That's a real shame, and quite a surpruise - you seem to have very much fallen foul of 'judge bingo' - there are some good ones and some crap ones.
Neither party should be ambushing the other with fresh evidence, and most judges would take a dim view of any attempts to do the same. You could if you wish contact BW Legal and point out that you have not received their bundle. Then at the hearing point out that you either haven't received it, or have received it late (if they do send it), putting you at a disadvantage. You can point this out alongside some of the other issues (such as the Mazur point and their late submission of a supplementary WS) as evidence of their ongoing poor conduct in the handling of the case - all of this is particularly important if you win and are discussing costs.
At risk of sounding vague, much depends on the view of the judge on the day, County Court can be unpredictable.
I think one of the key facts in your case is that you have a meritorious defence point, namely that the claimant hasn't proved that a contract was formed in the first place. Even if you leave aside all the (entirely valid) technical points, there can be no money owed if no contract was formed. I'd be keen to ensure that this point does not get lost amidst any protracted debates about any technicalities (after all, as noted, most judges want an easy life).
You've seen their WS, I'm correct in assuming? Just not the full 'bundle'
How fatal will it be to tomorrow's hearing if I choose to wait and raise the non-service at the start of the hearing?Probably depends on the judge. There's often more 'leeway' in the Small Claims track, although some judges rightly expect professional law firms to be doing things by the book.
Claimant’s witness asserts conduct of litigation
8. The Claimant’s witness, a BW Legal paralegal, states at paragraph 1 of her witness statement (and repeats the same statement again in the Claimant’s later ‘additional evidence’ statement), signed under a statement of truth, that she has ‘conduct of the litigation’ subject to supervision. The conduct of litigation is a reserved legal activity under the Legal Services Act 2007. If that statement is correct, it describes an arrangement that is not permitted for an unauthorised person and is capable of amounting to a criminal offence under the Act; if it is not correct, then the Claimant has nonetheless twice advanced a plainly inaccurate assertion under a statement of truth. In either case, the Court is respectfully invited to treat this as materially undermining the reliability and weight of the Claimant’s evidence and submissions; and, further, to note that in Mazur & Anor v Charles Russell Speechlys LLP [2025] EWHC 2341 (KB) the High Court reaffirmed that an unauthorised person cannot ‘conduct litigation’ even under supervision.
The 'Save as to Costs' nature of the letter feels interesting, as it's clearly an attempt to double-down on their belief that they will win at courtI'm not sure I'd read too much into that. It is entirely normal for settlement offers to be made on a without prejudice save as to costs basis.
WITHOUT PREJUDICE SAVE AS TO COSTS
[Date]
BW Legal
[Email address shown on their correspondence]
Our Client: Norwich Traffic Control Limited
Claim No: []
Your Ref: []
Dear Sirs,
Drop-hands proposal: discontinue with no order as to costs
Further to your client’s claim, now transferred to Norwich County Court for hearing on 8 January 2026, I invite your client to discontinue the proceedings on a drop-hands basis: each party to bear its own costs, no order as to costs, and no admissions. This offer is open for 7 days from the date of this letter.
Why your client’s case is untenable1. No contract; no “period of parking” evidenced
Your Notice to Driver / Notice to Keeper records only a single timestamp. There is no period of parking alleged or proved. That is fatal to any case that a contract was formed by conduct: absent an evidenced duration on site, the court cannot be satisfied that any consideration period elapsed or that terms were capable of being read and accepted.
2. PoFA non-compliance (keeper liability cannot arise)
Schedule 4 PoFA paras 7(2)(a) and 8(2)(a) require the notice to “specify the period of parking” to which it relates. Your client’s notices do not. In the persuasive appeal Scott Brennan v Premier Parking Solutions (2023) H6DP632H, HHJ Mitchell held (paras 27–30) that PoFA requires an identifiable period (even a short one), not a mere moment in time. On your own evidence, keeper liability is unavailable.
3. Driver not identified; no presumption
I have not identified the driver. In VCS v Edward (2023) HOKF6C9C, HHJ Gargan at para 35.3 confirmed it is not appropriate to infer that the registered keeper was the driver “on balance of probabilities”—one simply cannot tell. With PoFA unavailable (see 2), the claim fails against the keeper.
4. PAP and pleading conduct
You were put on notice pre-action to supply core material (proper signage proof, legal basis of the £60 add-on, PoFA compliance). The Particulars of Claim remained inadequate (CPR 16.4/PD16), and you attempted to cure defects post-issue via witness/skeleton material. That is procedurally improper and has caused unnecessary cost and court burden.
Conduct of litigation – reserved activity issue (costs relevance)
Your witness statement signed by Ms Eden Moore (paralegal) states—under a Statement of Truth—that she “has conduct of this action” “subject to supervision”. Conduct of litigation is a reserved legal activity (Legal Services Act 2007, ss.12–15). In Mazur v Charles Russell Speechlys LLP [2025] EWHC 2341 (KB), the High Court confirmed that supervision does not authorise an unauthorised person to conduct litigation. Ms Moore’s sworn statement that she “has conduct of this action” is a prima facie admission of unauthorised conduct of litigation; if you proceed, I will rely on this for CPR 27.14(2)(g) costs and reserve my position regarding regulatory escalation.
Commercial reality
Your client now faces (a) a merits failure on PoFA/driver, (b) pleading/PAP points, and (c) a realistic risk of 27.14(2)(g) costs consequences. With the matter listed in Norwich, attendance will likely require either travel or a local advocate, increasing your client’s sunk cost with no realistic prospect of improving the underlying defects.
Offer and costs position
If you accept this drop-hands proposal within 7 days, each party walks away bearing its own costs. If you decline and the claim is discontinued later or dismissed, I will place this letter before the court on the issue of costs only and seek an order under CPR 27.14(2)(g) reflecting your client’s unreasonable conduct, including the reserved-activity point above.
Please confirm by return that the claim will be discontinued, and file/serve a Notice of Discontinuance accordingly.
Yours faithfully,
[Defendant’s name]
[Address for service]
Subject: FAO: Civil Listings - Claim [number] – Transfer order dated 3 July 2025 – Listing status enquiry
Dear Listing Officer,
I write regarding Claim [number], [Claimant] v [Defendant]. By order dated 3 July 2025 the matter was transferred to the Defendant’s home court for listing. Could you confirm (i) whether the file has been received, (ii) current listing status, and (iii) when Notice of Allocation (N157) is likely to issue? The previous hearing (1 August 2025) was vacated and prior directions rescinded.
I attach the 3 July order for ease.
Yous faithfully,
[Name, address for service, phone]
Attachment: Order 3 July 2025.pdf”
Rather than summarising the contents of the letter it may be worth you sharing it with us.
Subject: URGENT Request to Review Hearing Venue and Date – Claim [CLAIM NUMBER]
Dear Sir or Madam,
I write with urgency regarding the above-referenced case, in which a small claims hearing has been listed to take place by telephone at [INSERT TIME] on [INSERT DATE].
