option would be to prove — with actual evidence — that the keeper was also the driver. They have not done so.
There is no legal presumption that the keeper was the driver. In VCS v Edward (2023) [H0KF6C9C], a persuasive County Court judgment in which HHJ Gargan explained precisely why it is not appropriate to infer driver identity from registered keeper status. MET has not presented any evidence to support such an inference.
POPLA is not entitled to make assumptions in the operator’s favour, nor is it permitted to apply a lower evidential threshold than the law requires. Keeper liability only arises if PoFA is complied with. It is not a default position, and it does not arise by implication.
Accordingly, the only lawful conclusion is that MET cannot pursue the appellant as keeper. There is no PoFA compliance, no driver identification, and therefore no legal basis for continuing enforcement of this charge.
4. Inadequate and Ambiguous Signage
The operator is put to strict proof of clear, prominent, and adequate signage in situ on the material date.• MET must provide a detailed site plan showing the placement of each sign and legible images of the actual signs.
• They must prove that signage was visible, legible, and compliant with the Private Parking Single Code of Practice (PPSCoP), including font size, positioning, and the prominence of key terms.
• The photographs they have provided already show ambiguous and faded bay markings. No contract can be formed where terms such as “park only in marked bays” are not objectively clear.
5. Landowner Authority
The operator is put to strict proof of a valid, contemporaneous contract or lease flowing from the landowner that authorises the operator to manage parking, issue PCNs, and pursue legal action in its own name. I refer the operator and the POPLA assessor to Section 14 of the PPSCoP (Relationship with Landowner), which clearly sets out mandatory minimum requirements that must be evidenced before any parking charge may be issued on controlled land.
In particular, Section 14.1(a)–(j) requires the operator to have in place written confirmation from the landowner which includes:• the identity of the landowner,
• a boundary map of the land to be managed,
• applicable byelaws,
• the duration and scope of authority granted,
• detailed parking terms and conditions including any specific permissions or exemptions,
• the means of issuing PCNs,
• responsibility for obtaining planning and advertising consents,
• and the operator’s obligations and appeal procedure under the Code.
These requirements are not optional. They are a condition precedent to issuing a PCN and bringing any associated action. Accordingly, I put the operator to strict proof of compliance with the entirety of Section 14 of the PPSCoP. Any document that contains redactions must not obscure the above conditions. The document must also be dated and signed by identifiable persons, with evidence of their authority to act on behalf of the parties to the agreement. The operator must provide an agreement showing clear authorisation from the landowner for this specific site.
Conclusion
For the reasons above:• The NtK fails PoFA 2012 and cannot create keeper liability.
• The driver has not been identified.
• Signage and bay markings are inadequate and ambiguous.
• The operator has not proven landowner authority.
• The evidence fails to establish any parking event beyond the permitted consideration period.
Accordingly, I respectfully request that POPLA allow this appeal and direct that the charge be cancelled.
Your POPLA draft is on the right track and already covers the essential points, but I’d recommend tightening the language a little, so it reads more like a structured legal submission rather than a complaint letter. POPLA assessors tend to prefer clear, numbered grounds rather than commentary. Here’s a refined version of what you’ve drafted:QuoteI am the registered keeper of the vehicle. I deny any liability for this parking charge and appeal in full.
The operator bears the burden of proof. They must establish that a contravention occurred, that a valid contract was formed between the operator and the driver, and that they have lawful authority to operate and issue Parking Charge Notices (PCNs) in their own name.
Accordingly, I put MET Parking Services to strict proof of the following:1. Failure to Comply with PoFA 2012 – No Period of Parking Specified
The Notice to Keeper (NtK) does not comply with Schedule 4 of the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012, Paragraph 9(2)(a), which requires that a “period of parking” be specified.
MET Parking has only provided a single timestamp (16:57 on 21 June 2025) and vague wording about “the period of parking immediately prior to that time”. A single timestamp is not a period. This has been confirmed in the persuasive appellate case of Brennan v Premier Parking Solutions (2023) [H6DP632H], where the judge held that a single observation time cannot evidence a “period of parking” and thus the NtK was not PoFA-compliant.
