Thank you.
Version 3:
POPLA Verification Code: [Verification Code]
GROUPNEXUS PCN Number: [PCN Number]
Vehicle Registration: [Vehicle Registration]
Re: Response to GROUPNEXUS Evidence Submission and Reaffirmation of Appeal Points
I am the registered keeper of the vehicle and I am appealing against the issue of this Parking Charge Notice on the following grounds:
1. The signage is inadequate and unclear – breach of section 3.1.3(J) of the BPA code
2. Inadequate notice of charge
3. The Notice to Keeper fails to inform the keeper of the reason behind the charge as per Paragraph 9(2)(b) of PoFa
4. The Notice to Keeper does not comply with Paragraph 9(2)(e)(i) of Schedule 4 to the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 – no invitation to the keeper to pay.
5. The Notice to Keeper does not comply with Paragraph 9(2)(f) of Schedule 4 of PoFa. There is no valid reference to a 28 day warning period.
6. The Notice to Keeper fails to identify the creditor as required by Paragraph 9(2)(h) of PoFA.
7. The NtK fails to clarify whether Groupnexus is acting as an agent or principal
8. The operator has not identified the driver and cannot rely on PoFA to transfer liability to the keeper.
9. The operator is put to strict proof that it holds a valid contract flowing from the landowner in accordance with PPSCoP Section 14.
1. The signage is inadequate and unclear – breach of section 3.1.3(J) of the BPA code
GROUPNEXUS asserts that their signage complies with the BPA Code of Practice but provides no specific evidence to support this claim. They rely on generic statements that their signs meet the necessary standards. I wish to draw attention to the following breaches with respect to the BPA code of practice, version 1.1 :
(i) 3.1.1: No evidence was provided of adequate entrance signage that clearly conveys the terms and conditions of parking. GROUPNEXUS failed to show that the entrance sign made it clear that terms and conditions applied. The signage at the site does not clearly convey the parking charge of £100. It is buried in a wall of small text, making it almost impossible for a motorist to understand that they are entering into a contract that includes a substantial penalty for non-compliance. In contrast, the signage in ParkingEye v Beavis [2015] UKSC 67 prominently displayed the charge in large, bold text.
(ii) 3.1.3 GROUPNEXUS has not shown that the parking charge is prominently displayed. As demonstrated by the image comparison with the Beavis case signage, the £100 charge is obscured in small print, violating Section 3.1.3 of the BPA Code.
(iii) 3.1.4 The parking charge is not sufficiently distinct from other information on the sign, making it easy to miss. This violates the requirement for important terms to be clearly distinguishable.
The image comparison I provided clearly shows how the £100 charge is obscure and neither bolded nor prominent, supporting my claim that no valid contract was formed.
2.
Inadequate notice of charge
The charge was not adequately brought to the attention of the driver and fails to meet the standards required under ParkingEye v Beavis [2015] UKSC 67
The appellant submits that the signage at the location does not sufficiently bring the parking charge to the attention of the driver. This is a key requirement for a charge to be enforceable under the principles established by the Supreme Court in ParkingEye v Beavis.
In that case, the Supreme Court made clear that although parking charges possess many of the characteristics of a penalty, they may still be enforceable if they serve a legitimate interest and are not extravagant or unconscionable. Crucially, the Court attached great importance to the fact that the £85 charge in that case was clearly and prominently displayed in large lettering on the signage. At paragraph 100 of the judgment, the Court stated:
“None of this means that ParkingEye could charge overstayers whatever it liked. It could not charge a sum which would be out of all proportion to its interest or that of the landowner for whom it is providing the service.”
Therefore, proportionality and prominence are central to the enforceability of such charges.
In a recent POPLA decision, an assessor rightly concluded that:
“The reference to a £100 PCN is written in a much smaller font than the conditions that precede it, particularly the requirements of the maximum stay times, which is significantly more prominent. […] Taking these principles into account, I am going to consider the charge amount in the appellant’s case, as well as the signage. On this, I conclude the charge is not sufficiently brought to the attention of motorists on the signs and therefore it does not meet the expectations of ParkingEye v Beavis.”
