A response, finally:
Penalty Charge Notice: CU74691635
Location: BELSZE LANE NW3
Date: 24/04/2026 at 09:06
Vehicle: MH65RTZ
[Name and address redacted]
29 May 2026
Dear Mr XXXXX
NOTICE OF REJECTION OF REPRESENTATIONS AGAINST PENALTY CHARGE NOTICE
- The London Local Authorities Acts 1990 - 2003
Verification code: 71E611
Contravention code: 52M
Failing to comply with a prohibition on certain types of vehicle (no motor vehicles)
Thank you for your representations received on 19/05/2026 regarding the above Penalty Charge Notice (PCN). Following my investigation I have decided to formally reject your representations for the reasons detailed below.
Firstly, please accept my apologies for the delay in responding to your query and any inconvenience this may have caused. Although we endeavour to respond to all enquiries within our targeted time frame of 10 working days, in this instance it has not been possible.
The enforcement camera recorded your vehicle in Belsize Lane in contravention of the prohibition on certain types of vehicles. This footage has been reviewed by a Civil Enforcement Officer who has confirmed your vehicle was in contravention of the restriction.
You have stated that the penalty charge exceeded the amount applicable in the circumstances of the case and does not comply with section 4(8)(a)(v) of the London Local Authorities and Transport for London Act 2003, however, this does not provide an exemption or sufficient mitigation to cancel the PCN.
The Council does not accept that the PCN is invalid. The PCN must be read as a whole. It correctly states that the penalty charge must be paid before the end of the period of 28 days beginning with the date of the Notice. It also correctly states that if the penalty charge is paid before the end of the period of 14 days beginning with the date of the Notice, the amount of the penalty charge will be reduced by 50%.
The later reference to 28 days beginning with the date of service appears in the part of the PCN dealing with the making of representations and the possible issue of a Charge Certificate. This is consistent with Schedule 1 to the 2003 Act. Schedule 1 paragraph 1(3) provides that the enforcing authority may disregard representations received after the end of 28 days beginning with the date on which the PCN was served. Schedule 1 paragraph 5 further provides that, where no representations are made, the relevant period for service of a Charge Certificate is 28 days beginning with the date on which the PCN was served.
The Council therefore does not accept that the PCN conflates or misstates the statutory scheme. Rather, the PCN sets out the payment period by reference to the date of the Notice, and separately explains the representation and escalation position by reference to the date of service. The reference to date of service does not reduce the period available to the recipient. If anything, it provides additional protection to the recipient, particularly where a postal notice is received after the date printed on the notice.
The Council has also noted the adjudication decisions referred to in your representations. Those decisions are not binding on the Council or another adjudicator, and each case must be considered on its own facts and on the wording of the PCN in question. The Council is satisfied that this PCN, read fairly and as a whole, substantially complies with the requirements of the 2003 Act.
The Council is therefore not satisfied that the penalty charge exceeded the amount applicable in the circumstances of the case.
In relation to this PCN, I have reviewed the CCTV footage which shows your vehicle proceeding past duplicate signage informing drivers of the prohibition on certain types of vehicles. These signs notify drivers that motor vehicles are not allowed to enter Belsize Lane Monday to Friday 8am-9:15am and 3pm-4pm during school term time and I am satisfied that the signs are sufficiently clear to inform motorists of the restrictions in place and these signs are fully compliant with the Traffic Signs Regulations and General Directions 2016. As your vehicle entered the street where the prohibition was in force, a contravention occurred and I am enforcing this PCN.
Certain streets within Camden are restricted to specific types of vehicles, some or all of the time. This is to reduce traffic flow near schools or nurseries and deter drivers from using short cuts through residential areas.
I have included CCTV images below for your reference and enclosed a photograph of the signage at the location. You may also view video footage of the incident online at camden.gov.uk/pcn.
I have considered the comments that you have made in accordance with the requirements of schedule 1 of the London Local Authorities Act 1990 - 2003 and for the reasons outlined above I am satisfied that a contravention occurred. We will accept the discount rate of £80.00 if received within 14 days from the date of this letter. After this period the charge will revert to £160.00 and this amount will apply to any further correspondence or an appeal to the Environment and Traffic Adjudicators.
Yada, yada...
Camden’s rejection is more or less as predicted, as it does not really answer the statutory point. It mainly asserts “read as a whole” and “substantial compliance”.
Their rejection appears to have three weaknesses.