Because the NtK is not compliant, MET cannot transfer liability to the keeper. The operator’s repeated assertions that their NtK is PoFA compliant do not make it so.
2. No Contract Could Have Been Formed – No Period of Parking Evidenced
The operator has failed to evidence any period of parking, instead relying on a single timestamp to justify the charge. This is completely inadequate and fails both the legal and contractual standards.
The operator has ignored the minimum consideration period that must be allowed under the Private Parking Single Code of Practice, section 5.1. That section states that operators must allow a reasonable consideration period for the driver to find the terms, read them, and either decide to accept and park or leave. This period is defined as a minimum of five minutes.
By producing only a single timestamp and no proof of a parking duration beyond the mandatory consideration period, the operator has failed to evidence that a valid contract was ever formed with the driver. The law requires that a motorist be given sufficient time to read the terms, understand them, and make an informed decision whether to accept. Without evidence that the vehicle remained for longer than the minimum consideration period, there is no basis to conclude that any contract was entered into.
The operator is attempting to have it both ways: they wish to rely on PoFA to hold the keeper liable, which requires evidence of a defined parking period, yet at the same time they are relying on nothing more than a single instant in time to claim that a contract was entered into and breached. That is legally and logically unsustainable.
This is not about whether the vehicle was briefly observed on site. It is about whether the evidence demonstrates that the driver had sufficient time to read and accept the terms, which is essential for contract formation. A single timestamp does not prove that a parking period took place.
Therefore, even if every other element of the operator’s case were accepted (which they are not), their failure to show that the vehicle remained for longer than the minimum five-minute consideration period fatally undermines any claim that a binding contract was formed or that the PoFA requirements have been met.
3. No Evidence the Keeper was the Driver – Keeper Cannot Be Held Liable
MET has provided no evidence whatsoever that the appellant was the driver at the time of the alleged contravention. The identity of the driver has not been disclosed, and MET has not disputed this or provided any evidence to the contrary.
This leaves the operator with just one legal route: to pursue the registered keeper under Schedule 4 of the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 (PoFA). However, that mechanism only becomes available if the operator fully complies with every single mandatory condition set out in PoFA. As demonstrated earlier in point #1 of this appeal, the Notice to Keeper does not comply with a key requirements of PoFA, namely paragraph 9(2)(a), which requires that a “period of parking” be specified.
Therefore, by failing the overall test of absolute and unambiguous compliance with the statutory scheme, an analogy must be stated clearly: just as a person cannot be partially or even mostly pregnant, a Notice to Keeper cannot be partially or even mostly PoFA compliant. It is a binary point. It either is or it isn't — and in this case, it isn’t. That is the law.
This means MET cannot rely on PoFA to transfer liability to the keeper. With PoFA compliance off the table, the only remaining option would be to prove — with actual evidence — that the keeper was also the driver. They have not done so.
There is no legal presumption that the keeper was the driver. In VCS v Edward (2023) [H0KF6C9C], a persuasive County Court judgment in which HHJ Gargan explained precisely why it is not appropriate to infer driver identity from registered keeper status. MET has not presented any evidence to support such an inference.
POPLA is not entitled to make assumptions in the operator’s favour, nor is it permitted to apply a lower evidential threshold than the law requires. Keeper liability only arises if PoFA is complied with. It is not a default position, and it does not arise by implication.
Accordingly, the only lawful conclusion is that MET cannot pursue the appellant as keeper. There is no PoFA compliance, no driver identification, and therefore no legal basis for continuing enforcement of this charge.
4. Inadequate and Ambiguous Signage
The operator is put to strict proof of clear, prominent, and adequate signage in situ on the material date.• MET must provide a detailed site plan showing the placement of each sign and legible images of the actual signs.
• They must prove that signage was visible, legible, and compliant with the Private Parking Single Code of Practice (PPSCoP), including font size, positioning, and the prominence of key terms.
• The photographs they have provided already show ambiguous and faded bay markings. No contract can be formed where terms such as “park only in marked bays” are not objectively clear.