(https://i.imgur.com/qxUtGXl.png)
The same deficiency exists in the present case. The signage fails to present the parking charge with sufficient prominence. The amount is buried in small print and is overshadowed by other conditions on the sign, such as maximum stay time or tariff details, which are displayed more conspicuously. This is not in keeping with the Beavis requirement that the charge be clearly and prominently stated.
As such, the signage fails to bring the charge amount to the driver’s attention in a meaningful way, and the charge cannot be considered proportionate or enforceable. The appeal should therefore be allowed.
3. The Notice to Keeper fails to inform the keeper of the reason behind the charge as per Paragraph 9(2)(b) of PoFa[/b]
GROUPNEXUS has failed to comply with the Protection of Freedoms Act (PoFA) 2012, meaning they cannot transfer liability for the alleged parking charge from the driver to the registered keeper.
Under Schedule 4 of PoFA, strict conditions must be met before the keeper can be held liable for a parking charge incurred by the driver. GROUPNEXUS's failure to comply with several key requirements renders the Notice to Keeper (NtK) non-compliant, meaning they cannot hold the registered keeper liable for the charge.
GROUPNEXUS’s NtK fails PoFA on the following points:
Paragraph 9(2)(a): The NtK must specify the relevant land on which the vehicle was parked. GROUPNEXUS’s vague description of the location is insufficient under PoFA, as it does not clearly identify where the vehicle was allegedly parked, nor does it specify a defined area.
Paragraph 9(2)(b): PoFA requires that the NtK must inform the keeper of the reason for issuing the charge. In this case, GROUPNEXUS fails to make the alleged breach of contract clear in their NtK. There is merely a reference to signage on the site. The NtK must inform the keeper why the parking terms were allegedly breached. Thus, this is not sufficiently communicated.
4. Notice to Keeper does not comply with Paragraph 9(2)(e)(i) of Schedule 4 to the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 – no invitation to the keeper to pay.
It is important to emphasise that PoFA Schedule 4 Paragraph 9(2)(e)(i) sets out a mandatory and unambiguous requirement. It states that the Notice to Keeper must:
“state that the creditor does not know both the name of the driver and a current address for service for the driver and invite the keeper — (A) to pay the unpaid parking charges; or (B) if the keeper was not the driver of the vehicle, to provide the creditor with a statement...”
The key phrase here is “invite the keeper...to pay the unpaid parking charges.”
This requirement is not optional, and there is no allowance in law for this obligation to be met by implication or assumption. The law does not say that a notice may merely “imply” that the keeper is being invited to pay, nor does it say that the fact the NtK is addressed to the keeper is somehow enough. The statute uses the word MUST—meaning that an explicit, unambiguous invitation must be present within the wording of the notice itself.
In this case, the Notice to Keeper fails to meet that condition. It does not state anywhere that the keeper is invited to pay the charge. The only references made are to the effect that the keeper should either provide the driver’s details or pass the notice to the driver. There is no direct, clear statement inviting the keeper themselves to make payment. That is a fundamental omission.
To be absolutely clear for the avoidance of doubt:
• The Notice is not compliant simply because it is addressed to the keeper.
• It is not compliant because it implies that someone should take action.
• It is only compliant if it specifically and expressly invites the keeper to pay.
Adjudicators cannot rewrite or gloss over statutory language. Parliament deliberately included this requirement in Schedule 4 to ensure that the transition of liability from the unknown driver to the registered keeper only occurs when all strict statutory safeguards are met. These safeguards are not technicalities—they are legal thresholds.
Whilst some assessors choose to simply gloss over PoFA 9(2)(e), they fail to take into account that sub paragraph (i) is also required to be considered. It is a binary matter and here it is clear that it has not been complied with.