I must raise two serious procedural issues:1. Hearing Venue Ignored – Breach of CPR 26.3(3):On my N180 Directions Questionnaire, I clearly stated my preference for the hearing to be listed at my local County Court: [INSERT COURT NAME]. I am an individual defendant, and this is a claim for a specified sum of money. Accordingly, CPR 26.3(3) provides that the claim must be sent to the defendant’s home court. This has not occurred, and the listing for a remote hearing without my consent is inappropriate and contrary to the Civil Procedure Rules.
2. Hearing Date Conflicts with My Declared Unavailability (Section F4):On the same N180 form, I stated unavailability for the date now chosen for the hearing. This is recorded at Section F4. It is clear that my N180 has not been properly considered, which has resulted in a listing that is both procedurally defective and unfair.
This oversight has placed me, a litigant in person, at a considerable disadvantage. I am not legally represented, whereas the Claimant is. I respectfully submit that the current listing breaches the overriding objective under CPR 1.1, particularly the need to ensure that cases are dealt with fairly and in a way that ensures parties are on an equal footing.
I therefore request:• That the telephone hearing be vacated,
• That the matter be re-listed at my local County Court,
• And that a new date be set having proper regard to my availability as stated on the Directions Questionnaire.
Please confirm receipt of this email and advise what steps will now be taken to correct this.
Yours faithfully,
[Your Full Name]
[Your Address]
[Your Contact Details]
[Claim Number]
I feel at a complete disadvantage having this trial on the telephone. This is because I want to sit in the same room as the Judge and put my case over without any distraction of the telephone hearing perhaps going wrong or someone’s line being cut off. I did object to this hearing being on the telephone by writing to the court but my emails were ignored.
"Summary of Defence (Oral Statement to the Court)
I confirm my Defence as submitted, and in order to assist the Court and avoid unnecessary detail, I summarise the key points:
1. No contract could have been formed
For a contract to be formed by conduct, there must be a clear period during which the driver was able to seek out a terms sign, read, understand, and accept the terms. The Claimant has not evidenced any such period. Without showing that the driver remained after considering the signage, there is no basis to infer contractual acceptance or a meeting of minds.
2. Notice to Driver is invalid – no period of parking
The Notice to Driver attached to the vehicle includes only a single timestamp. Under Schedule 4, paragraph 7(2)(a) of PoFA, the notice MUST specify a period of parking. This was confirmed in the persuasive appeal case of Brennan v Premier Parking Solutions, where the judge held that a single timestamp alone is insufficient to evidence a period of parking for the purposes of PoFA. The notice is therefore non-compliant and cannot transfer liability to the Keeper.
3. No keeper liability
Because the Notice to Driver is non-compliant with PoFA, the Claimant cannot transfer liability to the registered keeper. The driver has not been identified, and there is no lawful basis to pursue the keeper.
Accordingly, I respectfully request that the Court dismiss the claim."
You need to make sure that any references to evidence you are relying on is correctly referenced in the WS and appended as evidence in your bundle. Have look at how the claimant has put together their bundle and do the same with your evidence and just make sure that it is correctly referenced in your WS.
You can add a hyperlink to the video if you wan to refer to the whole thing or just take some stills from it and reference those in your WS. You can also show how the claimants images of the signs taken who knows when but obviously before the state of the locations now, are not indicative of the state of the car park at the time of the alleged contravention and puts their evidence in doubt as being factual.
You can add a hyperlink to the video if you wan to refer to the whole thing or just take some stills from it and reference those in your WS.If including a hyperlink to a video, I'd personally be tempted to also refer to stills as a backup. That way, if their are technical issues on the day that prevent the display of the video, you'll have the stills to refer to.
IN THE COUNTY COURT AT ST HELENSClaim No: [Claim Number]BETWEEN:
Norwich Traffic Control Ltd
Claimant
- and -
[Defendant's Full Name]
Defendant
WITNESS STATEMENT
1. I am the Defendant in this claim and a litigant-in-person with no formal legal training. I have prepared this witness statement and my Defence to the best of my ability, having carried out detailed research into the relevant law and procedure. In doing so, I have received informal guidance from publicly accessible legal resources, including the forum www.ftla.uk (Free Traffic Legal Advice), which provides voluntary assistance on private parking and contractual matters. I respectfully ask the Court to take into account that this case has been presented in good faith by a lay person and is not a generic or template response, as inaccurately alleged by the Claimant’s representative. I confirm that the facts stated in this witness statement are true to the best of my knowledge and belief.
Claimants 'Witness' is third-hand hearsay
2. The Claimant’s witness statement is authored by a paralegal employed by BW Legal who confirms they are acting under the instruction of a senior. This makes the content of the statement, at best, third-hand hearsay. The witness has no personal knowledge of the facts, the site, the signage, or of me as the Defendant.
3. The statement is written predominantly in the third person and contains speculative, disparaging, and inadmissible commentary that strays far beyond the factual scope permitted by CPR Practice Direction 32. It includes an unfounded accusation—also repeated in the Skeleton Argument—that my Defence was copied from a generic internet forum, specifically moneysavingexpert.com. This is categorically false.
4. My Defence was compiled independently with tailored support from the consumer legal forum www.ftla.uk, which specialises in assisting members of the public in private parking contractual matters. As a litigant-in-person, I am entitled to seek legitimate advice and assistance. Even if the Defence had been influenced by online resources, that would not render it improper. In contrast, the Claimant’s own submissions appear to be generic templates containing boilerplate assertions and legal inaccuracies.
5. The witness, not being present at the hearing and not having personal knowledge, cannot be cross-examined. In accordance with the Civil Evidence Act 1995 and CPR 33, I respectfully submit that the Court should attach little or no weight to this untested, third-hand hearsay evidence, which fails to assist the Court on any material or disputed fact.
6. Moreover, the Claimant’s late attempt to plead their case through the witness statement further highlights that they could have—and should have—served proper Particulars of Claim within 14 days of issuing the claim online via MCOL, pursuant to PD 7C.5.2. Their decision not to do so has deprived the Court and the Defendant of a fair and timely understanding of the claim. This omission was avoidable and strategic, not inadvertent or constrained by MCOL limitations.
7. The focus of my Defence was on this very inadequacy—namely, that the Particulars of Claim failed to adequately comply with CPR 16.4 and Practice Direction 16. The Claimant has not addressed those defects in any meaningful or procedurally compliant way. Instead, they attempt to deflect attention from the deficiencies of their claim by attacking the format and supposed origin of my Defence, which entirely misses the point.
The Claimant failed to adequately plead their claim pursuant to CPR 16.4
8. The Particulars of Claim are vague, inadequately pleaded, and fail to adequately comply with CPR 16.4 and Practice Direction 16, paragraph 7.5. The Claimant does not identify the precise terms of the alleged contract, nor the clause(s) said to have been breached. There is no statement of when or for how long the alleged parking occurred, nor any identification of the signage or the specific terms displayed. The pleading fails to set out the facts necessary to establish either breach or the basis of any contractual entitlement to the sum claimed.
9. The Claimant has also failed to specify whether I am being pursued as the driver or the keeper. The pleading is impermissibly ambiguous, failing to disclose which legal basis is relied upon or to plead alternative causes of action with the required particularity. This is contrary to the basic principles of civil pleading and has caused significant prejudice to the myself.