5. Landowner Authority
The operator is put to strict proof of a valid, contemporaneous contract or lease flowing from the landowner that authorises the operator to manage parking, issue PCNs, and pursue legal action in its own name. I refer the operator and the POPLA assessor to Section 14 of the PPSCoP (Relationship with Landowner), which clearly sets out mandatory minimum requirements that must be evidenced before any parking charge may be issued on controlled land.
In particular, Section 14.1(a)–(j) requires the operator to have in place written confirmation from the landowner which includes:• the identity of the landowner,
• a boundary map of the land to be managed,
• applicable byelaws,
• the duration and scope of authority granted,
• detailed parking terms and conditions including any specific permissions or exemptions,
• the means of issuing PCNs,
• responsibility for obtaining planning and advertising consents,
• and the operator’s obligations and appeal procedure under the Code.
These requirements are not optional. They are a condition precedent to issuing a PCN and bringing any associated action. Accordingly, I put the operator to strict proof of compliance with the entirety of Section 14 of the PPSCoP. Any document that contains redactions must not obscure the above conditions. The document must also be dated and signed by identifiable persons, with evidence of their authority to act on behalf of the parties to the agreement. The operator must provide an agreement showing clear authorisation from the landowner for this specific site.
Conclusion
For the reasons above:• The NtK fails PoFA 2012 and cannot create keeper liability.
• The driver has not been identified.
• Signage and bay markings are inadequate and ambiguous.
• The operator has not proven landowner authority.
• The evidence fails to establish any parking event beyond the permitted consideration period.
Accordingly, I respectfully request that POPLA allow this appeal and direct that the charge be cancelled.
I am the registered keeper of the vehicle. I deny any liability for this parking charge and appeal in full.
The operator bears the burden of proof. They must establish that a contravention occurred, that a valid contract was formed between the operator and the driver, and that they have lawful authority to operate and issue Parking Charge Notices (PCNs) in their own name.
Accordingly, I put MET Parking Services to strict proof of the following:1. Failure to Comply with PoFA 2012 – No Period of Parking Specified
The Notice to Keeper (NtK) does not comply with Schedule 4 of the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012, Paragraph 9(2)(a), which requires that a “period of parking” be specified.
MET Parking has only provided a single timestamp (16:57 on 21 June 2025) and vague wording about “the period of parking immediately prior to that time”. A single timestamp is not a period. This has been confirmed in the persuasive appellate case of Brennan v Premier Parking Solutions (2023) [H6DP632H], where the judge held that a single observation time cannot evidence a “period of parking” and thus the NtK was not PoFA-compliant.
Because the NtK is not compliant, MET cannot transfer liability to the keeper. The operator’s repeated assertions that their NtK is PoFA compliant do not make it so.
2. No Contract Could Have Been Formed – No Period of Parking Evidenced
The operator has failed to evidence any period of parking, instead relying on a single timestamp to justify the charge. This is completely inadequate and fails both the legal and contractual standards.
The operator has ignored the minimum consideration period that must be allowed under the Private Parking Single Code of Practice, section 5.1. That section states that operators must allow a reasonable consideration period for the driver to find the terms, read them, and either decide to accept and park or leave. This period is defined as a minimum of five minutes.
By producing only a single timestamp and no proof of a parking duration beyond the mandatory consideration period, the operator has failed to evidence that a valid contract was ever formed with the driver. The law requires that a motorist be given sufficient time to read the terms, understand them, and make an informed decision whether to accept. Without evidence that the vehicle remained for longer than the minimum consideration period, there is no basis to conclude that any contract was entered into.
The operator is attempting to have it both ways: they wish to rely on PoFA to hold the keeper liable, which requires evidence of a defined parking period, yet at the same time they are relying on nothing more than a single instant in time to claim that a contract was entered into and breached. That is legally and logically unsustainable.
This is not about whether the vehicle was briefly observed on site. It is about whether the evidence demonstrates that the driver had sufficient time to read and accept the terms, which is essential for contract formation. A single timestamp does not prove that a parking period took place.
Therefore, even if every other element of the operator’s case were accepted (which they are not), their failure to show that the vehicle remained for longer than the minimum five-minute consideration period fatally undermines any claim that a binding contract was formed or that the PoFA requirements have been met.
