The relevant tribunal authority is Paul Richard Davis v The Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea (1970198981, 30 March 1998) (https://drive.google.com/file/d/1-RndFZ_r1JlVDGvo13wKLGpDCy3OBXqW/view).
A more recent binding authority on the duty of fairness is Bank Mellat v Her Majesty's Treasury (No. 2) [2013] UKSC 39 (https://supremecourt.uk/uploads/uksc_2011_0040_judgment_32e27b53c6.pdf) at para 35:
35. The duty of fairness governing the exercise of a statutory power is a limitation on the discretion of the decision-maker which is implied into the statute. But the fact that the statute makes some provision for the procedure to be followed before or after the exercise of a statutory power does not of itself impliedly exclude either the duty of fairness in general or the duty of prior consultation in particular, where they would otherwise arise. As Byles J observed in
Cooper v Board of Works for the Wandsworth District (1863) 14 CB(NS) 190, 194, “the justice of the common law will supply the omission of the legislature.” In
Lloyd v McMahon 1987] 1 AC 625, 702-3, Lord Bridge of Harwich regarded it as
“well established that when a statute has conferred on any body the power to make decisions affecting individuals, the courts will not
only require the procedure prescribed by the statute to be followed, but will readily imply so much and no more to be introduced by way
of additional procedural safeguards as will ensure the attainment of fairness.”
Like Lord Bingham in
R (West) v Parole Board [2005] 1 WLR 350 at para 29, I find it hard to envisage cases in which the maximum
expressio unius exclusio alterius could suffice to exclude so basic a right as that of fairness