This response addresses MET Parking Services' submission to POPLA and highlights the flaws in their arguments. MET Parking Services has failed to rebut key points raised in the appeal, and their attempt to rely on the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 (PoFA) is legally flawed.
1. The location is not relevant land under PoFA
The appellant has provided an official airport boundary map from Stansted Airport, which clearly shows that Southgate Park is within the official airport boundary. This map was submitted with the appeal as direct evidence of the statutory control over the land.
MET has completely ignored this map and has not rebutted the obvious evidence that the location falls within the airport boundary. Instead, they attempt to dismiss the argument by making vague assertions about whether the byelaws apply to parking but fail to provide any evidence contradicting the airport's official boundary.
MET has provided a link to the airport byelaws, but this link does not contain any map of the airport boundary. In contrast, the official map submitted by the appellant confirms that the car park is within the airport's jurisdiction. The fact that MET has ignored this map and provided no counter-evidence is a clear failure to rebut a key piece of evidence in this appeal.
Since PoFA does not apply to land that is under statutory control, MET has no legal basis to hold the keeper liable. They can only pursue the driver, whose identity has not been disclosed.
2. The location is under statutory control
MET Parking Services has failed to properly respond to the core argument that Southgate Park is under statutory control. The appeal clearly stated that PoFA Schedule 4, Paragraph 3(1)(c) excludes land if the parking of a vehicle on that land is subject to statutory control, such as land covered by airport byelaws. The Stansted Airport byelaws contain a provision that regulates where vehicles may be parked within the airport boundary. Since the byelaws impose statutory control over parking, this means the location is not relevant land under PoFA.
The airport byelaws do contain a provision stating:
“No person shall leave any cargo or baggage or park any vehicle or equipment elsewhere than in a place provided by the airport company for the accommodation of such cargo or baggage or the parking of such vehicle or equipment.”
This confirms that the parking of a vehicle is subject to statutory control because it dictates where vehicles may and may not be parked. The fact that the byelaws regulate where vehicles can be parked means that parking is subject to statutory control, satisfying the exclusion in PoFA
MET Parking Services has failed to acknowledge or rebut the official airport boundary map provided in this appeal, which confirms that Southgate Park is within the airport boundary and thus subject to these byelaws. They have also failed to explain why they believe that parking at this location is not subject to statutory control, despite the clear wording of the byelaws.
The byelaws provided in MET’s evidence pack confirm that they apply to any land within the boundary of Stansted Airport, meaning it is subject to statutory control.
MET Parking Services’ argument that byelaws only apply to areas where road traffic enactments do not apply is incorrect and misleading. The wording of PoFA does not require byelaws to specifically mention parking. It simply states that land under statutory control is not ‘relevant land.’ Byelaws exist over Stansted Airport, which means PoFA does not apply, and MET cannot transfer liability to the Keeper.
MET has failed to provide any legal argument or evidence to counter this point. Their response simply states that they are “confident” that byelaws do not apply to parking in this location. Confidence is not evidence. Their failure to address the specific wording of PoFA means that they have not rebutted the fundamental legal argument that this land is not ‘relevant land.’
Since PoFA does not apply, MET has no legal basis to hold the Keeper liable. They can only pursue the driver, whose identity has not been disclosed.
3. MET Parking Services has failed to address the core legal argument
The appeal highlighted that MET’s rejection of the initial appeal ignored the argument about statutory control. In their response to POPLA, MET again fails to provide any legal argument refuting this point. Instead, they attempt to deflect the issue by claiming that PoFA applies because the byelaws do not explicitly mention parking.
MET’s failure to address this key issue is a clear indication that they do not have a legal basis to enforce the parking charge. They have not cited any law, case law, or legal precedent to contradict the appellant’s argument. Their silence on this issue speaks volumes.
4. No Keeper liability under PoFA
MET states that they are pursuing the registered Keeper under PoFA because the driver has not been identified. However, this argument is entirely dependent on PoFA being applicable, which it is not. Since Southgate Park is subject to byelaws and therefore statutory control, PoFA does not apply, and MET cannot hold the Keeper liable.
MET has completely failed to explain how PoFA can apply when the location is not ‘relevant land.’ They have not addressed the clear wording of PoFA that excludes land under statutory control. Instead, they rely on a misleading and legally incorrect interpretation.
5. Misleading reliance on BPA/IPC Private Parking Code of Practice
MET attempts to rely on Annex C of the BPA/IPC Private Parking Single Code of Practice, which suggests that if a Keeper does not identify the driver, they can be assumed to be the driver. This is legally incorrect and has no basis in law.
