This was my original reply:
This is a very interesting case that raises multiple complex points of law. The starting point is the definition of a "road" found at section 142 of the Road Traffic Regulation Act 1984:
in England and Wales, means any length of highway or of any other road to which the public has access, and includes bridges over which a road passes, and
If the road is not adopted it might not be a highway, but it can still be a road to which the public has access. I certainly cannot see any physical barrier or signage indicating that members of the public cannot walk up and down that road as they wish.
In Bowen & Ors v Isle of Wight Council [2021] EWHC 3254 (Ch) (http://"http://bit.ly/3lPvv3Q") the High Court explained at 49 that:
In my judgment, a road will be a "road to which the public has access", and thus within the definition of "road" in section 142 of the 1984 Act, provided that the general public do as a matter of fact exercise access to it and provided that those members of the public "have not obtained access either by overcoming a physical obstruction or in defiance of prohibition express or implied" (in the words of Lord Sands in Harrison v Hill, as approved and applied by the Divisional Court). The enquiry is thus essentially a factual one. If the conditions are satisfied, it is, as the Divisional Court sought—apparently unsuccessfully—to make clear in Cox v White, irrelevant to enquire further whether the presence of the public on the road was merely by the tolerance of the owners or whether the tolerance is to be taken to have given implicit permission. The simplicity of the resulting test is welcome, for at least two reasons: first, it avoids the need for courts, when considering such matters as motoring offences, to become embroiled in, or confused by, subtle distinctions regarding when an owner's inaction does and does not imply permission; second, it avoids importing into the statutory definition a distinction that is wholly irrelevant to the statutory purpose of providing for the safety of those who may reasonably be expected to be on roads and affected by what happens on them.
The "private" road quite clearly appears to be a road to which the public have access, and if it comes to it you and your neighbours can easily give evidence about this.
I would make a very simple challenge:
Dear London Borough of Croydon,
The CEO's photos clearly show that my vehicle was parked on the carriageway of the unnamed service road that leads to the front doors of numbers 49 to 57 Eskmont Ridge, and to a number of garages. While I appreciate I was parked right at the junction, this is not in itself unlawful and it does not mean that I was parked on the footway. I trust you will now cancel the PCN and have words with the CEO about this overzealous enforcement.
Yours faithfully,
Council response:
(https://gcdnb.pbrd.co/images/6UaHw3trQaK2.png)
Have you now got a Notice to Owner? If so, please post it up.