I recently received a similar Notice to Keeper.of the driver.
In terms of POPLA appeals, the burden of proof rests with the operator to provide clear evidence of the contravention it alleges occurred, and consequently, that it issued the PCN correctly. The operator has provided evidence of the vehicle parked on the site on the day of the parking event. The appellant has advised that the operator cannot rely on PoFA Schedule 4 to transfer liablity as the land in question is not relevant. The operator has provided excerpts from Schedule 4 of the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 and the airport byelaws in the evidence file. The Byelaws describe areas within Stansted Airport in two ways: areas subject to traffic enactments, and areas not subject to traffic enactments. In either case, the land described would be subject to statutory control and not relevant land as defined within the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012. In this case the driver of the vehicle is not known and as the operator has not provided sufficient evidence to prove that the land is relevant land I am not satisfied that it can apply Protection of Freedoms Act (PoFA) 2012 to transfer liability. Accordingly, I am allowing this appeal. I note that the appellant has raised further grounds for appeal in this case, however as I have allowed the appeal for this reason, I have not considered them.
This response addresses MET Parking Services' submission to POPLA and highlights the flaws in their arguments. MET Parking Services has failed to rebut key points raised in the appeal, and their attempt to rely on the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 (PoFA) is legally flawed.
1. The location is not relevant land under PoFA
The appellant has provided an official airport boundary map from Stansted Airport, which clearly shows that Southgate Park is within the official airport boundary. This map was submitted with the appeal as direct evidence of the statutory control over the land.
MET has completely ignored this map and has not rebutted the obvious evidence that the location falls within the airport boundary. Instead, they attempt to dismiss the argument by making vague assertions about whether the byelaws apply to parking but fail to provide any evidence contradicting the airport's official boundary.
MET has provided a link to the airport byelaws, but this link does not contain any map of the airport boundary. In contrast, the official map submitted by the appellant confirms that the car park is within the airport's jurisdiction. The fact that MET has ignored this map and provided no counter-evidence is a clear failure to rebut a key piece of evidence in this appeal.
Since PoFA does not apply to land that is under statutory control, MET has no legal basis to hold the keeper liable. They can only pursue the driver, whose identity has not been disclosed.
2. The location is under statutory control
MET Parking Services has failed to properly respond to the core argument that Southgate Park is under statutory control. The appeal clearly stated that PoFA Schedule 4, Paragraph 3(1)(c) excludes land if the parking of a vehicle on that land is subject to statutory control, such as land covered by airport byelaws. The Stansted Airport byelaws contain a provision that regulates where vehicles may be parked within the airport boundary. Since the byelaws impose statutory control over parking, this means the location is not relevant land under PoFA.
The airport byelaws do contain a provision stating:
“No person shall leave any cargo or baggage or park any vehicle or equipment elsewhere than in a place provided by the airport company for the accommodation of such cargo or baggage or the parking of such vehicle or equipment.”
This confirms that the parking of a vehicle is subject to statutory control because it dictates where vehicles may and may not be parked. The fact that the byelaws regulate where vehicles can be parked means that parking is subject to statutory control, satisfying the exclusion in PoFA
MET Parking Services has failed to acknowledge or rebut the official airport boundary map provided in this appeal, which confirms that Southgate Park is within the airport boundary and thus subject to these byelaws. They have also failed to explain why they believe that parking at this location is not subject to statutory control, despite the clear wording of the byelaws.
The byelaws provided in MET’s evidence pack confirm that they apply to any land within the boundary of Stansted Airport, meaning it is subject to statutory control.
MET Parking Services’ argument that byelaws only apply to areas where road traffic enactments do not apply is incorrect and misleading. The wording of PoFA does not require byelaws to specifically mention parking. It simply states that land under statutory control is not ‘relevant land.’ Byelaws exist over Stansted Airport, which means PoFA does not apply, and MET cannot transfer liability to the Keeper.
MET has failed to provide any legal argument or evidence to counter this point. Their response simply states that they are “confident” that byelaws do not apply to parking in this location. Confidence is not evidence. Their failure to address the specific wording of PoFA means that they have not rebutted the fundamental legal argument that this land is not ‘relevant land.’
Since PoFA does not apply, MET has no legal basis to hold the Keeper liable. They can only pursue the driver, whose identity has not been disclosed.
3. MET Parking Services has failed to address the core legal argument
The appeal highlighted that MET’s rejection of the initial appeal ignored the argument about statutory control. In their response to POPLA, MET again fails to provide any legal argument refuting this point. Instead, they attempt to deflect the issue by claiming that PoFA applies because the byelaws do not explicitly mention parking.
