You have 33 days from the appeal rejection date to submit your POPLA appeal. Here is a draft POPLA appeal:
I am the registered keeper of the vehicle. I am appealing this Parking Charge Notice on the following grounds:
1. The Notice to Keeper does not comply with the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 (PoFA), and therefore no keeper liability can arise.
2. No Breach of Terms – Blue Badge Display Was Not Contractually Required.
3. 3. Failure to Comply with the PPSCoP – No Signage Accessible from Within the Vehicle
4. 4. No Evidence of Landowner Authority – Operator Put to Strict Proof
1. The Notice to Keeper does not comply with the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 (PoFA), and therefore no keeper liability can arise.
No driver details have been provided, and none will be. Accordingly, the operator’s only route to enforcement is through strict adherence to the statutory requirements set out in Schedule 4 of the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 (PoFA). If those requirements have not been fully met — then liability does not pass to the keeper. Just as a person cannot be partially or even mostly pregnant, an NtK cannot be partially or mostly PoFA compliant. This is a binary matter. It either is or it isn't compliant. This threshold test must be applied first, and the appeal allowed if compliance is not established.
In this case, the Notice to Keeper states only that the vehicle was “observed” and that the charge relates to “the period of parking immediately prior to 19:03 on 23 February 2025.” This wording is vague and fails to comply with Paragraph 9(2)(a) of PoFA, which requires that the Notice must “specify the period of parking to which the notice relates.” The operator has not done so. Instead, they provide a single moment — a time of observation — and loosely infer that something happened before it, without defining any time frame at all.
This failure is not a technicality. The requirement to specify a period of parking exists so that a keeper can understand the nature of the allegation, verify the claim, and assess whether PoFA conditions have been met. A reference to “immediately prior to” a particular time is legally meaningless without stating when that period began, how long it lasted, or how the operator knows that parking occurred. PoFA does not permit assumptions.
The parking operator might argue that their wording is sufficient, but there is clear case law which proves otherwise. In Brennan v Premier Parking Logistics (2023) [H6DP632H], a persuasive appellate-level decision made by HHJ Mitchell, the exact same issue was considered. The judge held that referencing a moment in time — whether through a timestamp or an observation — does not meet the requirement to specify a "period of parking" under PoFA Paragraph 9(2)(a). The judgment makes it explicitly clear that unless the operator defines an actual period — a measurable start and end — the notice is non-compliant.
If the assessor is unfamiliar with the Brennan case, they are strongly urged to review the transcript, which is widely circulated in parking appeals. The judge in Brennan explained that without a defined parking period, it is impossible to determine whether the vehicle was simply present momentarily while the driver was reviewing the signage, or whether the vehicle was ever parked at all in breach of terms.
This is directly relevant here. MET Parking has not produced any evidence that the vehicle was observed for any measurable length of time. There is no photographic or contemporaneous record showing the vehicle stationary in situ for more than the minimum consideration period required by the Private Parking Single Code of Practice (PPSCoP) section 5.1. Annex B of the PPSCoP makes the position crystal clear:
“The significance of whether the consideration has expired is fundamental as it is the point the driver has accepted the terms and conditions attached to the controlled land in question. A consideration period is not a free period of parking.”
The Code further confirms that “a parking charge must not be enforced where the consideration period has not expired.” Without proof that the vehicle remained on site for more than the minimum period required for the driver to decide whether to accept the terms, the operator has no basis to assert that a contract was formed — let alone breached.
Therefore, not only does the Notice to Keeper fail to meet the statutory requirements for keeper liability, but the operator has also failed to establish that any enforceable contract was ever created.
This appeal must succeed on this ground alone. The keeper cannot be held liable, and the operator has failed to demonstrate that any parking contravention occurred.
2. No Breach of Terms – Blue Badge Display Was Not Contractually Required
The PCN alleges: “Parked or waiting in a disabled bay without displaying a disabled badge.” Even if MET has photographic evidence showing that no badge was visible on the dashboard at the time their operative took a photo, this does not in itself establish a breach of any contractual terms.
As already addressed in point 1 above, there is no evidence that the vehicle remained in situ for longer than the minimum consideration period, nor any evidence that the driver accepted any terms and conditions. Therefore, the terms displayed on signage — including any obligation to display a Blue Badge — never came into effect. If no contract was formed, there could be no contractual breach.
Moreover, it is not disputed that the driver had a legitimate right to use the disabled bay. The vehicle was occupied throughout, and at no point was it left unattended. If MET’s operative had any concerns about badge display, they could and should have approached the occupants and made a simple request to confirm entitlement or to display the badge if required. They did not. Instead, they chose to issue a PCN without making any attempt to clarify the situation, which is wholly unreasonable behaviour.
Even if MET believed they were entitled to issue a PCN based on their observation, the matter should have been resolved the moment the Keeper submitted a copy of the front of a valid Blue Badge during the initial appeal. This confirmed that the occupants of the vehicle were entitled to use the space. Yet MET ignored this evidence entirely and demanded a copy of the reverse side — containing sensitive personal data — which was neither necessary nor relevant. Their refusal to acknowledge valid proof of entitlement, coupled with their failure to engage with the occupants at the time, highlights a rigid and unjustified reliance on form over substance.