10. I submitted a proposed draft order with the Defence, inviting the Court to strike out the claim or, in the alternative, to order further and better particulars. The Court failed to address that request and instead allocated the matter to a final hearing without requiring the Claimant to remedy the procedural defects. I respectfully submit that this oversight has resulted in procedural unfairness, and now invite the Court to exercise its case management powers to strike out the claim in its entirety pursuant to CPR 3.4(2)(a) and CPR 16.4 for failure to disclose reasonable grounds for bringing the claim.
11. There was nothing to prevent the Claimant from filing further and better particulars under PD 7C.5.2A within 14 days of the MCOL claim, which they chose not to do. That decision is not my responsibility. A failure to remedy defective pleadings cannot be excused by the 1080-character limit of the MCOL interface. Where a claim is factually or legally complex—as this one purports to be—the Claimant should have served separate, detailed particulars as expressly permitted by the Practice Direction. The option existed but was not exercised.
12. The Claimant’s Skeleton also states that “the hearing can focus on the facts of the case”, and that its solicitors will “respond to the Defendant’s facts” at the hearing. This confirms the Claimant’s strategic decision to rely on minimal pleadings and belatedly expand upon them at trial. That is procedurally inappropriate. The purpose of pleadings is to inform the other party of the case they must meet, not to be supplemented piecemeal via a witness statement or skeleton.
13. Furthermore, the Claimant’s assertion that the PoC must be deemed compliant because the case was allocated to the small claims track is misconceived. Allocation is an administrative process and does not imply judicial approval of pleadings. No judge has ruled on compliance with CPR 16.4 in this case, and silence cannot be taken as endorsement.
14. Additionally, the Claimant’s witness is a paralegal who has no first-hand knowledge of the facts and makes several speculative and disparaging comments that are inadmissible under CPR PD 32. These include opinions about the Defence’s origin and format, which are wholly irrelevant to the issues before the Court and serve only to undermine the integrity of these proceedings
No evidence of a contract being formed with the driver
15. The claim fails from the outset due to the Claimant’s total failure to show that a parking contract was ever formed. The Notice to Driver (NtD) and Notice to Keeper (NtK) merely record a single timestamp. There is no actual “period of parking” specified, and no evidence whatsoever of how long the vehicle was present. The option on the NtD to record and observation 'period' is shown as: "First seen at: N/A".
16. This is a fundamental omission. A contract by conduct cannot be formed without a consideration period. There must be sufficient time for the driver to seek out, read the signage, consider the terms, and make a decision to accept or reject them. Without showing how long the vehicle remained on site, the Claimant has not established that any contract was formed.
17. The IPC Code of Practice, Version 9, which applied at the time, confirms this. Section 13 requires that a consideration period of appropriate duration be allowed before a parking contract is formed. IN the latest version of their Code of Practice, this has now been confirmed to a period of no less than 5 minutes.
18. This is consistent with basic contract law: no contract can arise by conduct unless there has been sufficient time to seek out, read and consider the terms. The Claimant has provided no evidence that this requirement was met. The Claimant has provided no evidence that the vehicle remained on site beyond this undefined but necessary consideration period. Without this, the court cannot conclude that a contract was even capable of being created, let alone breached. As such, the entire basis for the claim collapses.
Failure to fully comply with all the requirements of PoFA 2012
19. This same deficiency also renders the Claimant’s notices non-compliant with Schedule 4 of the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 ("PoFA"). In order to transfer liability from the unknown driver to the registered keeper, strict compliance with the statutory requirements is mandatory. Paragraph 7(2)(a) (in respect of a Notice to Driver) and paragraph 8(2)(a) (for a Notice to Keeper following a NtD) both require that the notice 'must' "specify the period of parking to which the notice relates". A single timestamp, as provided by the Claimant, is not a “period” of parking and therefore fails this requirement, especially when their own paperwork provides a box precisely for this purpose.
20. This issue was considered in the persuasive appellate decision Scott Brennan v Premier Parking Solutions (2023) [H6DP632H]. Relevant excerpts are exhibited at Exhibit XX-01.
21. At paragraphs 27 to 30, HHJ Mitchell confirmed that PoFA requires the notice to specify a period of parking, even if it is a short one, and not merely a moment in time. He explained that:“The period of parking does not refer to the whole period a vehicle is in situ. It could be less than that... it could be any minimum period; that is the period to which the Notice relates. That is what the Regulations are getting to... Where it went wrong... is that the second of those [times] was put in as ‘NA’. If the time had been put in, that would have cured the problem and that simply had to be repeated in the Notice to keeper.”
22. The judgment makes it clear that where the notice fails to specify a minimum identifiable period, as is the case here, PoFA conditions are not met and keeper liability cannot arise.
Failure to fully comply with PoFA means no Keeper liability
23. The Claimant has also failed to establish the identity of the driver. The registered keeper is under no legal obligation to identify the driver, and I have not done so. In the persuasive appellate case of Vehicle Control Services v Ian Mark Edward (2023) [HOKF6C9C], HHJ Gargan made it clear that it is not appropriate for a court to infer that the registered keeper was the driver, even on the balance of probabilities, where there is no supporting evidence. A copy of the relevant section of the judgment is exhibited at Exhibit XX-02.
24. At paragraph 35.3, the judge stated:“It is consistent with the appropriate probability analysis whereby simply because somebody is a registered keeper, it does not mean on balance of probability they were driving on this occasion, because one simply cannot tell… These are all possibilities which show that it is not appropriate to draw an inference that, on balance of probability, the registered keeper was driving on any given occasion.”
25. I respectfully submit that in order for the claimant to be able to rely on the provisions of PoFA, all the requirements of the act must be met. Partial or even substantial compliance is not sufficient. To use an analogy, just like pregnancy, one either is or is not. It is a binary issue and the same applies to PoFA compliance. In this case, their notices are not fully compliant.
26. As the Claimant’s notices are not fully compliant with all the requirements of PoFA, they cannot rely on keeper liability, and in the absence of any admissible evidence identifying the driver, the claim must fail.
Failure to evidence a valid contract flowing from the landowner
27. The Claimant relies on a one-page document as its contract with the landholder, yet this purported agreement is fraught with deficiencies. It is signed only by a representative of Orbit Homes, with no counter-signature from the Claimant, raising doubts about whether it constitutes a valid and binding agreement.
28. The contract includes a self-declaration that the signatory is either the landowner or a duly authorised agent but provides no independent proof of landowner authority. This falls short of the requirements under CPR Practice Direction 16, paragraph 7.5, which require the source of the Claimant’s authority to be clearly set out.
29. The handwritten addition “Richard Dean, Future Build” appears without explanation or context. There is no indication of who Richard Dean is, what “Future Build” represents, or what legal interest—if any—this entity holds in the land. It is unclear whether this was added contemporaneously or afterwards. This unexplained annotation introduces serious uncertainty into the authenticity and authority behind the agreement.
30. Crucially, the agreement makes no express grant of authority for the Claimant to issue legal proceedings in its own name. The vague reference to a right to “pursue by any means lawful” does not amount to an assignment or clear authorisation, and is insufficient to confer locus standi.