3. No Evidence the Keeper was the Driver – Keeper Cannot Be Held Liable
MET has provided no evidence whatsoever that the appellant was the driver at the time of the alleged contravention. The identity of the driver has not been disclosed, and MET has not disputed this or provided any evidence to the contrary.
This leaves the operator with just one legal route: to pursue the registered keeper under Schedule 4 of the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 (PoFA). However, that mechanism only becomes available if the operator fully complies with every single mandatory condition set out in PoFA. As demonstrated earlier in point #1 of this appeal, the Notice to Keeper does not comply with a key requirements of PoFA, namely paragraph 9(2)(a), which requires that a “period of parking” be specified.
Therefore, by failing the overall test of absolute and unambiguous compliance with the statutory scheme, an analogy must be stated clearly: just as a person cannot be partially or even mostly pregnant, a Notice to Keeper cannot be partially or even mostly PoFA compliant. It is a binary point. It either is or it isn't — and in this case, it isn’t. That is the law.
This means MET cannot rely on PoFA to transfer liability to the keeper. With PoFA compliance off the table, the only remaining option would be to prove — with actual evidence — that the keeper was also the driver. They have not done so.
There is no legal presumption that the keeper was the driver. In VCS v Edward (2023) [H0KF6C9C], a persuasive County Court judgment in which HHJ Gargan explained precisely why it is not appropriate to infer driver identity from registered keeper status. MET has not presented any evidence to support such an inference.
POPLA is not entitled to make assumptions in the operator’s favour, nor is it permitted to apply a lower evidential threshold than the law requires. Keeper liability only arises if PoFA is complied with. It is not a default position, and it does not arise by implication.
Accordingly, the only lawful conclusion is that MET cannot pursue the appellant as keeper. There is no PoFA compliance, no driver identification, and therefore no legal basis for continuing enforcement of this charge.
4. Inadequate and Ambiguous Signage
The operator is put to strict proof of clear, prominent, and adequate signage in situ on the material date.• MET must provide a detailed site plan showing the placement of each sign and legible images of the actual signs.
• They must prove that signage was visible, legible, and compliant with the Private Parking Single Code of Practice (PPSCoP), including font size, positioning, and the prominence of key terms.
• The photographs they have provided already show ambiguous and faded bay markings. No contract can be formed where terms such as “park only in marked bays” are not objectively clear.
5. Landowner Authority
The operator is put to strict proof of a valid, contemporaneous contract or lease flowing from the landowner that authorises the operator to manage parking, issue PCNs, and pursue legal action in its own name. I refer the operator and the POPLA assessor to Section 14 of the PPSCoP (Relationship with Landowner), which clearly sets out mandatory minimum requirements that must be evidenced before any parking charge may be issued on controlled land.
In particular, Section 14.1(a)–(j) requires the operator to have in place written confirmation from the landowner which includes:• the identity of the landowner,
• a boundary map of the land to be managed,
• applicable byelaws,
• the duration and scope of authority granted,
• detailed parking terms and conditions including any specific permissions or exemptions,
• the means of issuing PCNs,
• responsibility for obtaining planning and advertising consents,
• and the operator’s obligations and appeal procedure under the Code.
These requirements are not optional. They are a condition precedent to issuing a PCN and bringing any associated action. Accordingly, I put the operator to strict proof of compliance with the entirety of Section 14 of the PPSCoP. Any document that contains redactions must not obscure the above conditions. The document must also be dated and signed by identifiable persons, with evidence of their authority to act on behalf of the parties to the agreement. The operator must provide an agreement showing clear authorisation from the landowner for this specific site.
Conclusion
For the reasons above:• The NtK fails PoFA 2012 and cannot create keeper liability.
• The driver has not been identified.
• Signage and bay markings are inadequate and ambiguous.
• The operator has not proven landowner authority.
• The evidence fails to establish any parking event beyond the permitted consideration period.
Accordingly, I respectfully request that POPLA allow this appeal and direct that the charge be cancelled.
So, do a search of other POPLA appeals on the forum to get an idea of how to put it together and the format. When you have something you think is ready, show us here and we will advise. You have 33 days from the date of the appeal rejection to submit your POPLA appeal.