The fact remains: the driver had a right to use the bay. A Blue Badge was in the vehicle and could have been shown on request. The vehicle was not left unattended, and no contract was formed. The requirement to display the badge arises only under the contractual terms — terms which never took effect, as MET has not shown that any contract was ever accepted.
Accordingly, the alleged breach has not occurred in law or in fact. This appeal must be allowed.
3. Failure to Comply with the PPSCoP – No Signage Accessible from Within the Vehicle
Section 4.1 of the Private Parking Single Code of Practice (PPSCoP) sets a mandatory standard regarding signage accessibility, particularly in relation to disabled motorists. It states:
“The parking operator must ensure that at least one sign containing the terms and conditions for parking can be viewed without the driver needing to leave the vehicle, in order for drivers with a disability to be able to make an informed decision on whether to park at the premises.”
This clause exists for a reason: a contract cannot be formed unless the driver is given a fair opportunity to review the terms before making a decision to park. For disabled drivers, that opportunity must be available without the need to leave the vehicle.
MET Parking Services have failed to comply with this requirement. The appellant knows for a fact that there was no signage containing the full terms and conditions visible or legible from within the vehicle upon entering or stopping in the area. This is a fundamental breach of the PPSCoP.
MET are therefore put to strict proof that they complied with Section 4.1. They must provide photographic evidence showing that at least one sign containing the full terms and conditions could be clearly read by a disabled driver before exiting the vehicle. This is not an optional standard — it is an enforceable accessibility requirement under the Code.
In the absence of such signage, no disabled driver could have made an informed decision about whether to accept the terms and conditions. Therefore, no contract can be said to have been formed.
A failure to comply with Section 4.1 invalidates the very basis of the PCN. The appeal must be allowed.
4. No Evidence of Landowner Authority – Operator Put to Strict Proof
The operator is put to strict proof that it holds a valid and current agreement flowing from the landowner which authorises it to issue and enforce Parking Charge Notices in its own name at the location in question.
This is a fundamental requirement under contract law and under the Private Parking Single Code of Practice. It is not sufficient for MET to simply state that they have permission; they must prove it. The contract must clearly demonstrate that the landowner — or a managing agent who has been expressly authorised by the landowner to enter into agreements with third parties — has granted the operator the necessary rights to perform enforcement activities, including the issuance and recovery of parking charges.
It is not enough for the operator to produce a generic or expired agreement. They must show that:
The agreement was valid and in force at the time of the alleged contravention;
It authorises MET to issue Parking Charge Notices and to pursue them in their own name; and
It covers the specific site in question and reflects the signage and terms that were in place on the date of the alleged event.
This final point is critical. It is extremely common in practice for signage and terms to be updated or changed by the operator over time, while the underlying contract remains unaltered. Unless MET can demonstrate that the landowner (or authorised agent) has agreed in writing to all such changes to the terms and signage, the operator is acting outside the scope of the authority originally granted.
If MET cannot produce a contract that confirms all of the above, then they do not have standing to pursue this charge and the appeal must be allowed.
Conclusion
This appeal must be allowed for multiple independent and compelling reasons:
• The Notice to Keeper fails to comply with the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 and therefore no keeper liability can arise.
• The operator has failed to demonstrate that any contractual obligation was breached, as there is no requirement to display a Blue Badge unless a contract has been formed — and no such contract has been established.
• MET has not complied with Section 4.1 of the Private Parking Single Code of Practice, as no signage containing the terms and conditions could be read without the driver leaving the vehicle.
• The operator has not shown that it holds a valid and current agreement flowing from the landowner that authorises the enforcement of parking terms at the site.
Each point alone is fatal to the charge. Taken together, they show a complete failure by the operator to meet both legal and procedural requirements. The appeal must be upheld, and the Parking Charge Notice cancelled
Appeal, only as the Keeper with the following and if possible, attach a copy of the blue badge but redact it and only show the validity date:
I am the keeper of the vehicle, and I dispute your 'parking charge'. I deny any liability or contractual agreement and will be making a complaint about your predatory conduct to your client landowner.
As your Notice to Keeper (NtK) does not fully comply with all the requirements of PoFA 2012, you are unable to hold the keeper of the vehicle liable for the charge. Partial or even substantial compliance is not sufficient. There will be no admission as to who was driving, and no inference or assumptions can be drawn. MET has relied on contract law allegations of breach against the driver only.
The registered keeper cannot be presumed or inferred to have been the driver, nor pursued under some twisted interpretation of the law of agency. Your NtK can only hold the driver liable.
Furthermore, your signage fails to comply with the Private Parking Single Code of Practice (PPSCoP) Section 4.1, which states:
"The parking operator must ensure that at least one sign containing the terms and conditions for parking can be viewed without the driver needing to leave the vehicle, in order for drivers with a disability to be able to make an informed decision on whether to park at the premises."
There are no signs with terms that can be viewed from within the vehicle, meaning that a driver with a disability was unable to make an informed decision before parking. The vehicle was parked in a disabled bay, and all occupants, including the driver, are Blue Badge holders. A copy of a valid Blue Badge is attached.
Additionally, your NtK fails to specify any "period of parking", as required by PoFA 2012 Schedule 4, Paragraph 9(2)(a). A single timestamp does not constitute a period of parking and does not evidence that the vehicle was stopped for more than the minimum consideration period before leaving. No contract was formed.
MET have no hope at POPLA, so you are urged to save us both a complete waste of time and cancel the PCN.