31. The contract also contains a retrospective enforcement clause, purporting to legitimise charges issued before the agreement was signed. Such a clause is legally ineffective and cannot confer retrospective authority.
32. The version of the purported contract disclosed to me by the Claimant is redacted. If the Claimant has provided an unredacted version to the Court but failed to serve the same upon me, this would constitute a breach of CPR 32.12 and CPR 1.3, which require mutual disclosure and cooperation in the interests of a fair hearing. It would also amount to procedural unfairness and a denial of my right as a litigant-in-person to properly examine the material relied upon. I respectfully request that the Court disregard any version of the contract which has not been disclosed in full and in equal terms to both parties.
33. The agreement refers to a site plan, which is said to form part of the contract and purportedly marks the signage locations. However, I visited the site upon receiving the Notice to Keeper and recorded a video capturing the actual signage conditions. Still images from this video are provided as evidence to demonstrate that crucial signage marked on the plan was either missing, obscured, illegible, or not in the locations indicated. As such, the site plan is materially inaccurate and does not reflect the actual conditions at the location.
34. This discrepancy is not a minor oversight—it goes to the heart of the alleged contractual framework. If the signage relied upon by the Claimant to form a contract was not in place as shown on the plan, then the plan cannot serve as reliable evidence of either the existence or adequacy of notice given to drivers.
35. Moreover, it casts serious doubt on the validity of the agreement itself, given that the purported basis of enforcement (i.e. effective signage) was not actually implemented as described in the contract documentation. The Court is therefore invited to find that this inconsistency further undermines the enforceability of the contract and the credibility of the Claimant's case.
36. For example, the key left hand entrance sign marked on the site plan is missing entirely and the other entrance sign is hidden round the corner of the building on the right as you approach the car park and mounted high on a wall and cannot be seen by a driver entering the car park . It is severely faded. Another supposed terms sign on the building opposite the entrance is absent. This undermines any suggestion that clear and visible contractual terms were communicated to the driver. A copy of the site plan showing the obvious anomalies is attached as evidence at XX-04.
37. The Claimants witness has shown multiple photo of signs that are not dated but were clearly taken prior to the date of the alleged contravention an dhow that the site has changed materially since they were taken, as the site is no longer the same shape and the boundary walls have been changed and are also now covered in graffiti.
38. Taken together, the contract is vague, inadequately executed, and factually contradicted by contemporaneous site conditions. The Court is invited to find that the Claimant has failed to prove either contractual standing or the existence of clear, accessible signage capable of forming a binding agreement with any motorist.
Failure of the Claimant to properly engage in the Pre Action Protocol
39. Following receipt of the Claimant’s Letter of Claim, I engaged in detailed correspondence raising fundamental concerns. These included: the validity of the signage, the alleged contractual authority of the Claimant, the calculation and legal basis of the £60 add-on charge, and the inapplicability of ParkingEye Ltd v Beavis [2015] UKSC 67 to this case. Despite being given ample opportunity to clarify or substantiate their position, the Claimant failed to answer these questions. No documents were provided, and no serious attempt was made to justify their claim.
40. Instead, the Claimant proceeded to issue a County Court claim via the MCOL interface, choosing to rely on vague and wholly inadequate Particulars of Claim. These did not specify the terms of the alleged contract, the signage relied upon, the period of parking, the nature of the breach, or even whether the claim was pursued against me as keeper or driver. This lack of detail falls well short of CPR 16.4 and PD16 paragraph 7.5, and left me in a position where I had no option but to plead my Defence on the basis of the Claimant’s inadequately pleaded case.
41. The Claimant is professionally represented and had the procedural right under PD7C 5.2A to serve full Particulars of Claim within 14 days of issuing the claim. Given the complexity of the issues raised in pre-action correspondence—including my challenge to their misapplication of Beavis, which clearly concerned a free car park at a retail site with prominent signage and a compelling commercial justification—they had every reason to exercise that right. Yet they chose not to.
42. The Claimant’s later reliance on Beavis—a Supreme Court judgment with highly specific facts and strict qualifying criteria—is not only inappropriate, but further reveals their unwillingness to properly engage with the material differences in this case. The site in question here does not present the same signage clarity, free parking rationale, or legitimate interest. I expressly raised this distinction in my pre-action replies, which the Claimant ignored.
43. Now, on the eve of witness statement submission deadline, the Claimant seeks to introduce extensive new arguments and factual assertions via a witness statement written by a paralegal acting under instruction. This third-hand, untested statement attempts to backfill the serious deficiencies in their case by addressing points they refused to clarify during the PAP process or in the claim particulars. This tactic of last-minute ambush—relying on arguments withheld pre-claim and absent from the PoC—is procedurally unfair and contrary to the Overriding Objective.
44. The Court is invited to give little or no weight to this strategy. The Claimant’s failure to engage with legitimate pre-action queries, their failure to plead a coherent claim, and their subsequent reliance on inadmissible hearsay to ‘plug the gaps’ at the final hour, demonstrates conduct which is inconsistent with fair litigation.
Conclusion
45. In conclusion, the Claimant has failed to demonstrate that any contract was formed, that a valid parking charge was incurred, or that the statutory requirements of Schedule 4 of the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 have been met. They have not provided evidence of the alleged period of parking, nor established keeper liability under PoFA. No admissible evidence has been produced to identify the driver, and the Particulars of Claim remain vague, non-compliant with CPR 16.4, and lacking in legal clarity.
46. The Claimant has pursued this claim despite repeated pre-action warnings of these fundamental defects and has failed to address them both before and after proceedings were issued. Their conduct has been unreasonable throughout.
47. I respectfully request that the claim be dismissed, and that the Court consider making a costs order pursuant to CPR 27.14(2)(g) due to the Claimant’s unreasonable behaviour.
Statement of truth
I believe that the facts stated in this witness statement are true. I understand that proceedings for contempt of court may be brought against anyone who makes, or causes to be made, a false statement in a document verified by a statement of truth without an honest belief in its truth.
Signed:
Date:
The Claimant’s witness statement has not been made by a representative of the Claimant company, but by a paralegal employed by its solicitors, BW Legal. This individual has no direct involvement in the circumstances giving rise to the claim, nor any first-hand knowledge of the relevant facts.
While hearsay evidence is permitted under the Civil Evidence Act 1995, it is well established that such evidence carries less weight, particularly where it relates to matters that could and should have been addressed by a witness with direct knowledge. The evidence relied upon is second-hand and simply recites instructions received from the Claimant.
The statement fails to comply with CPR Practice Direction 32, paragraph 18.2, which requires a witness to indicate which parts of their statement are made from their own knowledge and which are based on information or belief, with the source of any such belief stated. The witness has not identified the source of any information or belief and has not distinguished between fact and instruction. This omission renders the statement procedurally defective and undermines its evidential weight.
The individual who has made the statement is not an officer or employee of Norwich Traffic Control Limited and has no operational involvement with the site, the signage, the contractual arrangements, or the issuance of parking charges. Their role is purely that of a legal assistant instructed to compile a generic narrative in support of the claim.