MET’s failure to address this key issue is a clear indication that they do not have a legal basis to enforce the parking charge. They have not cited any law, case law, or legal precedent to contradict the appellant’s argument. Their silence on this issue speaks volumes.
4. No Keeper liability under PoFA
MET states that they are pursuing the registered Keeper under PoFA because the driver has not been identified. However, this argument is entirely dependent on PoFA being applicable, which it is not. Since Southgate Park is subject to byelaws and therefore statutory control, PoFA does not apply, and MET cannot hold the Keeper liable.
MET has completely failed to explain how PoFA can apply when the location is not ‘relevant land.’ They have not addressed the clear wording of PoFA that excludes land under statutory control. Instead, they rely on a misleading and legally incorrect interpretation.
5. Misleading reliance on BPA/IPC Private Parking Single Code of Practice
MET attempts to rely on Annex C of the BPA/IPC Private Parking Single Code of Practice, which suggests that if a Keeper does not identify the driver, they can be assumed to be the driver. This assumption has no basis in law and contradicts established legal precedent.
The appeal referenced the persuasive appeals case of VCS v Edward (2023), which confirms that the Keeper cannot simply be inferred or assumed to be the driver. MET has completely ignored this case and has not attempted to rebut it. Instead, they rely on a non-statutory industry code that contradicts established legal principles. POPLA must follow the law, not a misleading interpretation from a trade body.
6. Inadequate signage evidence
MET claims that their signage is clear and sufficient. However, they have failed to provide evidence that the signs were visible to motorists at the time of the alleged contravention. The burden of proof is on MET to show that their signage was clear, legible, and positioned in such a way that a contract could be formed.
The appeal specifically challenged MET to prove that:
- Signs were visible before entering the car park
- The terms were legible from a driver’s perspective
- The signs clearly stated PoFA compliance
MET has failed to provide any evidence to rebut these points. They have simply asserted that the signage is sufficient without addressing the specific concerns raised in the appeal. This is another example of their failure to properly engage with the arguments made.
7. No obligation to prove customer status
MET states that the appellant has not provided proof that the driver was a customer of the businesses on-site. However, the burden of proof is on MET to prove that a parking contract was formed and breached. The appellant is not required to prove anything.
MET’s attempt to shift the burden of proof onto the appellant is a clear indication that they have no actual evidence of a contract being formed. They must prove their case, not demand that the appellant provide evidence in their defence.
Conclusion
- MET Parking Services has failed to rebut the core legal argument that Southgate Park is under statutory control and is not relevant land under PoFA.
- hey have not provided any legal justification for attempting to enforce Keeper liability under PoFA.
- MET has ignored the case law referenced in the appeal, failing to address binding legal principles that refute their position.
- Their signage evidence is inadequate and does not address the specific concerns raised.
- Their attempt to shift the burden of proof onto the appellant is legally flawed.
Given these failures, MET Parking Services has not demonstrated that they have any legal basis to enforce the parking charge against the Keeper. Therefore, the appeal must be allowed, and the Parking Charge Notice should be cancelled.
In the appeal to POPLA KEEPER states that this is not relevant land and therefore PoFA 2012 does not apply, so we cannot seek registered keeper liability. As we have not been provided with the name and address of the driver of the vehicle, we are pursuing the registered keeper under Schedule 4 of The Protection of Freedoms Act 2012. Please see our compliant Notice to Keeper in Section B of our evidence pack. Please also see a full explanation of why we may pursue the registered keeper under Schedule 4 of PoFA 2012 in Section C of our evidence pack. As stated in paragraph 3 of Schedule 4 of the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012, Relevant Land is any land that is not a) a highway maintainable at the public expense, b) a parking place which is provided or controlled by a traffic authority, or c) any land excepting the aforementioned on which the parking of a vehicle is subject to statutory control. Paragraph 3 subsection 3 states that parking is subject to statutory control if any statutory provision imposes a liability in respect of the parking of vehicles on that land. The Stansted Airport byelaws do not impose a penalty for vehicles parking within Southgate Park. We have included in section E of this evidence pack excerpts from the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 and also the Airport byelaws. The full airport byelaws may be viewed online at: https://assets.live.dxp.maginfrastructure.com/f/73114/x/46195467c9/stansted-byelaws.pdf In light of this, the site is not excluded by the definitions laid out in paragraph 3 of Schedule 4 of the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 and as such is considered Relevant Land. In this instance, the driver was not entitled to the free parking period as they were not a customer and had not registered the vehicle. As advised on the signs, only customers are entitled to the free parking period, and they must register their vehicle on arrival. The driver did not make payment for their stay as an alternative and as such the parking charge was issued. This would not qualify under F.3(g) of the Appeals Charter as only Starbucks customers are permitted to park for free, and at no point has KEEPER claimed that the driver was a customer or provided evidence to demonstrate that they were. The terms and conditions of parking are clearly stated on the signs that are prominently displayed at the entrance to and around the car park. These include that the car park is for the use of Southgate Park customers only and that to receive the 60-minute maximum free stay for customers, drivers must enter their vehicle registration on arrival. Visitors that are not Starbucks customers may pay to park for up to 3 hours by using the pay by phone service. As the evidence we have provided in Section E of our evidence pack demonstrates, the vehicle remained in the car park without being registered for the free parking period and no payment was made as an alternative. It remains the driver’s responsibility to check the signs where they park and comply with the stated terms and conditions. Therefore, we believe that the charge notice was issued correctly, and the appeal should be refused.