In failing to include the required wording, the operator has not met the requirements of PoFA Paragraph 9(2)(e)(i). It is irrelevant what the operator intended to imply. What matters is whether the statutory wording is present on the face of the notice. It is not.
Therefore, POPLA must find that the NtK does not comply with PoFA and that keeper liability has not been established. The charge cannot be enforced against the registered keeper.
5. The Notice to Keeper does not comply with Paragraph 9(2)(f) of Schedule 4 of PoFa. There is no valid reference to a 28 day warning period.
Paragraph 9(2)(f): PoFA mandates that the NtK must include a warning to the keeper that if, after 28 days, neither payment nor driver details are provided, the keeper will become liable. GROUPNEXUS’s NtK fails to provide this warning with clearly and in the correct format.
6. The Notice to Keeper fails to identify the creditor, as required by Paragraph 9(2)(h) of Schedule 4 to the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012
Paragraph 9(2)(h) of Schedule 4 to the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 states:
“The notice must—identify the creditor and specify how and to whom payment or notification to the creditor may be made.”
This is a mandatory statutory requirement, and one which this NtK blatantly fails to meet. Nowhere in the Notice does it state who the creditor actually is. There is no sentence—nor even a vague attempt—to say: “The creditor is GroupNexus,”or any other entity to this effect, as required by law.
Instead, the Notice merely refers to “we” throughout, without defining who “we” actually is in a legal context. If the operator intends to rely on this ambiguous term to signify the creditor, then at the very least the Notice must state “we, the creditor” or “we, GroupNexus as the creditor.” It does not. The word “creditor” is not mentioned once in the document.
The failure to explicitly identify the creditor means the NtK is not compliant with Paragraph 9(2)(h), and therefore the operator cannot hold the keeper liable. As keeper, I cannot be expected to respond to a notice that fails to state, even once, who is legally entitled to the charge.
Accordingly, I respectfully request that POPLA allow this appeal and instruct the operator to cancel the charge.
7. The NtK fails to clarify whether Groupnexus is acting as an agent or principal
Further compounding the breach of Paragraph 9(2)(h) of PoFA, the Notice to Keeper also fails to state whether Groupnexus is acting:
• as the principal, issuing the parking charge in its own name and right (in which case it must be clearly named as the creditor), or
• as an agent of the landowner, in which case the actual creditor is the landowner and must be identified.
There is no information in the NtK to clarify the capacity in which Groupnexus is acting. This creates a situation where the keeper is being pursued for a payment allegedly owed to an unknown party. This undermines the basic requirements of legal certainty and transparency.
POPLA and courts have consistently held that the operator must identify the creditor and clarify their legal standing in relation to the land. Without such clarification, the Notice is materially non-compliant, and keeper liability cannot be established.
Given these failures, GROUPNEXUS has not complied with the requirements of PoFA, meaning they cannot transfer liability to the keeper. Without strict compliance with PoFA, GROUPNEXUS cannot hold the keeper liable, and this charge is therefore unenforceable.
8. The operator has not identified the driver and cannot rely on PoFA to transfer liability to the keeper.
As GROUPNEXUS cannot rely on PoFA to transfer liability to the keeper, they must provide evidence that the keeper was the driver at the time of the alleged parking contravention.
GROUPNEXUS have not provided any evidence to suggest that the registered keeper was the driver.
GROUPNEXUS has made no attempt to prove the identity of the driver, and they have not demonstrated why they believe the registered keeper should be held liable without PoFA compliance.
As there is no evidence that I, as the registered keeper, was the driver, GROUPNEXUS has no legal grounds to pursue this charge against me.
9. The operator is put to strict proof of landowner authority to issue PCNs in their own name
It is a well-established requirement under the Private Parking Single Code of Practice (PPSCoP) and longstanding POPLA precedent that a private parking operator must have clear, current, and contractual authority flowing from the landowner to manage parking and issue PCNs in their own name.