The witness statement is improperly drafted in the third person, which is contrary to CPR PD 32, paragraph 18.1. A witness statement must be in the first person and clearly state the evidence being given by the witness in their own words. This further supports the inference that the statement is not based on personal knowledge, but rather is a solicitor-assisted summary of instructions from the Claimant.
I submit that little weight should be given to this statement and that, where it is not supported by contemporaneous documents or admissible evidence, it should be disregarded entirely.
You need to make the file public so I can access it
IN THE COUNTY COURT AT ST HELENSClaim No: [Claim Number]BETWEEN:
Norwich Traffic Control Ltd
Claimant
- and -
[Defendant's Full Name]
Defendant
WITNESS STATEMENT
1. I make this statement in support of my defence to the claim brought by Norwich Traffic Control Limited. I confirm that the facts set out here are true to the best of my knowledge and belief.
No Contract Formed
2. The claim fails from the outset due to the Claimant’s total failure to show that a parking contract was ever formed. The Notice to Driver (NtD) and Notice to Keeper (NtK) merely record a single timestamp. There is no actual “period of parking” specified, and no evidence whatsoever of how long the vehicle was present. This is a fundamental omission. A contract by conduct cannot be formed without a consideration period. There must be sufficient time for the driver to seek out, read the signage, consider the terms, and make a decision to accept or reject them. Without showing how long the vehicle remained on site, the Claimant has not established that any contract was formed.
3. The IPC Code of Practice, Version 9, which applied at the time, confirms this. Section 13 requires that a consideration period of appropriate duration be allowed before a parking contract is formed. This is consistent with basic contract law: no contract can arise by conduct unless there has been sufficient time to seek out, read and consider the terms. The Claimant has provided no evidence that this requirement was met. The Claimant has provided no evidence that the vehicle remained on site beyond this undefined but necessary consideration period. Without this, the court cannot conclude that a contract was even capable of being created, let alone breached. As such, the entire basis for the claim collapses.
No Compliance with PoFA 2012
4. This same deficiency also renders the Claimant’s notices non-compliant with Schedule 4 of the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 ("PoFA"). In order to transfer liability from the driver to the registered keeper, strict compliance with the statutory requirements is mandatory. Paragraph 7(2)(a) (in respect of a Notice to Driver) and paragraph 8(2)(a) (for a Notice to Keeper following a NtD) both require that the notice must "specify the period of parking to which the notice relates." A single timestamp, as provided by the Claimant, is not a “period” of parking and therefore fails this requirement.
5. This issue was considered in the persuasive appellate decision Scott Brennan v Premier Parking Solutions (2023) [H6DP632H]. Relevant excerpts are exhibited at Exhibit XX-01.
6. At paragraphs 27 to 30, HHJ Mitchell confirmed that PoFA requires the notice to specify a period of parking, even if it is a short one, and not merely a moment in time. He explained that:“The period of parking does not refer to the whole period a vehicle is in situ. It could be less than that... it could be any minimum period; that is the period to which the Notice relates. That is what the Regulations are getting to... Where it went wrong... is that the second of those [times] was put in as ‘NA’. If the time had been put in, that would have cured the problem and that simply had to be repeated in the Notice to keeper.” (paras. 28–29)
7. The judgment makes it clear that where the notice fails to specify a minimum identifiable period, as is the case here, PoFA conditions are not met and keeper liability cannot arise.
No Evidence of Driver Identity
8. The Claimant has also failed to establish the identity of the driver. The registered keeper is under no legal obligation to identify the driver, and I have not done so. In the persuasive appellate case of VCS v Ian Mark Edward (2023) [HOKF6C9C], HHJ Gargan made it clear that it is not appropriate for a court to infer that the registered keeper was the driver, even on the balance of probabilities, where there is no supporting evidence. A copy of the relevant section of the judgment is exhibited at Exhibit XX-02.
9. At paragraph 35.3, the judge stated:“It is consistent with the appropriate probability analysis whereby simply because somebody is a registered keeper, it does not mean on balance of probability they were driving on this occasion, because one simply cannot tell… These are all possibilities which show that it is not appropriate to draw an inference that, on balance of probability, the registered keeper was driving on any given occasion.”
10. As the Claimant’s notices are non-compliant with PoFA, they cannot rely on keeper liability, and in the absence of any admissible evidence identifying the driver, the claim must fail.
Failure to Comply with CPR 16.4
11. The Particulars of Claim are vague, inadequately pleaded, and fail to comply with CPR 16.4 and Practice Direction 16, paragraph 7.5. The Claimant does not identify the precise terms of the alleged contract, nor the clause(s) said to have been breached. There is no statement of when or for how long the alleged parking occurred, nor any identification of the signage or the specific terms displayed. The pleading fails to set out the facts necessary to establish either breach or the basis of any contractual entitlement to the sum claimed.
12. The Claimant has also failed to specify whether I am being pursued as the driver or the keeper. The pleading is impermissibly ambiguous, failing to disclose which legal basis is relied upon or to plead alternative causes of action with the required particularity. This is contrary to the basic principles of civil pleading and has caused significant prejudice to the Defendant.
13. The Defendant submitted a proposed draft order with the Defence, inviting the Court to strike out the claim or, in the alternative, to order further and better particulars. The Court failed to address that request and instead allocated the matter to a final hearing without requiring the Claimant to remedy the procedural defects. The Defendant respectfully submits that this oversight has resulted in procedural unfairness, and now invites the Court to exercise its case management powers to strike out the claim in its entirety pursuant to CPR 3.4(2)(a) and CPR 16.4 for failure to disclose reasonable grounds for bringing the claim.
14. In a similar claim heard before another County Court, a District Judge struck out the case on the court’s own initiative due to the Claimant’s failure to comply with CPR 16.4. I submitted a copy of that draft order with my defence. The judge held that requiring further case management steps in such a poorly pleaded claim would be disproportionate, given the modest value of the claim. The same reasoning applies here.
No Evidence of a Valid Contract with the Landowner
15. The Claimant has failed to provide any evidence of a valid and binding contract with the landowner conferring authority to manage the land, issue parking charges, and pursue legal action in its own name. This is a serious omission that undermines the foundation of the claim.
16. The mere presence of signage is not sufficient to establish that the Claimant has the necessary legal rights to form parking contracts or enforce them. As confirmed by the Court of Appeal in Vehicle Control Services Ltd v HMRC [2013] EWCA Civ 186 at [22], a party must demonstrate that it has a sufficient interest in the land or specific authorisation from the landowner to offer contracts to park and to enforce any resulting charges. Without this, the operator cannot be a contracting party, and any alleged contract would be void for want of locus standi.
17. In this case, the Claimant has not produced any document showing:(i) the identity of the landowner;
(ii) the dates and duration of any agreement;
(iii) the geographic extent of the authority granted;
(iv) whether the Claimant was authorised to form contracts and/or bring legal proceedings in its own name;
(v) the terms under which any consideration flows between the landowner and the Claimant.
18. The existence of such a contract is not a mere formality. It is a mandatory requirement to establish standing. As stated by District Judge McLean in Excel Parking Services v Wilkinson (Stockport County Court, 2017, unreported but widely cited), “a person who puts up a sign cannot automatically claim that they are authorised to do so by the landowner... the burden of proof is on the Claimant to show that they had the necessary rights.”