Subject: Request for Parliamentary Question Regarding DVLA’s Failure to Enforce KADOE Contract with MET Parking Services
Dear [MP’s Title and Surname],
I am writing as your constituent to ask you to raise a parliamentary question to the Secretary of State for Transport regarding the DVLA’s failure to investigate clear and repeated breaches of the Keeper at Date of Event (KADOE) contract by MET Parking Services Ltd.
Specifically, MET Parking continues to issue Notices to Keeper (NtKs) that falsely assert liability for parking charges under Schedule 4 of the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 (PoFA) at locations that are not “relevant land” under that legislation. These sites fall within the boundaries of airports and are therefore subject to statutory control by virtue of airport byelaws.
The DVLA has been provided with clear evidence—including official airport boundary maps—proving that the car parks in question fall within land that is subject to statutory control under airport byelaws. Despite this, the Agency continues to provide MET Parking with access to registered keeper data and has not taken enforcement action under the KADOE contract.
I enclose a short briefing note explaining the matter further, including the key locations involved: Southgate Park at Stansted Airport, and McDonald's Gatwick.
I would be grateful if you would ask the Secretary of State for Transport to explain:• Why the DVLA has failed to act against MET Parking for breaching its KADOE contract;
• What steps are being taken to ensure that DVLA data is not misused to unlawfully pursue liability under PoFA at sites where it cannot apply;
• Whether the Secretary of State will order a review of all Notices to Keeper issued by MET Parking at these sites and require them to cease using DVLA data in this manner.
Thank you in advance for your assistance, and I would appreciate a copy of any response you receive.
Yours sincerely,
[Your Full Name]
Briefing Note: MET Parking Services – Misuse of DVLA Data and Breach of KADOE Contract
Background
MET Parking Services Ltd is an unregulated private parking operator that accesses DVLA vehicle keeper data via the KADOE (Keeper At Date Of Event) contract. Under this agreement, parking operators must use keeper data lawfully and only in accordance with Schedule 4 of the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 (PoFA), which permits “keeper liability” for unpaid private parking charges only on relevant land.
Issue
Despite clear legal restrictions, MET Parking continues to issue postal Notices to Keeper (NtKs) asserting that the vehicle keeper is liable under PoFA at sites where PoFA does not apply. These locations are within the boundaries of UK airports and are therefore subject to statutory control (airport byelaws), which makes them not “relevant land” under Schedule 4 of PoFA.
Key Locations of Concern
Southgate Park, Stansted Airport (CM24 1PY)
– This car park is within the boundary of Stansted Airport, as shown by official airport maps.
– A POPLA appeal has upheld that the site is not “relevant land” for the purposes of PoFA.
McDonald's, Ring Road North, Gatwick Airport (RH6 0NN)
– Located within the Gatwick Airport perimeter road.
– Gatwick Airport is a designated area subject to airport byelaws under statutory control.
Airport boundary maps are attached withe the locations clearly marked within those boundries.
In both cases, MET Parking has continued to issue NtKs alleging that the keeper is liable under PoFA, despite being unable to lawfully do so.
Legal Reference
PoFA Schedule 4 Paragraph 3(1)(c) excludes from the definition of “relevant land”:“any land … on which the parking of a vehicle is subject to statutory control.”
Paragraph 3(3) clarifies:“The parking of a vehicle on land is ‘subject to statutory control’ if any statutory provision imposes a liability … in respect of the parking on that land.”
It is therefore irrelevant whether the land is operated by a private business. If the land falls within the jurisdiction of statutory airport byelaws—and those byelaws have not been formally revoked by the Secretary of State—then it cannot be relevant land for the purpose of PoFA.
Why This Matters• The DVLA is under a duty to enforce the terms of its KADOE contract.