GroupNexus is therefore put to strict proof. The operator must produce, but not limited to:
• A contemporaneous, unredacted contract or agreement with the landowner (or the landowner’s agent, with written proof of such agency),
• Confirmation that the contract permits the operator to issue PCNs in their own name and to pursue unpaid charges,
• Proof that the contract is still valid and in force as of the date of the alleged contravention,
• Identification of the exact land covered (including “New Street Retail Park”),
• Disclosure of all material terms, including the scope, duration, enforcement conditions, and authority limits,
• Confirmation of any variations agreed since the contract was first executed.
Importantly, any redactions of critical parts of the contract—such as the validity term, the agreed parking conditions, the times of enforcement, or the names, signatures, and dates of the signatories—renders the evidence incomplete and unreliable. These elements are essential to proving that a valid, enforceable contract existed at the material time.
Excessive or unnecessary redactions serve only to raise suspicion that the operator has something to hide. It is not sufficient for an operator to say “there is a contract” or to supply a heavily redacted version that fails to meet the standards set out in Section 14 of the PPSCoP. That section sets clear expectations about what a compliant contract must contain.
A simple assumption that “there must be a contract because signs are in place” is not acceptable. That position shows a total disregard for the PPSCoP and POPLA’s evidential standards. Signage presence is not proof of legal authority. If the operator cannot prove that all required contractual points under Section 14 have been satisfied, then any suggestion that they have a valid contract must be treated as null and void.
Unless GroupNexus produces full, unredacted contractual proof meeting all the criteria of the PPSCoP, they cannot demonstrate any legal standing to issue or pursue this charge. The appeal must therefore be upheld.
Conclusion
The Parking Charge Notice fails on multiple substantive grounds, both statutory and procedural. GroupNexus has not complied with the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 or the Private Parking Single Code of Practice or the BPA code of practice. As the operator has failed to establish keeper liability and has not evidenced a valid authority to issue the charge, I respectfully request that POPLA uphold this appeal and instruct the operator to cancel the PCN.
[/quote]
Based on the image of the sign you showed, you could include that in your appeal (embed) and use the following wording relating to it:
Adequate notice of charge argument
The charge was not adequately brought to the attention of the driver and fails to meet the standards required under ParkingEye v Beavis [2015] UKSC 67
The appellant submits that the signage at the location does not sufficiently bring the parking charge to the attention of the driver. This is a key requirement for a charge to be enforceable under the principles established by the Supreme Court in ParkingEye v Beavis.
In that case, the Supreme Court made clear that although parking charges possess many of the characteristics of a penalty, they may still be enforceable if they serve a legitimate interest and are not extravagant or unconscionable. Crucially, the Court attached great importance to the fact that the £85 charge in that case was clearly and prominently displayed in large lettering on the signage. At paragraph 100 of the judgment, the Court stated:
“None of this means that ParkingEye could charge overstayers whatever it liked. It could not charge a sum which would be out of all proportion to its interest or that of the landowner for whom it is providing the service.”
Therefore, proportionality and prominence are central to the enforceability of such charges.
In a recent POPLA decision, an assessor rightly concluded that:
“The reference to a £100 PCN is written in a much smaller font than the conditions that precede it, particularly the requirements of the maximum stay times, which is significantly more prominent. […] Taking these principles into account, I am going to consider the charge amount in the appellant’s case, as well as the signage. On this, I conclude the charge is not sufficiently brought to the attention of motorists on the signs and therefore it does not meet the expectations of ParkingEye v Beavis.”
(https://i.imgur.com/qxUtGXl.png)
The same deficiency exists in the present case. The signage fails to present the parking charge with sufficient prominence. The amount is buried in small print and is overshadowed by other conditions on the sign, such as maximum stay time or tariff details, which are displayed more conspicuously. This is not in keeping with the Beavis requirement that the charge be clearly and prominently stated.
As such, the signage fails to bring the charge amount to the driver’s attention in a meaningful way, and the charge cannot be considered proportionate or enforceable. The appeal should therefore be allowed.