19. Accordingly, without this foundational evidence, the Claimant cannot demonstrate a cause of action and the claim ought to be struck out.
Failure to Comply with the PAP
20. I responded to the Claimant’s Letter of Claim raising detailed objections and requesting key evidence. The Claimant failed to meaningfully engage with my response. Specifically, they did not provide timestamped photographs of the signage in situ at the material time, nor did they address my argument that the £60 “debt recovery” charge was not transparently included in the original terms.
21. I also challenged the Claimant’s reliance on ParkingEye Ltd v Beavis [2015] UKSC 67, as the facts of that case are clearly distinguishable. In Beavis, the signage was prominent, clear, and unambiguous, and the Supreme Court held that the charge was justified by a legitimate commercial interest. By contrast, in this case, the Claimant has presented no evidence of comparable signage, no evidence of a legitimate interest justifying the charge, and no basis for the application of the Beavis ruling.
22. Had the Claimant dealt with the concerns raised pre-action, this matter could likely have been resolved or discontinued without burdening the court. The Claimant’s failure to do so has resulted in unnecessary litigation and wasted time, for which I submit that a costs order is justified.
Conclusion
23. In conclusion, the Claimant has failed to demonstrate that any contract was formed, that a valid parking charge was incurred, or that the statutory requirements of Schedule 4 of the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 have been met. They have not provided evidence of the alleged period of parking, nor established keeper liability under PoFA. No admissible evidence has been produced to identify the driver, and the Particulars of Claim remain vague, non-compliant with CPR 16.4, and lacking in legal clarity.
24. The Claimant has pursued this claim despite repeated pre-action warnings of these fundamental defects and has failed to address them both before and after proceedings were issued. Their conduct has been unreasonable throughout.
25. I respectfully request that the claim be dismissed, and that the Court consider making a costs order pursuant to CPR 27.14(2)(g) due to the Claimant’s unreasonable behaviour.
Statement of truth
I believe that the facts stated in this witness statement are true. I understand that proceedings for contempt of court may be brought against anyone who makes, or causes to be made, a false statement in a document verified by a statement of truth without an honest belief in its truth.
Signed:
Date:
Dear Eden Moore,
Re: Claim No. [XXXXXXXX] – Norwich Traffic Control Limited v [Defendant Name]
Thank you for your email of [insert date].
The Defendant’s position remains as clearly set out in the fully pleaded defence. There is no basis for further negotiation. If your client continues to pursue this claim unreasonably, the Defendant will seek costs under CPR 27.14(2)(g).
Please also note that the Civil National Business Centre (CNCB) has transferred this case to St Helens County Court, which is not the Defendant’s local court as specified in the Directions Questionnaire. This appears to be an administrative error. A formal request has been submitted to the CNCB for the matter to be re-transferred to the correct venue.
Accordingly, the Defendant does not accept that St Helens County Court is the appropriate hearing centre for this claim, and any further conduct premised on the suitability of that venue will be challenged.
Yours faithfully,
[Defendant Name]
Dear Sir/Madam,
Re: Norwich Traffic Control Ltd v [Defendant] – Claim No. [XXXXXXXX]
I am the Defendant in this matter. I have received a Notice stating that the claim has been transferred to St Helens County Court for allocation. However, this is not my local court, and I did not request it.
In my Directions Questionnaire (N180), I specified that my preferred hearing venue was [insert name of local county court], which is nearest to my home.
This appears to be an administrative error. I respectfully request that the case be re-allocated to [Local County Court], in accordance with CPR 26.2A(2) and the overriding objective.
Please confirm the correction and confirm that no allocation or directions will proceed from St Helens in the meantime.
Yours faithfully,
[Full Name]
[Address]
[Email / Phone]
Subject: Incorrect Transfer – Claim No. XXXXXXXX
Dear Court Manager,
I am the Defendant in this matter. I have been informed that the case has been transferred to St Helens County Court. However, this appears to be an administrative error, as my N180 Directions Questionnaire clearly requested my local court: [insert local court].
I have written to the Civil National Business Centre (CNCB) to request correction. Kindly place a note on the file and suspend any further action until the CNCB has confirmed the appropriate court venue.
Yours faithfully,
[Defendant's Name]
At Section F3 they have stated that nobody will be giving evidence for the claimant at the hearing. This seems a little odd; does it suggest that, even now, they are planning to discontinue or not attend?This just means that Norwich Traffic Control will not be sending a witness to any hearing (if it gets that far) and will be relying on written witness statements and their lawyer on the day.
Alongside the DQ I received a covering letter containing the usual misrepresentations about CCJs, alongside yet another offer to settle. Now that the matter has gone legal, and the covering letter was sent alongside court documents, does a deliberate misrepresentation of the process such as this constitute any sort of misconduct on their part?It's impossible to comment on the contents of their letter without seeing it.
When you have completed the form, attach it to a single email addressed to both dq.cnbc@justice.gov.uk and enquiries@gladstonessolicitors.co.uk and CC in yourself. Make sure that the claim number is in the subject field of the email.
IN THE COUNTY COURTClaim No: [Claim Number]BETWEEN:
Norwich Traffic Control Ltd
Claimant
- and -
[Defendant's Full Name]
Defendant
DEFENCE
1. The Defendant denies the claim in its entirety. The Defendant asserts that there is no liability to the Claimant and that no debt is owed. The claim is without merit and does not adequately disclose any comprehensible cause of action.
2. There is a lack of precise detail in the Particulars of Claim (PoC) in respect of the factual and legal allegations made against the Defendant such that the PoC do not comply with CPR 16.4.
3. The Defendant is unable to plead properly to the PoC because:(a) The contract referred to is not detailed or attached to the PoC in accordance with CPR PD 16(7.5);
(b) The PoC do not state the exact wording of the clause (or clauses) of the terms and conditions of the contract (or contracts) which is/are relied on;
(c) The PoC do not adequately set out the reason (or reasons) why the claimant asserts the defendant has breached the contract (or contracts)
(d) The PoC do not state with sufficient particularity exactly where the breach occurred, the exact time when the breach occurred and how long it is alleged that the vehicle was parked before the parking charge was allegedly incurred;
(e) The PoC do not state precisely how the sum claimed is calculated, including the basis for any statutory interest, damages, or other charges;
(f) The PoC do not state what proportion of the claim is the parking charge and what proportion is damages;
(g) The PoC do not provide clarity on whether the Defendant is sued as the driver or the keeper of the vehicle, as the claimant cannot plead alternative causes of action without specificity.
4. The Defendant further submits that the Claimant cannot hold the Defendant liable as the registered keeper due to non-compliance with Schedule 4 of the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 (PoFA).
5. The Notice to Driver (NtD) and Notice to Keeper (NtK) failed to comply with paragraphs 7(2)(a) and 8(2)(a) of PoFA, which require the Claimant to "specify the period of parking." Instead, the notices merely record a single point in time, which is insufficient.
6. The persuasive appeal decision in Scott Brennan v Premier Parking Solutions (2023) H6DP632H supports this position. At paragraph 27, HHJ Mitchell clarified that PoFA requires a recorded minimum period of parking, not merely an instant in time. Since the Claimant has failed to do so, its notices are non-compliant and incapable of transferring liability to the keeper.