• Continued access to keeper data for unlawful use undermines public trust in data handling.
• Registered Keepers and Hirers of vehicles are being wrongly told they are legally liable when they are not.
The DVLA’s current position misrepresents the legal test under PoFA and shifts responsibility away from its own enforcement obligations.
Suggested Parliamentary QuestionTo ask the Secretary of State for Transport, what steps the Department is taking to ensure that the DVLA enforces compliance with the KADOE contract in cases where private parking operators, such as MET Parking Services Ltd, have been shown to issue Notices to Keeper under Schedule 4 of the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 at locations that are not relevant land due to their being within the boundary of airports subject to statutory control.
Optionally:... and whether the DVLA will review the lawfulness of such Notices to Keeper issued at Southgate Park (Stansted) and McDonald's Gatwick, and consider suspension of data access where misuse is identified.
Location maps
(https://i.imgur.com/Hp2CEV0.jpeg)
(https://i.imgur.com/z560i7d.jpeg)
POPLA Appeal Submission – Grounds: Land is not ‘relevant land’ under the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 (PoFA)
I am appealing this Parking Charge Notice as the registered keeper of the vehicle. I am under no legal obligation to identify the driver to a private parking company, and I have not done so. This appeal is made solely in my capacity as Keeper.
This appeal is made on the basis that MET Parking Services is attempting to rely on the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 (PoFA) in a location where it does not apply. The land in question is not “relevant land” as defined in PoFA Schedule 4. Therefore, MET has no lawful basis to pursue the registered keeper.
The vehicle was parked at Southgate Park, which lies within the boundary of Stansted Airport. This is not a speculative assumption — it is a matter of fact. I now submit with this appeal a map produced by Stansted Airport that clearly shows the official airport boundary. I have marked on this map the location of Southgate Park, which falls squarely within the blue boundary line of Stansted Airport.
(https://i.imgur.com/57P2tH5.jpeg)
The test is whether statutory provisions apply to the land. Where a parcel of land lies within the boundary of an airport to which byelaws apply — such as Stansted Airport — it is by definition under statutory control and therefore excluded from the definition of “relevant land” in Schedule 4 of PoFA. Unless the Secretary of State has formally revoked the application of the byelaws to this specific parcel of land (which there is no evidence has occurred), then the land cannot lawfully be treated as relevant land. This remains true even if the land is used by a private company, such as MET Parking Services, or contains commercial outlets such as Starbucks.
I first raised this point directly with MET in my original appeal. In response, they issued a generic rejection stating only: “The charge was not incurred at the Airport, it was incurred at Southgate Park (Starbucks).” This is wholly inadequate and avoids the key legal issue. Southgate Park being “not the terminal” is legally irrelevant. The only test that matters is whether byelaws apply to the land — and they do.
I then sent a further written response to MET explaining clearly (again) why Southgate Park is under statutory control, why PoFA does not apply, and why their assertions of Keeper Liability are legally baseless. In summary, that correspondence set out the following:1. Southgate Park Falls Under Stansted Airport Byelaws
The map now submitted is produced by Stansted Airport and shows the area in question within the airport’s official boundary. Stansted Airport is governed by Airport Byelaws. Land subject to statutory control is not “relevant land” under PoFA. Therefore, PoFA Keeper Liability cannot apply at Southgate Park.
2. “Private Land” Does NOT Mean “Relevant Land”
MET appear to believe that all private land is automatically “relevant land.” This is wrong. Schedule 4 of PoFA specifically excludes land subject to statutory control, regardless of whether it is privately owned. For example, train station car parks are also private land, but are not “relevant land” under PoFA because they fall under Railway Byelaws. The same principle applies to Southgate Park due to Airport Byelaws.
3. MET Is in Breach of the Private Parking Single Code of Practice (PPSCoP)
By issuing a Notice to Keeper that falsely asserts Keeper Liability under PoFA, MET is in breach of the PPSCoP Section 8.1.1(d), which states:“The parking operator must not serve a notice which in its design and/or language states the keeper is liable under the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 where they cannot be held liable.”
MET has knowingly issued a misleading notice, purporting to hold the registered keeper liable in a location where this is not legally possible.
4. Misuse of DVLA Data – KADOE Breach
MET is misusing Keeper data obtained from the DVLA by using it to assert a legal position that is invalid. PoFA does not apply at Southgate Park, yet the NtK sent by MET falsely states that the Keeper will be liable if the driver is not named. This misuse of DVLA data is a breach of the KADOE agreement and will be reported.
Following my second letter, MET responded again, entirely ignoring the issue of land status. Their response merely restated signage and payment terms, and made no effort to address the critical point: that the land is not relevant land under PoFA, and Keeper Liability does not apply.
