The VWFS letter of 7 July 2025 is fatal to the council’s position because it discloses that the authority purported to act on a representation that did not fall within any of the permissible statutory grounds under the London Local Authorities and Transport for London Act 2003. Section 6 of that Act permits the transfer of liability only in narrowly defined circumstances, one of which is where the recipient of the PCN is a vehicle hire firm and the vehicle was subject to a vehicle hiring agreement of not more than six months. Section 92 of the Road Traffic Offenders Act 1988, which is imported into the 2003 Act, defines a vehicle hiring agreement in strict terms. It must be a written agreement, signed by the hirer, for a fixed term not exceeding six months, and it must be accompanied by a signed statement of liability from the hirer. None of these statutory prerequisites were satisfied.
VWFS’ letter referred to a one-day lease commencing and terminating on 22 June 2025. Such an agreement is inconsistent with your evidence, which demonstrates that your lease expired on 20 June 2025 and that you had acquired title to the vehicle under a sales contract by that date. Even if VWFS had still owned the vehicle on 22 June, their assertion of a one-day lease is unsustainable in law, because it was not evidenced by the production of the written agreement required by statute, nor by a signed statement of liability from you as hirer. The authority, in accepting this representation and cancelling the PCN of 26 June issued to VWFS, acted outside their powers. The issue is not whether you were in fact the owner of the vehicle, but whether the statutory machinery was properly engaged to make you liable. It was not.
The concern that some adjudicators may adopt a pragmatic approach and focus on your ownership status is understandable, but legally misconceived. Liability in civil enforcement proceedings of this nature arises not by virtue of beneficial ownership but by operation of statute. The starting point is the registered keeper, subject to specific statutory exceptions. Unless the council can demonstrate that VWFS made representations on a permitted ground, supported by the requisite documentation, and that the PCN was lawfully cancelled on that basis, any subsequent PCN issued to you is a nullity. This is not a matter of discretion but of jurisdiction. The tribunal’s own decisions recognise that procedural impropriety or ultra vires conduct renders enforcement void: see for example Camden LBC v The Parking Adjudicator [2011] EWHC 295 (Admin), where it was emphasised that an authority must act strictly within the statutory framework.
The appropriate ground of representation is therefore that the penalty charge exceeded the amount applicable in the circumstances of the case. The circumstances are that VWFS were not a hire firm within the meaning of the 2003 Act at the material time, the letter of 7 July 2025 does not satisfy the statutory requirements for transfer of liability, and the council had no power to issue a new PCN in your name. To reinforce this point, you may invite the authority to produce the signed hire agreement and statement of liability that section 66(4) requires. If they cannot, the only proper course is cancellation of the PCN.
Tactically, it is unnecessary and potentially distracting to argue about your status as owner. The strongest position is to deny liability as a matter of statutory procedure, supported by the documentary inconsistency in VWFS’ letter. If pressed, you may rely on your sales invoice and correspondence showing purchase on 20 June, but only to demonstrate that VWFS’ account is false, not to prove ownership as a ground of liability. If the council reject your representation and the matter proceeds to the tribunal, your case will rest on clear statutory footing: the authority had no jurisdiction to transfer liability to you and the PCN is void.
The most effective remedy is therefore to pursue cancellation on the procedural ground alone. This maximises your prospects because it compels the council to justify its decision within the strict confines of the statutory scheme, where its case is plainly defective.