The main points will be the fact that the driver is not identified and the NtK is not compliant with PoFA paragraph 9(2)(a) because there is no "period of parking" stated. Relevant case law is Brenna v Premier Parking Solutions (2023) where the judge stated that a single timestamp is not evidence of a "period of parking" and therefore the NtK was not PoFA compliant and the Keeper cannot be liable.
You can then also include the fact that the ground markings are ambiguous and cause confusion with the slightly faced line on the right being visible. Also throw in a requirement that puts them to strict proof that they have a valid contract flowing from the landowner that authorises them to issue PCNs in their own name at the location.
If you want to understand why a judge deemed that not stating a "period of parking" other than a single observation time or timestamp, have a read of this:
Brennan v Premier Parking Solutions (2023) (https://www.dropbox.com/scl/fi/1b9rpna57dutsetdgwi60/Brennan-v-Premier-Parking-Plymouth-CC-Judgment-20230821-V-Final_-14.pdf?rlkey=203u1fav6fve811lz8cm8wpwx&st=cd9hzrea&dl=0)
So, no PoFA compliance to be able to hold the Keeper liable and no evidence that a contract was formed with the driver.
If you want to understand why a judge deemed that not stating a "period of parking" other than a single observation time or timestamp, have a read of this:
Brennan v Premier Parking Solutions (2023) (https://www.dropbox.com/scl/fi/1b9rpna57dutsetdgwi60/Brennan-v-Premier-Parking-Plymouth-CC-Judgment-20230821-V-Final_-14.pdf?rlkey=203u1fav6fve811lz8cm8wpwx&st=cd9hzrea&dl=0)
So, no PoFA compliance to be able to hold the Keeper liable and no evidence that a contract was formed with the driver.
The Notice to Keeper (NtK) is not PoFA compliant and therefore they cannot transfer liability from the unknown (to them) driver to the known Keeper. There is no "period of parking" stated on the NtK which means that MET have not complied with PoFA 9(2)(a).
Any initial appeal is going to be rejected so don't waste much effort on this. After it is rejected, you will have an opportunity to appeal to POPLA where you can go into the detail of why there is no Keeper liability and quote relevant, persuasive legal precedent at them.
There is no legal obligation on the known keeper (the recipient of the Notice to Keeper (NtK)) to reveal the identity of the unknown driver and no inference or assumptions can be made.
The NtK is not compliant with all the requirements of PoFA which means that if the unknown driver is not identified, they cannot transfer liability for the charge from the unknown driver to the known keeper.
Use the following as your appeal. No need to embellish or remove anything from it:QuoteI am the keeper of the vehicle and I dispute your 'parking charge'. I deny any liability or contractual agreement and I will be making a complaint about your predatory conduct to your client landowner.
As your Notice to Keeper (NtK) does not fully comply with ALL the requirements of PoFA 2012, you are unable to hold the keeper of the vehicle liable for the charge. Partial or even substantial compliance is not sufficient. There will be no admission as to who was driving and no inference or assumptions can be drawn. MET has relied on contract law allegations of breach against the driver only.
The registered keeper cannot be presumed or inferred to have been the driver, nor pursued under some twisted interpretation of the law of agency. Your NtK can only hold the driver liable. MET have no hope at POPLA, so you are urged to save us both a complete waste of time and cancel the PCN.
I am the keeper of the vehicle and I dispute your 'parking charge'. I deny any liability or contractual agreement and I will be making a complaint about your predatory conduct to your client landowner.
As your Notice to Keeper (NtK) does not fully comply with ALL the requirements of PoFA 2012, you are unable to hold the keeper of the vehicle liable for the charge. Partial or even substantial compliance is not sufficient. There will be no admission as to who was driving and no inference or assumptions can be drawn. MET has relied on contract law allegations of breach against the driver only.
The registered keeper cannot be presumed or inferred to have been the driver, nor pursued under some twisted interpretation of the law of agency. Your NtK can only hold the driver liable. MET have no hope at POPLA, so you are urged to save us both a complete waste of time and cancel the PCN.