It is the operator’s burden to demonstrate that the site is relevant land. They have failed to do so. They have not rebutted the airport boundary map. They have not provided any evidence from the landowner, the airport authority, or the Secretary of State, to show that statutory control does not apply. They have not met the legal threshold.
Conclusion• The land in question is under statutory control and not “relevant land.”
• MET cannot rely on PoFA Schedule 4.
• The Keeper is not liable.
• The NtK is misleading and non-compliant with both PoFA and the PPSCoP.
• MET’s conduct raises further concerns regarding KADOE misuse and must be brought to the attention of the relevant authorities.
I respectfully request that POPLA allows this appeal.
Appeal Against Parking Charge Notice (PCN) Issued by MET Parking Services
PCN Reference: [Insert reference number]
Vehicle Registration: [Insert vehicle registration]
Date of Alleged Contravention: [Insert date]
This is an appeal by the Keeper of the vehicle and I raise the following points for POPLA to consider:
1. The Location is Not 'Relevant Land' under the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 (PoFA)
2. Failure to Address Appeal Points
3. Inadequate Evidence of Clear and Prominent Signage
4. No Legal Obligation to Identify the Driver or Assumption of Driver Identity
Grounds for Appeal:
1. The Location is Not 'Relevant Land' under the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 (PoFA):
The alleged contravention occurred at Southgate Park, which is located within the boundary of Stansted Airport. This boundary is confirmed by a Stansted Airport-issued map provided with this appeal. Stansted Airport is governed by airport byelaws, which constitute statutory control over the land. Paragraph 3(1)(c) of Schedule 4 of PoFA explicitly states that "relevant land" excludes any land that is "subject to statutory control," such as land covered by byelaws. Therefore, Southgate Park is not relevant land for the purposes of PoFA.
While the land may be private and MET Parking Services may have been contracted by the landowner’s agents to manage the car park, this does not negate the fact that it is within the airport boundary and subject to byelaws. The existence of byelaws over the land places it under statutory control, as established by law. MET Parking Services’ argument that the land is not covered by byelaws is incorrect and does not override the statutory framework. As a result, MET Parking Services cannot rely on PoFA to transfer liability to the registered Keeper. They can only pursue the driver, whose identity has not been disclosed. As the Keeper, I am under no legal obligation to identify the driver, and there can be no Keeper liability in this case.
2. Failure to Address Appeal Points:
In my initial appeal to MET Parking Services, I specifically raised the issue of the site being under statutory control and therefore not relevant land under PoFA. Despite this, MET Parking Services failed to address this critical legal argument in their rejection. Instead, they dismissed the appeal without engaging with the evidence or addressing the legal basis of my argument. This omission suggests their decision to reject my appeal was not based on a proper consideration of the facts or the applicable legal framework.
3. Inadequate Evidence of Clear and Prominent Signage:
MET Parking Services has not provided sufficient evidence that the terms and conditions were clearly displayed and visible to motorists. For a driver to have agreed to any contractual terms, the signage must have been legible, prominently positioned, and capable of being read before entering into a contract. Without evidence of the signage’s visibility and clarity at the time of the alleged contravention, the claim is unsubstantiated.
4. No Legal Obligation to Identify the Driver or Assumption of Driver Identity:
As the registered Keeper of the vehicle, I am not legally obligated to identify the driver. MET Parking Services has provided no evidence to identify the driver at the time of the alleged contravention. Since liability cannot be transferred to the Keeper under PoFA due to the site’s statutory control, MET Parking Services must pursue the driver—if they can identify them. Without such identification, their claim against the Keeper is baseless.
Furthermore, the POPLA assessor must not assume or infer that the Keeper was also the driver. There is extensive persuasive case law on this matter. In VCS v Edward H0KF6C9C [2023], HHJ Mark Gargan in his conclusion, stated in paragraph 35.3:
“It is consistent with the appropriate probability analysis whereby simply because somebody is a registered keeper, it does not mean on balance of probability they were driving on this occasion, because one simply cannot tell. For example, there will be companies who are registered keepers of vehicles where many drivers have the use of the vehicle from time to time. There will be individual employers who are the registered keeper but who allow a number of people to drive their vehicles. There may be situations where husband and wife are each registered keepers of their respective vehicles but for some reason drive the other. These are all possibilities which show that it is not appropriate to draw an inference that, on balance of probability, the registered keeper was driving on any given occasion.”