7. The Claimant is put to strict proof of the allegation that the Defendant was the driver, as no presumption of driver liability exists. In VCS v Edward (2023) HOKF6C9C, HHJ Gargan (paragraph 35) held that it is not appropriate to infer that the registered keeper was the driver in the absence of evidence. The Claimant has failed to establish PoFA compliance and cannot assume keeper liability.
8. The Claimant has failed to engage meaningfully with the Defendant's Letter of Claim (LoC) response and has not addressed critical issues, breaching the Pre-Action Protocols (PAP). The Claimant’s solicitor has:(a) Failed to respond to the Defendant’s argument that the £60 'debt recovery' charge is unenforceable, as it was not explicitly stated on the signage, nor does it comply with the Consumer Rights Act 2015.
(b) Ignored the Defendant’s request for timestamped photographs of the signage in situ at the time of the alleged contravention, despite claiming compliance with the IPC Code of Practice.
(c) Provided a generalised statement about signage but failed to establish that the specific signage at the location was clear, legible, and compliant with contractual and consumer law.
(d) Refused to acknowledge or address the failure to specify a "period of parking" in the NtD and NtK, thereby failing to justify their attempt to hold the Keeper liable under PoFA.
(e) Misapplied ParkingEye Ltd v Beavis [2015] without demonstrating that the facts of this case align with the Beavis ruling. The Claimant’s reliance on Beavis ignores the distinctions regarding signage, the contractual basis of the charge, and whether the charge is genuinely a deterrent.
9. The Claimant’s failure to engage meaningfully with the Defendant’s response demonstrates unreasonable behaviour under CPR 27.14(2)(g) and a failure to comply with the Pre-Action Protocols (PAP). The Defendant submits that this warrants a strike-out of the claim or, in the alternative, a costs order for unreasonable conduct.
10. The Defendant attaches to this defence a copy of a draft order approved by a district judge at another court. The court struck out the claim of its own initiative after determining that the Particulars of Claim failed to comply with CPR 16.4. The judge noted that the claimant had failed to:(i) Set out the exact wording of the clause (or clauses) of the terms and conditions relied upon;
(ii) Adequately explain the reasons why the defendant was allegedly in breach of contract;
(iii) Provide separate, detailed Particulars of Claim as permitted under CPR PD 7C.5.2(2).
(iv) The court further observed that, given the modest sum claimed, requiring further case management steps would be disproportionate and contrary to the overriding objective. Accordingly, the judge struck out the claim outright rather
than permitting an amendment.
11. The Defendant submits that the same reasoning applies in this case and invites the court to adopt a similar approach by striking out the claim for the Claimant’s failure to comply with CPR 16.4.
Statement of truth
I believe that the facts stated in this Defence are true. I understand that proceedings for contempt of court may be brought against anyone who makes, or causes to be made, a false statement in a document verified by a statement of truth without an honest belief in its truth.
Signed:
Date:
Boilerplate response but you may as well have a bit of fun with them by responding with the following:
Dear Sirs,
Re: Your Response to My Letter of 17th December 2024
I acknowledge receipt of your email and attached documents. However, your response does not adequately address the points raised in my previous correspondence. I will reiterate and expand on my concerns below.
1. Debt Recovery Costs
You claim that the £60 "debt recovery" fee is contractually agreed upon when entering the car park. This is categorically disputed.• Lack of Contractual Basis: The signage at the location forms the basis of any purported contract. If the £60 debt recovery fee is not explicitly mentioned on the sign, it cannot be considered part of the terms agreed upon by motorists. Please provide photographic evidence of the exact signage in place at the time of the alleged contravention, showing that it clearly states this additional fee as part of the terms.
• Consumer Rights Act 2015: Even if such a charge were mentioned (which is denied), any term imposing an arbitrary £60 penalty would likely be deemed an unfair contract term and unenforceable.
• VAT Clarification: While you assert that your VAT-liable services are distinct, this does not explain how the £60 is calculated or why it should be recoverable from the motorist. Provide a clear breakdown of this charge and its VAT treatment.
Without evidence that the £60 charge was explicitly agreed upon and prominently displayed on the signage, this fee is unenforceable.
2. Nature of the Alleged Parking Charge
Your response suggests the parking charge is for breach of contract, yet you have also implied it is a contractual fee. This inconsistency is misleading. Please clarify:• Was the parking charge issued as damages for a breach of contract or as a fee for a contractual service?
• If it is for breach of contract, provide evidence of how the charge is a legitimate reflection of the breach. If it is a fee, explain how the “core terms” of the contract were agreed upon by a motorist who neither parked nor authorised any contractual agreement.
3. Signage and Contractual Clarity
You assert that the vehicle was parked directly beside your client’s signage, making the terms of the contract clear. However, proximity to a sign does not necessarily equate to an acceptance of its terms, especially if the sign is unclear, ambiguous, or fails to meet legal and regulatory standards.
I require the following evidence to properly assess the validity of your claim:• Photographs of the Signage: Clear, timestamped photographs of the specific sign next to which the vehicle was parked. These should demonstrate the content, visibility, and clarity of the sign, including any relevant lighting or obstructions present at the time of the alleged contravention.
• Compliance with the IPC Code of Practice: Evidence that the signage complies with the International Parking Community (IPC) Code of Practice, specifically regarding font size, contrast, placement, and visibility.
• Reference to Additional Charges: If you assert that the £60 debt recovery fee is enforceable, you must provide evidence that this charge was clearly displayed on the sign. Any terms not prominently displayed cannot form part of a purported contract.
Simply parking near a sign does not amount to unequivocal acceptance of its terms, particularly if those terms are unclear, inconspicuous, or inconsistent with regulatory standards. If the sign failed to make the terms of the alleged contract clear, any claim of breach is invalid.
4. NtK and NtD Non-Compliance with PoFA
As the Registered Keeper responding to this Letter of Claim, I note that both the Notice to Driver (NtD) and the Notice to Keeper (NtK) fail to comply with the statutory requirements of the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 (PoFA). Specifically, they do not meet the requirement to "specify the period of parking" as mandated by paragraphs 7(2)(a) (NtD) and 8(2)(a) (NtK).
Failure to Specify "Period of Parking"• The NtD and NtK both provide only a single timestamp of 0948, which does not constitute a "period of parking" as required under PoFA. A single timestamp merely indicates the vehicle’s presence at a specific moment in time but does not demonstrate that the vehicle was parked for a "period," as defined by law.
• PoFA explicitly requires the notice to specify "the vehicle, the relevant land on which it was parked, and the period of parking to which the notice relates." Without a defined period, the notices fail to establish any alleged contravention.
Relevance of "Unauthorised Parking"• Even in cases of "unauthorised parking," PoFA mandates that the notice must "specify the period of parking." The term "parking" inherently implies a duration of time during which the vehicle was stationary. A single timestamp, such as 0948, does not substantiate the alleged contravention or demonstrate that the vehicle was parked without authorisation for any specific period.
• Without specifying a period of parking, it is impossible to determine whether the alleged breach occurred or whether the vehicle was legitimately stationary for a reasonable duration, such as to read unclear signage.