First, they wrongly characterise the point as if it were asking for “an exemption or sufficient mitigation”. It is neither. It is a statutory validity argument. The point is that the PCN failed to include mandatory information required by section 4(8)(a)(v).
Second, they accept the PCN must be read as a whole, but then avoid the core issue. Section 4(8)(a)(v) requires the PCN to state that if the penalty is not paid before the end of “the 28 day period”, an increased charge may be payable. “The 28 day period” refers back to section 4(8)(a)(iii), namely 28 days beginning with the date of the notice. Camden’s PCN does not state that. Their response says the payment period is correctly stated elsewhere, but that is not the same as stating the mandatory section 4(8)(a)(v) warning.
Third, Camden’s reliance on Schedule 1 is the argument as expected, but it is not a complete answer. Schedule 1 explains when a Charge Certificate may be served. Section 4(8) prescribes what the PCN itself must state. Camden are effectively saying that because their later enforcement wording is consistent with Schedule 1, it does not matter that the mandatory wording required by section 4(8)(a)(v) is absent or misstated. That should be the issue for the adjudicator.
I will ask the Keeper whether they are prepared to risk the additional £80.
Chalko gives this point a real chance.
Barnet gives the broader High Court principle. I understand that it is still not guaranteed, because the adjudicator may accept Camden’s “read as a whole/substantial compliance” argument.
How does this sound for the London Tribunals appeal:
Appeal against Notice of Rejection
PCN CU74691635
Ground: The penalty charge exceeded the amount applicable in the circumstances of the case
I appeal on the ground that the penalty charge exceeded the amount applicable in the circumstances of the case.
This is not a mitigation appeal. It is a statutory validity appeal. The PCN fails to comply with section 4(8)(a)(v) of the London Local Authorities and Transport for London Act 2003.
Section 4(8)(a)(iii) requires the PCN to state that the penalty charge must be paid before the end of the period of 28 days beginning with the date of the notice. Section 4(8)(a)(v) then requires the PCN to state that, if the penalty charge is not paid before the end of “the 28 day period”, an increased charge may be payable.
The reference to “the 28 day period” plainly refers back to the 28-day period identified in section 4(8)(a)(iii), namely the period of 28 days beginning with the date of the notice.
The Camden PCN does not state that mandatory information. Instead, it states:
“If you fail to pay the Penalty Charge or make representations before the end of a period of 28 days beginning with the date of service of this notice an increased charge of £240 may be payable…”
That is materially different. It substitutes “date of service” for “date of the notice” and conflates the payment period with the separate period for making representations. The PCN therefore fails to state the mandatory information required by section 4(8)(a)(v).
The Council’s Notice of Rejection does not cure the defect. It says the PCN should be read as a whole and that the reference to 28 days beginning with date of service is consistent with Schedule 1. That misses the point. Schedule 1 deals with when a Charge Certificate may be served. Section 4(8) deals with what the PCN itself must state. Compliance with one provision does not excuse non-compliance with the other.
The Council also states that the date-of-service wording gives additional protection to the recipient. Again, that is not the statutory test. The issue is not whether the recipient was given a longer practical period before escalation. The issue is whether the PCN stated the mandatory information required by section 4(8)(a)(v). It did not.
I rely on Joanna Chalko v London Borough of Havering, case reference 2250426286. In that case, the adjudicator allowed an appeal on the same section 4(8)(a)(v) point, finding that the difference between “date of the notice” and “date of service” could lead to miscalculation of the relevant period and that the collateral challenge succeeded.
I also rely on R (London Borough of Barnet) v The Parking Adjudicator [2006] EWHC 2357 (Admin). Although that case concerned an earlier statutory regime, the principle is directly applicable. Where the statutory scheme prescribes mandatory PCN content, compliance is required. The High Court rejected the argument that absence of prejudice could cure non-compliance.
The Council says the tribunal decisions relied on are not binding. I accept that London Tribunals decisions are not binding on another adjudicator. However, Chalko is directly persuasive because it concerns the same statutory provision and the same date-of-notice/date-of-service defect. Barnet is High Court authority and supports the proposition that mandatory statutory requirements cannot simply be disregarded on a “no prejudice” or “substantial compliance” basis.
Accordingly, the PCN was not compliant with section 4(8) of the 2003 Act. No valid penalty charge was lawfully demanded. The penalty charge therefore exceeded the amount applicable in the circumstances of the case and the appeal should be allowed.
Any views from the experts?