The appeal referenced the persuasive appeals case of VCS v Edward (2023), which confirms that the Keeper cannot simply be inferred or assumed to be the driver. MET has completely ignored this case and has not attempted to rebut it. Instead, they rely on a non-statutory industry code that contradicts established legal principles. POPLA must follow the law, not a misleading interpretation from a trade body.
6. Inadequate signage evidence
MET claims that their signage is clear and sufficient. However, they have failed to provide evidence that the signs were visible to motorists at the time of the alleged contravention. The burden of proof is on MET to show that their signage was clear, legible, and positioned in such a way that a contract could be formed.
The appeal specifically challenged MET to prove that:
- Signs were visible before entering the car park
- The terms were legible from a driver’s perspective
- The signs clearly stated PoFA compliance
MET has failed to provide any evidence to rebut these points. They have simply asserted that the signage is sufficient without addressing the specific concerns raised in the appeal. This is another example of their failure to properly engage with the arguments made.
7. No obligation to prove customer status
MET states that the appellant has not provided proof that the driver was a customer of the businesses on-site. However, the burden of proof is on MET to prove that a parking contract was formed and breached. The appellant is not required to prove anything.
MET’s attempt to shift the burden of proof onto the appellant is a clear indication that they have no actual evidence of a contract being formed. They must prove their case, not demand that the appellant provide evidence in their defence.
Conclusion
- MET Parking Services has failed to rebut the core legal argument that Southgate Park is under statutory control and is not relevant land under PoFA.
- hey have not provided any legal justification for attempting to enforce Keeper liability under PoFA.
- They have completely ignored the case law referenced in the appeal.
- Their signage evidence is inadequate and does not address the specific concerns raised.
- Their attempt to shift the burden of proof onto the appellant is legally flawed.
Given these failures, MET Parking Services has not demonstrated that they have any legal basis to enforce the parking charge against the Keeper. Therefore, the appeal must be allowed, and the Parking Charge Notice should be cancelled.
The wording of PoFA does not require byelaws to specifically mention parking. It simply states that land under statutory control is not ‘relevant land.’Does it? It says that any land "on which the parking of a vehicle is subject to statutory control" is not 'relevant land'. That's potentially slightly different to a blanket statement that any statutory control over the land renders it not 'relevant land'.
This response addresses MET Parking Services' submission to POPLA and highlights the flaws in their arguments. MET Parking Services has failed to rebut key points raised in the appeal, and their attempt to rely on the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 (PoFA) is legally flawed.
1. The location is not relevant land under PoFA
The appellant has provided an official airport boundary map from Stansted Airport, which clearly shows that Southgate Park is within the official airport boundary. This map was submitted with the appeal as direct evidence of the statutory control over the land.
MET has completely ignored this map and has not rebutted the obvious evidence that the location falls within the airport boundary. Instead, they attempt to dismiss the argument by making vague assertions about whether the byelaws apply to parking but fail to provide any evidence contradicting the airport's official boundary.
MET has provided a link to the airport byelaws, but this link does not contain any map of the airport boundary. In contrast, the official map submitted by the appellant confirms that the car park is within the airport's jurisdiction. The fact that MET has ignored this map and provided no counter-evidence is a clear failure to rebut a key piece of evidence in this appeal.
Since PoFA does not apply to land that is under statutory control, MET has no legal basis to hold the keeper liable. They can only pursue the driver, whose identity has not been disclosed.
2. The location is under statutory control
MET Parking Services has failed to properly respond to the core argument that Southgate Park is under statutory control. The appeal clearly stated that PoFA Schedule 4, Paragraph 3(1)(c) excludes land that is subject to statutory control, such as land covered by airport byelaws. The byelaws provided in MET’s evidence pack confirm that they apply to any land within the boundary of Stansted Airport, meaning it is subject to statutory control.
MET Parking Services’ argument that byelaws only apply to areas where road traffic enactments do not apply is incorrect and misleading. The wording of PoFA does not require byelaws to specifically mention parking. It simply states that land under statutory control is not ‘relevant land.’ Byelaws exist over Stansted Airport, which means PoFA does not apply, and MET cannot transfer liability to the Keeper.
MET has failed to provide any legal argument or evidence to counter this point. Their response simply states that they are “confident” that byelaws do not apply to parking in this location. Confidence is not evidence. Their failure to address the specific wording of PoFA means that they have not rebutted the fundamental legal argument that this land is not ‘relevant land.’