Non-Compliance Undermines Keeper Liability
As liability under PoFA depends on strict compliance with its requirements, the failure to specify a period of parking in both the NtD and NtK means that your client cannot transfer liability to the registered keeper. Any further attempts to pursue the alleged debt against me as the Keeper are baseless and constitute unreasonable behaviour.
5. Misapplication of the Beavis Case
It is astonishing that your client and yourselves, their bulk-litigation representative, continue to refer to ParkingEye Ltd v Beavis [2015] as though it is some kind of universal panacea that legitimises all parking charge notices (PCNs), regardless of the specific facts of the case or the legal framework. This misuse of the Beavis precedent demonstrates an embarrassing lack of understanding of its scope and applicability.
Fundamental Differences Between This Case and Beavis
The circumstances of Beavis involved a free retail car park with clear and prominent signage, where the charge was deemed commercially justified as a deterrent to overstaying. Key factors considered by the Supreme Court included:• The clear and prominent nature of the signage.
• The legitimate interest of the landowner in managing parking for commercial benefit.
• The absence of terms or charges that were disproportionate or extravagant.
In stark contrast:1. The alleged contravention in this case involves "unauthorised parking," not overstaying in a free car park. The Beavis principles do not automatically apply.
2. The signage relied upon by your client has not been demonstrated to meet the same standard of clarity and prominence as in Beavis.
3. Your client seeks to impose an additional £60 "debt recovery" charge that was not mentioned in Beavis and appears to be an arbitrary penalty, inconsistent with the Consumer Rights Act 2015.
Irrelevance of Beavis to This Matter
Your attempt to rely on Beavis without addressing these fundamental differences only serves to undermine your position and highlights the flawed nature of your claim. To treat Beavis as a one-size-fits-all justification for PCNs shows an alarming disregard for the nuances of contract law and the specific circumstances required for the Beavis principles to apply.
Conclusion on Misapplication
The reference to Beavis in this case does not strengthen your client’s claim—it weakens it by drawing attention to the significant deficiencies in their approach. Should this matter proceed to court, I will not hesitate to bring your client’s misuse of Beavis to the court's attention as evidence of poor litigation practice and a lack of legal understanding.
6. Data Protection and Address for Service
You have failed to confirm that any outdated address has been erased from your records in compliance with data protection obligations. I repeat my request for confirmation that my current address for service is the only one held on file.
Conclusion
Your response has failed to justify the alleged debt or meaningfully address the serious concerns I raised, particularly regarding the lack of compliance with PoFA, the absence of a contractual basis for additional charges, and the misapplication of legal precedent. I maintain that the alleged debt is disputed, and should you proceed with legal action, I will robustly defend the claim, highlighting your client’s unreasonable and potentially unlawful conduct.
I remind you of your obligations under the Overriding Objective and the Pre-Action Protocols to avoid unnecessary court proceedings. Should you continue to provide inadequate responses or pursue this baseless claim, I will ensure that your client’s conduct and misuse of legal processes are brought to the court’s attention.
Yours faithfully,
[Your Name]
Dear Sirs,
Re: Letter of Claim dated 17th December 2024
I refer to your Letter of Claim.
I confirm that my address for service at this time is as follows, and I request that any outdated address be erased from your records to ensure compliance with data protection obligations:
[YOUR ADDRESS]
Please note that the alleged debt is disputed, and any court proceedings will be robustly defended.
I note that the sum claimed has been increased by an excessive and unjustifiable amount, which appears contrary to the principles established by the Government, who described such practices as “extorting money from motorists.” Please refrain from sending boilerplate responses or justifications regarding this issue.
Under the Pre-Action Protocol for Debt Claims, I require specific answers to the following questions:1. Does the additional £60 represent what you describe as a “Debt Recovery” fee? If so, is this figure net of or inclusive of VAT? If inclusive, I trust you will explain why I, as the alleged debtor, am being asked to cover your client’s VAT liability.
2. Regarding the principal sum of the alleged Parking Charge Notice (PCN), is this being claimed as damages for breach of contract, or will it be pleaded as consideration for a purported parking contract?
I would caution you against simply dismissing these questions with vague or boilerplate responses, as I am fully aware of the implications. By claiming that PCNs are exempt from VAT while simultaneously inflating the debt recovery element, your client – with your assistance – appears to be evading VAT obligations due to HMRC. Such mendacious conduct raises serious questions about the legality and ethics of your and your clients practices.
I strongly advise your client to cease and desist. Should this matter proceed to court, you can be assured that these issues will be brought to the court’s attention, alongside a robust defence and potentially a counterclaim for unreasonable conduct.
Yours faithfully,
[YOUR NAME]
Keep the video as the entrance sign is not even visible as you go in. Have a read of page 27 of the IPC Code of Practice (CoP) and tell us if you think that signs conforms to the requirements?
IPC Code of Practice v9 (https://irp.cdn-website.com/262226a6/files/uploaded/IPC%20Code%20of%20PracticeV9%20V4.pdf)
You may want to redact your personal data from those photos, such as your name, address, VRM and PCN number. I just tried to log into the appeals website with your details and it say the following:
(https://i.imgur.com/FzhvMYz.png)
The NtK is mostly PoFA compliant as far as I can see except for the "period of parking" being only specified as "the period immediately preceding...".
The NtD and the NtK both fail to comply with PoFA paragraphs 7(2)(a) and 8(2)(a) respectively, which require the notice to "specify the vehicle, the relevant land on which it was parked, and the period of parking to which the notice relates."
The NtD and NtK provided by NTC do not specify a period of parking, but instead only give a single timestamp of 0948. A single point in time does not constitute a "period" of parking as required by law. The notices should indicate the duration during which the vehicle was allegedly parked.
If the alleged contravention states "Unauthorised parking" and the NtD or NtK only provide a single point in time without specifying the period of parking, it does not comply with the requirements of PoFA, even with the "unauthorised parking" allegation.
PoFA still mandates that the notice must "specify the period of parking" regardless of the nature of the contravention, whether it's for overstaying, failing to pay, or "unauthorised parking." The reason is that the term "parking" inherently refers to a period during which the vehicle is stationary. Therefore, to prove "unauthorised parking", NTC must establish that the vehicle was parked for a specific period without authorisation, not just at a single moment.
A single timestamp, such as 0948, does not show the vehicle was "parked" or unauthorised for a period of time, making it difficult to substantiate the contravention. The failure to specify a period of parking is non-compliant with the statutory requirements of PoFA.
However, you are dealing with an IPC member and no appeal (not that, apparently, they are giving you any chance to appeal anyway) is going to succeed with them or the IAS. You are going to have to sit this out, ignoring all reminders and debt collector letters and wait and see if/when they decide to issue a claim for the alleged debt. If/when they do, then come back and we can advise on how to defend any claim.
TO assist you in future, if/when they decide to try and make a claim, you are advised to get your own evidential photos of the entrance to the location and an overview of the actual car park area and a close up of the terms signs so that we can scrutinise them for breaches of contract law and the IPC Code of Practice (CoP).
As it is an IPC operator, just wait for the NtK to be issued.