The appellant is explaining this point in detail because some assessors have in the past erroneously allowed MET Parking Services to claim that the Keeper was likely the driver without any evidence. MET attempts to mislead assessors by relying on a misleading and erroneous note in Annex C of the BPA/IPC Private Parking Single Code of Practice, which states:
“Liability
It is the driver that is liable for the parking charge.
NOTE: The driver is often the same person as the keeper and/or the hirer. Where a keeper or hirer fails or refuses to provide the name and serviceable address of the driver when requested to, it may be assumed they are the driver, based on that failure or refusal.”
This statement is contrary to the law, as explained in VCS v Edward. The Keeper’s refusal to identify the driver does not permit any assumption of driver identity. Any such inference would be legally baseless and improper. POPLA assessors must adhere to established legal principles and not be misled by incorrect interpretations provided by rogue parking operators.
Conclusion:
Southgate Park’s location within Stansted Airport places it under statutory control and excludes it from being considered relevant land under PoFA. The wording of Paragraph 3(1)(c) of Schedule 4 of PoFA is clear: land subject to statutory control, such as land covered by byelaws, is not relevant land. The official map of the airport boundary provided with this appeal confirms this fact beyond any doubt. Additionally, the registered Keeper cannot be assumed to be the driver, as supported by persuasive case law. MET Parking Services cannot hold the registered Keeper liable for the alleged parking charge. Their failure to address this fundamental point in their rejection of my initial appeal further demonstrates the inadequacy of their claim. I therefore request POPLA to uphold this appeal and instruct MET Parking Services to cancel the Parking Charge Notice.
How many times will they want to go back and forth...Frankly, let them! They're paying some poor sod to spend their time sending this drivel.
Dear MET,
It is beyond comprehension that you are still claiming Southgate Park, Stansted Airport is "relevant land" for the purposes of PoFA. This is not a grey area, a technicality, or up for debate. It is an undeniable fact that land under statutory control cannot be relevant land under PoFA. Your repeated failure to understand this is either utter incompetence or a deliberate attempt to mislead motorists.
Since this appears to be a struggle for you, let me break it down in the simplest terms possible:
1. Southgate Park Falls Under Stansted Airport Byelaws
Southgate Park is within the boundary of Stansted Airport. The attached map is produced by Stansted Airport. It clearly shows the official boundary of the airport. I have highlighted in red, the location of Southgate Park, which is clearly within the blue airport boundary.
Stansted Airport is governed by Stansted Airport Byelaws. Any land subject to statutory control, such as Byelaws, is not relevant land under PoFA. Therefore, PoFA Keeper Liability cannot apply. It is basic logic that even a toddler should be able to understand.
It does not matter that Southgate Park is not right next to the terminal. The only legal test that matters is whether the land is subject to statutory control. Since it is, PoFA does not apply. End of story.
2. “Private Land” Does NOT Automatically Mean “Relevant Land”
I have heard that MET tries to claim that "because Southgate Park is private land, it must be relevant land" is legally and factually absurd. "Private land" does NOT mean "relevant land" under PoFA. "Relevant land" means land where no statutory control applies. Since Byelaws apply to Southgate Park, it is NOT relevant land.
To put it in terms even you might understand... Train station car parks are also private land, yet PoFA does not apply to them because they are covered by Railway Byelaws. The exact same principle applies to Southgate Park because it is covered by Stansted Airport Byelaws. If you still cannot grasp this, you should not be in the business of issuing legally enforceable documents.
3. Your Conduct is a Clear Breach of the PPSCoP
By falsely claiming Keeper Liability under PoFA at Southgate Park in your NtKs, you are in breach of the Private Parking Single Code of Practice (PPSCoP) Section 8.1.1(d)"The parking operator must not serve a notice which in its design and/or language states the keeper is liable under the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 where they cannot be held liable."
Yet you misrepresent liability, issue misleading notices, and falsely claim the Keeper is liable when you have zero legal basis to do so. This is not an accident. This is clearly a deliberate and ongoing breach of industry standards.
4. DVLA KADOE Breach
You are in clear breach of your KADOE agreement because you are using Keeper Data to falsely assert PoFA liability where none exists. While you may have obtained the data lawfully, you are now misusing it by misrepresenting the Keeper’s legal position. PoFA does not apply at Southgate Park, yet you have knowingly issued an NtK that falsely states the Keeper will be liable under PoFA if they do not provide the driver’s details.
This is a clear breach of KADOE, as the Keeper’s data must not be used for purposes that are legally invalid. You are not just issuing unlawful demands; you are misleading the Keeper into believing they are liable when they are not.
However, the central issue is your complete failure to understand and apply the law correctly. The DVLA matter, which will be reported, is secondary—your utter stupidity in not comprehending why PoFA is not applicable is the real problem.