Since PoFA does not apply, MET has no legal basis to hold the Keeper liable. They can only pursue the driver, whose identity has not been disclosed.
3. MET Parking Services has failed to address the core legal argument
The appeal highlighted that MET’s rejection of the initial appeal ignored the argument about statutory control. In their response to POPLA, MET again fails to provide any legal argument refuting this point. Instead, they attempt to deflect the issue by claiming that PoFA applies because the byelaws do not explicitly mention parking.
MET’s failure to address this key issue is a clear indication that they do not have a legal basis to enforce the parking charge. They have not cited any law, case law, or legal precedent to contradict the appellant’s argument. Their silence on this issue speaks volumes.
4. No Keeper liability under PoFA
MET states that they are pursuing the registered Keeper under PoFA because the driver has not been identified. However, this argument is entirely dependent on PoFA being applicable, which it is not. Since Southgate Park is subject to byelaws and therefore statutory control, PoFA does not apply, and MET cannot hold the Keeper liable.
MET has completely failed to explain how PoFA can apply when the location is not ‘relevant land.’ They have not addressed the clear wording of PoFA that excludes land under statutory control. Instead, they rely on a misleading and legally incorrect interpretation.
5. Misleading reliance on BPA/IPC Private Parking Code of Practice
MET attempts to rely on Annex C of the BPA/IPC Private Parking Single Code of Practice, which suggests that if a Keeper does not identify the driver, they can be assumed to be the driver. This is legally incorrect and has no basis in law.
The appeal referenced the persuasive appeals case of VCS v Edward (2023), which confirms that the Keeper cannot simply be inferred or assumed to be the driver. MET has completely ignored this case and has not attempted to rebut it. Instead, they rely on a non-statutory industry code that contradicts established legal principles. POPLA must follow the law, not a misleading interpretation from a trade body.
6. Inadequate signage evidence
MET claims that their signage is clear and sufficient. However, they have failed to provide evidence that the signs were visible to motorists at the time of the alleged contravention. The burden of proof is on MET to show that their signage was clear, legible, and positioned in such a way that a contract could be formed.
The appeal specifically challenged MET to prove that:
- Signs were visible before entering the car park
- The terms were legible from a driver’s perspective
- The signs clearly stated PoFA compliance
MET has failed to provide any evidence to rebut these points. They have simply asserted that the signage is sufficient without addressing the specific concerns raised in the appeal. This is another example of their failure to properly engage with the arguments made.
7. No obligation to prove customer status
MET states that the appellant has not provided proof that the driver was a customer of the businesses on-site. However, the burden of proof is on MET to prove that a parking contract was formed and breached. The appellant is not required to prove anything.
MET’s attempt to shift the burden of proof onto the appellant is a clear indication that they have no actual evidence of a contract being formed. They must prove their case, not demand that the appellant provide evidence in their defence.
Conclusion
- MET Parking Services has failed to rebut the core legal argument that Southgate Park is under statutory control and is not relevant land under PoFA.
- hey have not provided any legal justification for attempting to enforce Keeper liability under PoFA.
- They have completely ignored the case law referenced in the appeal.
- Their signage evidence is inadequate and does not address the specific concerns raised.
- Their attempt to shift the burden of proof onto the appellant is legally flawed.
Given these failures, MET Parking Services has not demonstrated that they have any legal basis to enforce the parking charge against the Keeper. Therefore, the appeal must be allowed, and the Parking Charge Notice should be cancelled.
Appeal Against Parking Charge Notice (PCN) Issued by MET Parking Services
PCN Reference: [Insert reference number]
Vehicle Registration: [Insert vehicle registration]
Date of Alleged Contravention: [Insert date]
This is an appeal by the Keeper of the vehicle and I raise the following points for POPLA to consider:1. The Location is Not 'Relevant Land' under the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 (PoFA)
2. Failure to Address Appeal Points
3. Inadequate Evidence of Clear and Prominent Signage
4. No Legal Obligation to Identify the Driver or Assumption of Driver Identity
Grounds for Appeal:1. The Location is Not 'Relevant Land' under the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 (PoFA):
The alleged contravention occurred at Southgate Park, which is located within the boundary of Stansted Airport. This boundary is confirmed by a Stansted Airport-issued map provided with this appeal. Stansted Airport is governed by airport byelaws, which constitute statutory control over the land. Paragraph 3(1)(c) of Schedule 4 of PoFA explicitly states that "relevant land" excludes any land that is "subject to statutory control," such as land covered by byelaws. Therefore, Southgate Park is not relevant land for the purposes of PoFA.
While the land may be private and MET Parking Services may have been contracted by the landowner’s agents to manage the car park, this does not negate the fact that it is within the airport boundary and subject to byelaws. The existence of byelaws over the land places it under statutory control, as established by law. MET Parking Services’ argument that the land is not covered by byelaws is incorrect and does not override the statutory framework. As a result, MET Parking Services cannot rely on PoFA to transfer liability to the registered Keeper. They can only pursue the driver, whose identity has not been disclosed. As the Keeper, I am under no legal obligation to identify the driver, and there can be no Keeper liability in this case.
2. Failure to Address Appeal Points:
In my initial appeal to MET Parking Services, I specifically raised the issue of the site being under statutory control and therefore not relevant land under PoFA. Despite this, MET Parking Services failed to address this critical legal argument in their rejection. Instead, they dismissed the appeal without engaging with the evidence or addressing the legal basis of my argument. This omission suggests their decision to reject my appeal was not based on a proper consideration of the facts or the applicable legal framework.
3. Inadequate Evidence of Clear and Prominent Signage:
MET Parking Services has not provided sufficient evidence that the terms and conditions were clearly displayed and visible to motorists. For a driver to have agreed to any contractual terms, the signage must have been legible, prominently positioned, and capable of being read before entering into a contract. Without evidence of the signage’s visibility and clarity at the time of the alleged contravention, the claim is unsubstantiated.
4. No Legal Obligation to Identify the Driver or Assumption of Driver Identity:
As the registered Keeper of the vehicle, I am not legally obligated to identify the driver. MET Parking Services has provided no evidence to identify the driver at the time of the alleged contravention. Since liability cannot be transferred to the Keeper under PoFA due to the site’s statutory control, MET Parking Services must pursue the driver—if they can identify them. Without such identification, their claim against the Keeper is baseless.
Furthermore, the POPLA assessor must not assume or infer that the Keeper was also the driver. There is extensive persuasive case law on this matter. In VCS v Edward H0KF6C9C [2023] (https://www.dropbox.com/scl/fi/zra61px7l3if53o3bp9c4/VCS-v-EDWARD-Transcript.pdf?rlkey=bv4bba389nau5qpfglqkpjq5l&st=rvj2pfco&dl=0), HHJ Mark Gargan in his conclusion, stated in paragraph 35.3:“It is consistent with the appropriate probability analysis whereby simply because somebody is a registered keeper, it does not mean on balance of probability they were driving on this occasion, because one simply cannot tell. For example, there will be companies who are registered keepers of vehicles where many drivers have the use of the vehicle from time to time. There will be individual employers who are the registered keeper but who allow a number of people to drive their vehicles. There may be situations where husband and wife are each registered keepers of their respective vehicles but for some reason drive the other. These are all possibilities which show that it is not appropriate to draw an inference that, on balance of probability, the registered keeper was driving on any given occasion.”
The appellant is explaining this point in detail because some assessors have in the past erroneously allowed MET Parking Services to claim that the Keeper was likely the driver without any evidence. MET attempts to mislead assessors by relying on a misleading and erroneous note in Annex C of the BPA/IPC Private Parking Single Code of Practice, which states:“Liability
It is the driver that is liable for the parking charge.
NOTE: The driver is often the same person as the keeper and/or the hirer. Where a keeper or hirer fails or refuses to provide the name and serviceable address of the driver when requested to, it may be assumed they are the driver, based on that failure or refusal.”
This statement is contrary to the law, as explained in VCS v Edward. The Keeper’s refusal to identify the driver does not permit any assumption of driver identity. Any such inference would be legally baseless and improper. POPLA assessors must adhere to established legal principles and not be misled by incorrect interpretations provided by rogue parking operators.
Conclusion:
Southgate Park’s location within Stansted Airport places it under statutory control and excludes it from being considered relevant land under PoFA. The wording of Paragraph 3(1)(c) of Schedule 4 of PoFA is clear: land subject to statutory control, such as land covered by byelaws, is not relevant land. The official map of the airport boundary provided with this appeal confirms this fact beyond any doubt. Additionally, the registered Keeper cannot be assumed to be the driver, as supported by persuasive case law. MET Parking Services cannot hold the registered Keeper liable for the alleged parking charge. Their failure to address this fundamental point in their rejection of my initial appeal further demonstrates the inadequacy of their claim. I therefore request POPLA to uphold this appeal and instruct MET Parking Services to cancel the Parking Charge Notice.
2. Do not hijack another person's thread in order to post your own problem. Start your own.