Final Word: Stop Making This Ridiculous Argument
Your pathetic insistence that Southgate Park is "not at the airport" and "private land" therefore PoFA applies, is not just legally wrong, it is embarrassingly ignorant.
Stop issuing unlawful PCNs, stop misrepresenting Keeper Liability, and stop pretending PoFA applies when it clearly does not. You look like clueless amateurs every time you try to argue otherwise.
Yours sincerely,
[Your Name]
Decision: Successful
Assessor Name: XXXXXX XXXXXXX
Assessor summary of operator case
The operator has issued the Parking Charge Notice (PCN) due to being longer than the period of parking that had bene paid for or without authorisation.
Assessor summary of your case
The appellant’s case is that:
• The parking operator can not pursue the keeper of the vehicle as it relates to a car park within the boundary of statutory land.
• They are unable to use the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 as it is not relevant land.
• The car park sits within the boundary of Stansted Airport so it is under statutory control, under Airports Act 1986, even if it is a private car park.
• They have evidence of the land being within the airport boundary from the UK Government and Stansted Airport.
It is important to note that the appellant was provided the opportunity to comment on the operator’s case file, the appellant has expanded on their grounds within their comments regarding the landowner contract.
The appellant has provided a boundary image of Stansted Airport showing the location of the car park within the boundary as evidence to support their appeal.
The above evidence will be considered in making my determination.
Assessor supporting rational for decision
By issuing a parking charge notice to the appellant the operator has implied that a breach of the terms and conditions has occurred. When an appeal comes to POPLA, the burden of proof begins with a parking operator to demonstrate that the appellant has breached the restrictions of the car park as they claim.
I am allowing this appeal, with my reasoning outlined below:
The appellant has provided a map suggesting a boundary of Stansted airport, and the area within which the vehicle was parked is within the boundary. The operator has stated its confidence that the land would be considered relevant land as defined in the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012, however no evidence has been provided by the parking operator to show the car park is located on relevant land.
I am not satisfied that the operator has rebutted the motorist’s reason for appeal. The operator has provided no evidence to suggest that the boundary set out on the map provided by the appellant is incorrect.
That is not to say the site is certainly located within the airport boundary, and different evidence from the operator might have resulted in a different conclusion. But I have made my decision based on the evidence before me.
I note the appellant has raised other issues as grounds for appeal, however, as I have decided to allow the appeal for this reason, I did not feel they required further consideration.
If you receive a Parking Charge Notice (PCN) issued by an unregulated private parking company and dispute it, there are four main ways to fight it before it ever gets to the stage of a County Court Judgment (CCJ).
Plan A – Complain to the Landowner (Best Chance to Get It Cancelled Early)
Before doing anything else, try to get the landowner (or whoever hired the parking company) to cancel the charge. Supermarkets, shopping centres, and hospitals often have the power to cancel tickets if you were a genuine customer or had a valid reason. If this works, the problem ends here.
If that fails, move on to Plan B.
Plan B – Appeal to the Parking Company
You can send an appeal directly to the parking company, explaining why the charge is unfair. However, since these companies make money from issuing tickets, they usually reject appeals with a generic response. If they refuse to cancel, they must give you details of the next stage of appeal.
This leads to Plan C.
Plan C – Appeal to an 'Independent' Appeals Service
Most private parking companies belong to one of two trade bodies:• BPA members use POPLA (Parking on Private Land Appeals)
• IPC members use IAS (Independent Appeals Service)
POPLA sometimes rules in favour of motorists, but IAS rarely does. These appeal services are supposedly meant to be neutral, but they often side with the parking company who are their paymasters and definitely anything but 'independent'. If they reject your appeal, their decisions are not binding on you and the parking company may start chasing you for payment.
At this point, they will send letters from debt collectors, but these companies are powerless – they cannot take you to court. They can only send you worthless bits of paper which you must ignore. The debt collectors are not a party to the contract allegedly breached by the driver and are powerless to do anything but try and scare the gullible into paying out of ignorance and fear.
If the parking company is still saying that you owe them money, the final stage is Plan D.
Plan D – County Court (The Ultimate Dispute Resolution Service)
If the parking company is seriously greedy and really wants your money, they may send a Letter Before Claim (LBC), warning that they might take you to court. This is the first step in the litigation process. They hope that you are low-hanging fruit on the gullible tree and will capitulate and pay up at the first sign of litigation.
You have 30 days to explain why you dispute the charge. If you don’t respond or they disagree, they might file a county court claim against you. The vast majority of these disputes are handled by a small group of bulk litigation firms, all of them staffed by stunningly incompetent wannabe legals. However, most people are not aware of this and are intimidated enough to capitulate at this stage.
Those that capitulate and pay up at this stage of the process are wasting their money. They will be paying an amount that could not be legally claimed and would never be allowed if it went all the way to a hearing with a judge.
If/when they finally issue a court claim, you will receive an N1SDT Claim Form from the Civil National Business Centre (CNBC) which is the administrative centre for handling all county court claims before they are processed and then passed to the defendants local county court. You must respond within 14 days or request extra time by submitting an Acknowledgement of Service (AoS). You can either:• Defend the claim and argue why you don’t owe the money
• Settle the claim if you decide to pay
• Ignore it (not recommended – this can lead to an automatic default judgment [CCJ] against you)
If you defend the claim, there is another process that you have to go through before it ever gets to a hearing in front of a judge. The claimant has to acknowledge the claim and confirm whether they intend to proceed. You will then have to complete a Directions Questionnaire (DQ) which is for administrative purposes and lets the CNBC know which is your local county court and any dates you would not be available for a hearing in the next 6 months. You then have to "attend" a telephone mediation call which is not part of the judicial process as no judge or solicitor is involved but you simply offer £0 and it is over in minutes.
After this, the claim is assigned to your local count court (in a civil debt dispute where an individual is being sued by a company, the hearing is always assigned to the individuals local court, not the businesses) and a 'procedural judge' at the local county court will check the claim and either strike the claim out if there are any procedural errors made by the claimant or may order that the claimant submit further or more detailed Particulars of Claim (PoC) or schedule a hearing date.
In the majority of cases that are not dismissed or struck out before the hearing date, the claimant will have to pay a hearing fee. It is at this stage that most of these claims are then discontinued by the claimant. They will have been hanging on up to this point hoping that the defendant will capitulate and pay up out of ignorance and fear.
In the unlikely event that the claim goes all the way to a hearing, you would have to submit a Witness Statement (WS) that basically fleshes out your defence. The claim is heard by the judge and a decision is made as to whether you owe the parking company a debt or not. Costs are fixed as this is the small claims track and the fake added charges that the parking companies have tried to claim for are not usually allowed.
In most cases where the claim is actually tried at a hearing and lost, the amount the judge awards is less than the original claim amount. A typical single PCN claim that is lost in court will amount to around £200 all in.
If you win, you pay nothing. If you lose, you must pay the amount ordered by the court. Even at this stage, if it ever got this far, you would still not have a "CCJ" on your credit file.
When Does a CCJ Get Recorded?
A CCJ (County Court Judgment) is only recorded on your credit file if:• You lose in court, AND
• You don’t pay the full amount within 30 days.
If you pay the fill amount within 30 days, the CCJ is expunged, and it won’t affect or harm your credit. But if you ignore it or don't pay it in full within 30 days, the CCJ will be recorded and stay on your credit file for six years, making it almost impossible to get loans, mortgages, or even mobile phone contracts.
SummaryPlan A: Try to get the landowner to cancel the PCN.
Plan B: Appeal to the parking company (low chance of success).
Plan C: Appeal to an ‘independent’ appeals service (often biased).
Plan D: If all else fails, the parking company might take you to court.
A CCJ only happens if you go through the process and lose in court AND don’t pay it in full within 30 days.
Well, what happens after they reject the first appeal?What I outlined in reply #5:
if/when they reject, they must provide a POPLA code, and an appeal there yields a higher chance of success.
Thanks for a quick reply, do we know how effective this is?That rather depends on what you mean by 'effective'. If you mean 'will they accept the appeal?', then the answer is 'probably not', because they don't make money from accepting appeals. But, if/when they reject, they must provide a POPLA code, and an appeal there yields a higher chance of success.
I am the registered keeper. MET cannot hold a registered keeper liable for any alleged contravention on land that is under statutory control. As a matter of fact and law, MET will be well aware that they cannot use the PoFA provisions because Stansted Airport is not 'relevant land'.
If Stansted Airport wanted to hold owners or keepers liable under Airport Bylaws, that would be within the landowner's gift and another matter entirely. However, not only is that not pleaded, it is also not legally possible because MET is not the Airport owner and your 'parking charge' is not and never attempts to be a penalty. It is created for MET's own profit (as opposed to a bylaws penalty that goes to the public purse) and MET has relied on contract law allegations of breach against the driver only.
The registered keeper cannot be presumed or inferred to have been the driver, nor pursued under some twisted interpretation of the law of agency. Your NtK can only hold the driver liable. MET have no hope at POPLA, so you are urged to save us both a complete waste of time and cancel the PCN.